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Dedication
This work is dedicated to the many members of the Fire, Paramedic, Police and other 
rescue services who gave their lives at the World Trade Center, New York City, 
Tuesday 11th September 2001 when organisational sensemaking broke down in the 
most tragic of circumstances.
Abstract
This thesis explores the way leadership, in a variety of organisations from the public 
and private sectors attempts to stimulate and sustain adaptive change.
By conducting research in new empirical settings we try to understand how people 
who live their working lives within organisations understand their environments at 
times of change through a process of sensemaking, a concept that will form the 
cornerstone of our work.
We suggest that the creation and transfer of meaning through knowledge, language 
and symbolic activity by leadership at times of change can be identified as 
sensegiving, an active process that both follows and precedes sensemaking. Further 
more we suggest that attempts to bring about adaptive change in organisations can 
be enhanced by leaders recognising the value of incorporating future perfect thinking 
and requisite variety into the sensegiving process.
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A personal note: of boys with books and men with motorcycles
‘It is a great pity to read a book too soon in life. The first 
impression is the one that counts; and if it is a slight one, it 
may be ail that can be hoped for. A later and second 
perusal may recoil from a surface already hardened by 
premature contact. Young people should be careful in their 
reading, as old people in eating their food. They should not 
eat too much. They should chew it well.’
(Churchill, 1934, p.14)
When the author of this work as an eighteen-year-old motorcyclist and fan of former 
World Motorcycle Racing Champion Barry Sheene ('Mr Motorcycle' - until he hit the 
tarmac at Daytona without motorcycle: travelling at 165 M.P.H.), heard about a new 
book release at W.H.Smith’s - Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (Pirsig, 
1974), it was an automatic ‘must have’! The book was duly purchased -  a great title 
and one that appeared to fit the times, but it didn't have much about motorcycles or 
their maintenance in the first couple of chapters and was eventually consigned to the 
attic.
Twenty-five years later (with twenty-five year old motorcycle gathering dust in the 
garage!) and three teenage children with whom the odd 'journey’ had been 
experienced, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance made sense as a metaphor 
to someone who had done a bit of living. Different then from the first and second 
sittings when any meaning appeared abstract and even obtuse.
Having returned to the book, it is possible to see how Peters and Waterman (1982) 
were able to lift ‘simple-even beautiful-values' (p.37) from the text. Yet to this author 
at least it remains a book that takes some understanding and some living.
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For the author, the nine years covered by this work (subject to a gap of two years) 
seemed, at the time, confusing, disjointed and lacking direction - save the focus of 
noting the activity of executive groups in what appeared to be periods of change. 
There was no rigid plan rather a broad direction overlaid by experience. W e started 
out with a symptom of change - the contracting out of staff - and followed a winding 
path to the process of sensemaking during adaptive change.
Much of the following work is punctuated by references to the theory of sensemaking 
and the writing of Social Psychologist Karl Weick. For the management 
practitioner/consultant/author of this work - Weick had to be experienced; we had to 
do the walk before we could understand the talk.
Being part of the action, as Churchill (ibid) notes 'chewing slowly', was not just the 
preferred route it was the only route to bridging the gap between theory and practice. 
But then, as Weick would no doubt point out pointedly, sensemaking is not to be 
found in the theory it is to be found in the doing (Weick, 1995).
'...from the perspective of the managers and leaders 
who sit in the eye of the storm, shaping and being 
shaped by it'.
(Champy & Nohria, 1996, p263)
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Section 1:
Root metaphor: Assembling the easel
Pepper (1942), quoted in Mangham (1978) describes a root metaphor in the following 
terms:-
‘A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a 
clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some idea of 
common-sense fact and tries if he cannot understand 
others areas in terms of this one. The original area then 
becomes his basic analogy or root metaphor\
(pp. 1 9 -2 0 )
In the sections that follow we set out our metaphor as one of art, more specifically 
impressionist water-colour painting. This will form a substantial part of our 
description for displaying; laying out and commenting upon the data and it is, 
therefore, our root metaphor to which we will return repeatedly.
The context of change
The Times They Are A-Changin’
For people who have reached 'a certain age' Bob Dylan’s anthem for the sixties 
summed up a context in which the values and attitudes of society underwent a 
radical re-assessment. Something over thirty years later the times are still changing 
although now it is more likely to be the launch (or crash!) of a dot.com organisation 
that takes the headlines rather than shifts in social behaviour.
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It is in the changing times of organisational life that we position this work and it is 
within the process of change in organisations that we focus this work.
For our definition of organisation we agree with the view that they are social 
constructions within which meaning is created, shared and shared out through social 
interaction (Cook & Yanow,1993).
Champy & Nohria (1996) focus on three specific areas that have a strong bearing on 
organisational change: -
Technology, the speed and ease of communication via the Internet, particularly in 
1998 and 1999, that, potentially, re-modelled the selection and buying process for 
goods and services and changed the definition of 'organisation' that no longer 
requires a physical 'bricks and mortar* presence to create value and market 
presence. 'Advances, particularly those in information technology, have made it 
possible to conceive of new kinds of organizing principles that do not depend on co- 
location in time or space' (Schein, 1996, p.235).
Government, the trend towards deregulation, privatisation and creation of economic 
free-trade zones.
Globalisation, the way that advantage is created by locating services or 
manufacturing in geographic locations best able to provide companies with 
competitive advantage - British Airways ticketing administered in India, Mercedes- 
Benz assembling motorcars in South Africa and virtually the whole of the 
manufacturing process for the British toy industry located in China.
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The essence of change was that the principles of classical bureaucracy on which 
many organisations were founded, and where many managers started their careers, 
had given rise to ‘slow-witted’ and ‘flat-footed’ hierarchies no longer appropriate to 
the times. The new call was for faster thinking and more nimble organisations 
(Colville et al 1993), away from strategic planning units sitting above divisional 
structures to flatter decentralised organisational forms (Mintzberg, 1989). Staffed 
with people who could be creative and focused, managers who could be challenging 
and supportive, leaders who provide vision and adapt their organisations to meet 
shifting contexts, this has become the new anthem.
W e are told that the psychological contract has changed (Schein, 1988, Rousseau,
1995). No longer can employees expect a predictable working environment that
guarantees life-long employment and incremental promotion paid for by loyalty.
‘In short, the “new psychological contract” that existed 
when many of these people were recruited may have been 
broken.’
(Wooldridge, 1995)
Now we are told that the old deal is off, we need to take ownership of our careers, be 
prepared to move between organisations and pay for employment by committing 
ourselves to providing consistently high levels of performance; but what about the 
people? : -
‘It is unlikely that they will be relaxing and thinking how 
fortunate they are to have survived the latest cuts. More




Schein (ibid), upped the tempo even more by suggesting that from a macro- 
economic perspective the people are not top of the priority list for Western societies:-
‘The fact that thousands of laid-off employees may be 
suffering economic depravation as a result of worldwide 
“downsizing” is only a small problem when the very 
survival of total organizations and industries is viewed to 
be at issue.’
(p.235)
At the start of this research it was certainly an environment for which a quote from an 
American football star John Ellsworth, who played in the NFL for the New York 
Giants, held resonance.
‘It is high impact. You're crashing into each other at full 
speed. You hope that God will bless you and you will not 
be injured. You try to put yourself in the best physical 
condition so that, if you do get hurt, you will heal quickly. I 
was always taught: everybody's hurt, but not everybody's 
injured.’
(The Times 5th November 1996)
We started this project by looking at the process of contracting out staff, a particularly 
profound symptom of change for workers facing the issue of who was 'core' and who 
was not 'core' to the interests of respective organisations.
This was a period of recession and cutbacks for much of American and European 
industry at a time when Hammer (1990) was extolling the virtues of radically 
changing organisations - and the roles of employees - through the concept of
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Reengineering. However, as we worked with different organisations, we found that 
contracting out was merely a clue to the way organisational sensemaking operated.
Organisations, in the main, recognised that to prosper they required change to 
deliver and meet the expectations of an already changed and more discerning 
customer. Leaving those defined within the generic term leadership to bear the brunt 
of responsibility for bringing about such changes (Peters, 1978, Quinn 1980). This 
brought with it other issues as ‘the basic beliefs, or mind set, of the strategic actor 
tend towards stability, and this inhibits the making of strategic choices which are 
adaptive to new circumstances’ (Child, 1997, p.50).
Rather than try to recreate why certain events had occurred we set a broad direction 
of working with executive groups as they sought to adapt to changes in their 
environment - we watched their problems develop and tried to understand, over a 
period of time, what they were doing -  how they made sense of, and for, themselves 
and their organisations. Much of what we saw, viewed as isolated activities, 
appeared insignificant, paradoxical and confusing; it was only through observing a 
series of processes that sense started to take shape.
We cite organisational change but we do not seek to add to the wider discussions on 
organisational change, we use it as a vehicle for examining the sensemaking 
process. To this end there is no contrast and compare between the various 
proponents of techniques for bringing about organisational change Lewin (1947), 
Kanter (1983), Tichy & Dervanna (1986), Beckhard & Harris (1987), Hammer & 
Champy (1993), Kotter (1996) et al. Instead we take a typology of change described 
by Watzlawick et al (1974) as first-order change. From this we position the 
leadership function and discuss how this might be linked to the sensemaking model
8
at times of change. The active stage, we conclude, being through the creation and 
sharing out of meaning from leadership to the wider organisational community.
Whilst we view the sharing out of meaning as a mixture of symbolism and language 
in the creation of meaning we demonstrate that when cues and clues are not 
reflected in the meanings taken it can cause confusion, disruption and even hostility. 
W e also demonstrate that cues and clues can be constructed retrospectively in order 
to add credibility or coherence to past activity through processes of requisite variety 
and future perfect thinking.
Sensemaking: why is it important?
This work is not about Karl Weick, it is about sensemaking during adaptive change, 
but because Weick provides an important algorithm for sensemaking, he also 
provides a benchmark and we are bound to take heed of his work.
Sensemaking as we detail below is the social processing of information that makes 
‘retrospective sense of the situations in which they [people] find themselves and their 
creations’ (Weick, 1995, p. 15). This concept is understood by examining one of 
Weick’s favourite aphorisms ‘How can I know what I think until I see what I say’ and 
overlaying a sensemaking perspective.
How can I - know what I think - until - I see - what I say
I I I
data ----------► seeing  ► (is) believing
I I I
How can I - make sense - until - I select - the belief (I already hold)
Figure 1.
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Told more simply we might better share understanding of this aphorism by reflecting 
upon the words of the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard (1938):-
'Life must be lived forward, but understood backwards’
(P. 23)
In this way we start to appreciate the retrospective nature of sensemaking; people 
impose beliefs on given situations after which they ‘see’ what they have already 
imposed. If people do not ‘see’ they do not believe and this acts as a form of 
equivocality reduction. Kierkegaard (ibid) suggests that looking forward creates 
paradox and unqualified choice, whereas action qualifies thought and reflection fixes 
and makes it concrete. Something that Weick (1999) cites as an important disjunction 
for theorists and one we shall seek to address:-
‘the gap between living forward with flawed foresight and 
understanding backward with equally flawed but 
mischievously seductive hindsight’
(P-134)
Sensemaking is not decision-making but a prior activity that identifies ‘what the 
decision is really about not what the decision should be’ (Drucker, 1974. p. 467). Its 
importance is the very fact that it is the matter upon which decisions are predicated 
and as such the quality of the sensemaking materially affects the quality of the 
decision-making. It is neither the cause nor the effect of action but the interpretation 
of the former and the enablement of the latter. If ‘seeing is believing’ it reduces 
equivocality (receptiveness to variety) and limits the response repertoire of those 
charged with leadership during adaptive change by limiting belief to existing 
knowledge and reducing the flexibility needed to respond to new or novel
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circumstances. Put another way sensemaking is the basis upon which actors process 
novel situations; an inherent aspect of adaptive organisational change.
Bate (1990), suggests that skilled change agents recognise adaptive emergent 
changes, make them more salient, and reframe them. This is the sophistication of the 
role played by leadership at times of change, to recognise, make sense and reframe 
so that others may make sense (sensegiving), there can be few organisational 
activities more important in these times.
What do we seek to add?
Our principle contribution is not to appropriate then apply the sensemaking model 
outlined by Weick. Given the nature of sensemaking as a low paradigm (Lodahl and 
Gordon, 1972), that we will explore later, such portability and testing would not be 
possible as sensemaking exists only as a conversation, an ongoing retrospective part 
of social processing, we can join in the conversation, we can seek to extend it but we 
cannot appropriate it. This had implications for the research methodology we 
describe and liken to impressionist water-colour painting. We had to be there 
prepared to record events -  then later make sense -  to understand what we had 
seen by seeing what we had described, remembering that sensemaking is defined by 
its activity.
This work cites new empirical settings for sensemaking and searches for instances 
and examples of sensemaking activity by changing locations and settings - much of it 
in the day-to-day activity of our actors, adding to the stock of sensemaking, and out 
of that adding to the range and nature of sensemaking conversations that are 
possible as we seek to extend its philosophy by considering how leadership can use 
requisite variety and future perfect thinking as aspects of the same process. Words
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and activity together constitute sensemaking or to put it in the argot of sensemaking 
this work not only walks the talk it also talks the walk at the same time and therein 
lies our thesis.
The telling
In Section 2: Sensemaking: the school: we detail the sensemaking model and identify 
some of the opinions of Karl Weick, the guiding light for our work, that set him apart 
from some others who contribute to this field of study and research. We acknowledge 
that issues have been raised about Weick’s work some of which we seek to address 
and clarify.
At Section 3: The how: but not as we know it: we discuss the difficulties of fitting 
acceptable methodology onto an activity as problem laden [to observe] as 
sensemaking. In finding an acceptable method of describing the large-scale and 
small-scale imagery necessary to make a convincing case across a variety of 
organisations we utilise the analogy of impressionist watercolour painting. We 
recognise the need for plausibility and complexity and so present our descriptions as 
a collection of canvases, upon which we convey imagery through lightness of touch. 
However we create a bounded platform from which we limit our analysis by viewing 
the data from a model that recognises the differences associated with doing research 
that is general, accurate or simple, we describe this model as our palette from which 
we are then free to mix colour (or in our case words) within defined limits. 
Sensemaking becomes the school through which we can view different contexts and 
interactions.
Section 4: Mixing the palette: we introduce our case studies and the process of 
analysis.
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Section 5: The canvases: applying the brush strokes: these are our case studies. 
We take different perspectives of the sensemaking process from four organisations: 
two public and two private. In keeping with our theme of painting in detail we use 
large, bold strokes to depict the macro activity and fine, delicate strokes to depict the 
micro activity:-
•  Private Banking: Parvin-May
• Service: the Police Force
• Modernising: Foreign & Commonwealth Office Services
• Copyright or Originalright: EMI Recorded Music
Section 6: Comparing hue: a search for contrast and sensemaking: this is the first 
level of analysis - where we compare and contrast the context of our organisations 
and then explain why they might be viewed as being of the school of sensemaking.
Section 7: Different ‘strokes’ for different folks: here we drill down into the detail of 
sensemaking and expand the agenda into leadership (as a generic term) providing 
sensegiving to organisations. We compare the nature and style of strokes as they are 
applied to each of our canvases.
Section 8: Enthinkment/Enactment: in this section we draw a distinction between 
sensemaking that results in physical activity as enactment and sensemaking that 
results in no physical activity -  what we shall describe as enthinkment.
Section 9: Requisite Variety & Future Perfect Thinking: here we look in detail at two, 
apparently, seldom-used techniques, available to those practised in the art of 
sensemaking. We look for examples in the context of our organisations and ponder 
why such techniques are not more widely utilised.
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We go on to consider where this might lead and introduce Sense dropping, 
considering the nature of making sense and adding a twist by combining the 
concepts of requisite variety and future perfect thinking, thus extending the 
sensemaking philosophy. We then extend this line of thought by considering the role 
of leadership in the creation of meaning that is at the heart of organisational 
sensemaking.
Section 10: Wiping down the easel: taking stock: we leave the activity of our
organisations to continue without us. We also hint that the techniques commented 
upon in section 9 may already have followers who have found success in their 




There is more to sensemaking than Karl Weick, but it 
wouldn’t make much sense without him’
(Colville, 1996, p. 152)
What is sensemaking?
Wicker (1992) describes sensemaking as:-
‘a response to continually changing events that emanate 
from both within and beyond the settings that people 
currently occupy. Sensemaking is a dynamic, cyclical 
process linking the ecological environment with the 
psychological processes of attending, acting, interpreting 
and remembering’
(p.189)
Boland (1984), takes this definition further and specifically positions sensemaking as 
an interpretation of prior activity, ‘sense-making assumes management action is a 
continuous, equivocal stream of experience that can only be understood (or made 
sense of) when it is viewed in retrospect’, (p. 869).
Ring & Rands (1989), suggest sensemaking is an interpretive framework for 
understanding confusing data, Waterman (1990) that it is a way to 'structure the 
unknown’ (p. 41). For Louis (1980) ‘Sensemaking can be viewed as a recurring cycle 
comprised of a sequence of events occurring over time  discrepant events or
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surprises, trigger a need for explanation ....for a process through which
interpretations of discrepancies are developed’ (p. 241). Feldman (1989) continues 
this line of thought and positions sensemaking as a method for organisational 
problem solving by identifying ‘what the problems it faces are, and how it should 
resolve them’ (p. 19). Prus’s (1996) description of sensemaking is ‘as meaningful 
linkaging of symbols and activity, that enables people to come to terms with the 
ongoing struggle for existence’ (p.232).
Weick (1995) says that sensemaking is not a metaphor it literally ‘is what it says it is, 
namely, making something sensible’ (p. 16). A process made easier by understanding 
sensemaking as a narrative process: -
'...given mankind’s propensity for inductive generalization, 
noteworthy experiences will often become the empirical 
basis for rules of thumb, proverbs, and other guides to 
conduct. Thus, telling stories about remarkable
experiences is one of the ways in which people try to make 
unexpected expectable, hence manageable’
(Robinson, 1981, p.60)
This view is supported by MacIntyre (1981): -
‘Man is in his actions and practice, as well as his fictions, 
essentially a story-telling animal’
(p.201)
Weick tells us that stories are ‘units of meaning’ (1995, p. 131), it is within those units 
we try and find how such meanings or stories are created and managed.
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The model that is Sensemaking
In his 1995 work Weick provides us with a complete review of sensemaking, as he 
perceives it, by outlining in detail the seven key characteristics of sensemaking 
(p p .17 -62 ).
Sensemaking is understood as a process that is: -
1. Grounded in identity construction
2. Retrospective
3. Enactive of sensible environments
4. Social
5. Ongoing
6. Focused on and by extracted cues
7. Driven by plausibility rather than accuracy
Grounded in identity construction
A real anchor here with the symbolic interaction school of Mead (1956), Blumer 
(1969) and McCall & Simmons (1978), as Weick unravels the complex nature of 
identity processing, ‘who am I who are the others in this interaction’ that he describes 
as: -
‘Identities are constructed out of the process of interaction.
To shift among interactions is to shift among definitions of 
self. Thus the sensemaker is himself or herself an ongoing 
puzzle undergoing continual redefinition, coincident with 





Weick suggests that Schutz’s (1967) analysis of meaningful lived experience laid 
the groundwork for retrospective sensemaking. Which captures ‘the reality that 
people can know what they are doing only after they have done it’ (p.24).
‘When by my act of reflection, I turn my attention to my 
living experience, I am no longer taking up my position 
within the stream of pure duration, I am no longer simply 
living within that flow. The experiences are apprehended, 
distinguished, brought into relief, marked out from one 
another; the experiences which were constituted as 
phrases within the flow of duration now become objects of 
attention as constituted experiences. What had first 
become constituted as a phase now stands out as a full­
blown experience, no matter whether the Act of attention
is one of reflection or reproduction For the Act of
attention -  and this is of major importance for the study of 
meaning -  presupposes an elapsed, passed-away 
experience -  in short, one that is already in the past.’
(Schutz, 1967, p.51)
Weick goes further to argue that ‘time exists in two distinct forms, as pure duration 
and as discrete segments’ (p.25). We capture the gist of this by applying it to the 
processes of adaptive change detailed later in this work. Each takes a snap shot of 
ongoing organisational activity, but then each snap shot constitutes a series of 
smaller activities or interactions.
From this view on retrospect Weick concludes that the generation of meaning is an 
attentional process -  of activity in the past, based upon when meaning took place -
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and memory. As anything that affects memory also affects the sense made of it this 
conclusion heightens the importance of a process we later describe as noticing.
Enactive of sensible environments
Enactment is a term that Weick uses in order to convey the sense that, in 
organisational life, people often produce part of the environment they face, ‘they act, 
and in doing so create the materials that become the constraints and opportunities 
they face’ (p.31).
An example of enactment being the discussion on zero tolerance that follows in our 
case study of the Police. It is a concept given meaning by the enactment of 
politicians who promote the activity and police officers who carry it out. Both these 
phases of the process are enactments and it is worth noting that we have not 
indicated how they are carried out. How the concept is promoted or earned out 
constitutes the enactment and from this perspective it becomes easier to envisage 
that actions can be started, stopped and abandoned -  it remains enactment and 
Weick cautions us to remember that enactment is not limited to creation, ‘the 
socially created world becomes a world that constrains actions and orientations’ 
(p.36). The enacted world is tangible because of the meanings we provide.
Social
For some; Leiter (1980), Ring & Rands (1989), Gioia & Chittipeddi (1991), Wicker 
(1992), sensemaking occurs at both the individual and group levels. However, 
Weick underlines the problem of perceiving sensemaking in organisations as an 
individual act and stresses the social and conversational aspects of the process; 
'sensemaking is grounded in both individual and social activity’ (p.6). He reminds us
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that ‘conduct is contingent upon the conduct of others, whether those others are 
imagined or physically present’ (p.36).
Weick argues cogently here against the notion that sensemaking can in any regard 
be thought of as a solitary activity. He cites Blumer (1969) in reinforcing his view 
that a lack of physical presence or face-to-face interaction does not preclude the 
social influences of sensemaking ‘that is the whole point of the phrase symbolic 
interaction’ (p.40).
Ongoing
‘To understand sensemaking is to be sensitive to the ways in which people chop 
moments out of continuous flows and extract cues from those moments’ (p.43). 
Weick quotes Langer (1989) in pointing out that the world is continuous and 
dynamic, yet we keep resorting to absolute categories that ignore large parts of 
continuity. It is an important moment for us to reflect here that we position a series 
of adaptive changes within four organisations. For each of these we provide an 
artificial start and finish, whereas, in keeping with the basis of ongoing activity, we 
might better describe our narratives as descriptions of ‘flows of actions and words 
....punctuated by events’ (p.45). In our case such events being the processes we 
will describe later.
Focused on and by extracted cues
Weick suggests that it is too easy for people who study sensemaking to identify the 
phenomenon, and that what is seen is more likely to be sense that has already been 
made rather than the making of it. He suggests that researchers need to watch how 
people deal with prolonged puzzles, paradoxes and dilemmas. The elusiveness and
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speed of sensemaking means that we need to be at the point of activity and be 
attuned to the ways in which people notice and extract cues or otherwise reflect 
upon sensemaking that has already happened rather than the process of 
sensemaking.
Our own work started by paying attention to the phenomenon of contracting out. 
With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to see how the allure of the artefact (the result 
of sensemaking, in this case contracting out) can mask the process of sensemaking. 
From this perspective it becomes more difficult to justify second-hand accounts of 
events retold through the sensemaking model as this becomes an interpretation of 
an interpretation. In our own case we followed the ethnographic principles of 
gathering first-hand data -  this led us to research what happened in organisations 
faced with novel adaptive change and this led us to overlay theory onto data not 
data onto theory, which seems the weakness of working with second-hand data in 
the sensemaking field.
Driven by plausibility rather than accuracy
A number of analogies and references are used here by Weick to convey the 
concept that sensemaking is about actors putting together plausible constructs that 
enable them to make sense of what has happened around them with sufficient 
certainty that they are able to respond to stimuli. In so doing he majors on the fact 
that accuracy is secondary to plausibility. There is a link here with the postulate of 
Schutz (1971) for whom the sharing of knowledge as a shared social activity need 
only be ‘of a sufficient coherence, clarity and consistency to give anybody a 
reasonable chance of understanding’ (p.95)
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Weick goes further and suggests that it is only necessary for the reasoning to fit the 
facts; it does not need to be accurate. To illustrate this point he refers to the tale of a 
young lieutenant in the Hungarian army who sent a detachment of soldiers into the 
Alps. They got lost but returned three days later and explained that one of them had 
found a map in his pocket which enabled them to discover their bearings. When the 
lieutenant looked at the map it was of the Pyrenees not the Alps. They were 
animated by confidence or the plausibility of the map (that acted somewhat as a 
touchstone) rather than the accuracy of the map (Weick, 1995. p. 121).
Refining the philosophy of sensemaking
The accepted view appears to be that the roots of sensemaking are to be found in a 
hybrid of the social constructionists; Burger, Luckmann, Schutz and interpretive 
interactionists; James and Mead (Boland.1984). Weick, himself, is somewhat 
dismissive of attempts to discern the theoretical antecedents of sensemaking and 
engage in arguments over its origins preferring instead a view that it is the role of 
theory to fit action, not action to fit theory; he holds that those who study 
sensemaking 'oscillate ontologically because that is what helps them understand the 
actions of people in everyday life' (1995, p.35). This stance echoes Child (1997), 
‘while different theoretical perspectives or paradigms may be irreconcilable in their 
own philosophical terms, when applied to the study of organizational phenomena 
they are not necessarily incommensurable’ (p.44).
For us ontological overlap, or contradiction, is secondary to grasping a fleeting insight 
into the activity of our actors and if that means we use the notion of sensemaking as 
a 'broad church', tolerant of multiple interpretations within an overriding set of 
principles; it does nothing more than reflect the apparent ambiguity and confusion of 
our actors as they use whatever tools come to hand to make sense of their world.
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‘Ontology and epistemology were woven together out of cognitive necessity (Weick, 
2001, p.ix).
‘In the next decade, the most important new sense-making 
tools will be those that help people visualize and stimulate’
(Saffo, 1997, p28)
In the earlier work Weick (1995) quotes the work of Lodahl and Gordon (1972) in 
enumerating the seven levels of paradigm development across scientific fields; in 
ascending order these being: political science, sociology, psychology, economics, 
biology, chemistry and physics. He positions sensemaking as existing within a low 
paradigm and advises us that the paradigm is preserved in the exemplars -  often in 
the form of representative anecdotes.
The problem, of course, in operating within a low paradigm is that we are always 
going to be faced with ambiguity and questions that cannot be bottomed out, a 
situation caught by Geertz (1973) and retold as the experience of working with the 
concept of culture by Bate (1994):-
'There is an Indian story -  at least I heard it as an Indian 
story -  about an Englishman who, having been told that 
the rest of the world rested on a platform which rested on 
the back of an elephant which rested in turn on the back 
of a turtle, asked....what did the turtle rest on? Another 




As with the experience with understanding culture; observers of sensemaking who 
seek the rigor of a higher paradigm to explain its origins and processing may just 
have to live with the ambiguity that sometimes it is turtles all the way down.
Whilst we draw heavily upon the sensemaking model described by Weick (1995) we 
also recognise that his work is not without issue, questions have been raised about 
his model and descriptions of its processing.
Wicker (1992) draws a comparison between Weick’s (1979) earlier work and that of 
Barker (1987) in that Weick’s scheme was intended to explain the functioning of 
organisations, rather than the social groupings in which they take place (behaviour 
settings in Wicker’s terms). A point that Weick concedes himself ‘what was missing 
in the original study is much appreciation of the social, interpersonal, multiple actor 
quality of coordinated activity that characterizes most task performance’ (2001, p. x). 
Context, for Wicker, is taken as being the larger social/physical environment within 
which such activity takes place (p. 169).
If such criticism of Weick’s (1979) work The Social Psychology of Organizing was 
valid then much was done to redress the balance with the model developed for 
Sensemaking in Organizations (Weick, 1995). Indeed the shift in polarity addresses 
Wicker’s concerns and extends the theory into the flux of complex social interaction. 
Kilduff (1996) describes this shift thus:-
'whereas the earlier books [1969,1979] were Weick’s 
attempts to formulate his own approach to organizing 
processes among people, in the new book [1995] Weick 
constrains himself to surveying, summarizing, listing
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quoting, juxtaposing, illustrating, compiling, collecting and 
accumulating1
(P- 246)
A graphic example being provided in the introduction to Sensemaking in 
Organizations (pp. 1-16) and the description of the way in which the theory of the 
battered child syndrome (BCS) was established. The syndrome was dated back to 
1946 when a paediatric radiologist, John Caffey, wrote an article based on six cases 
where parents gave 'histories’ that did not include how injuries, identified through X- 
rays, had occurred. Despite this report and several others in the 1950s awareness 
only changed when in 1961 when a panel entitled The Battered Child Syndrome’ sat 
at the American Academy of Pediatrics to review 749 reported cases. By 1976 with 
enhanced reporting processes in place the reported number of incidents had risen to 
500,000.
This was an ongoing series of actions (children being assaulted), identified in
retrospect, support for which was gained by social interaction. Weick positions BCS
as an example of sensemaking because it involves identity, retrospect, enactment, 
social contact, ongoing events, cues and plausibility, seven properties that we have 
just detailed.
Kilduff (ibid), however, then raises the next issue:-
'Despite Weick's own innovative use of the battered child 
syndrome to illustrate sensemaking, and despite his own 
well-established preference for studies of cognition- 
producing behaviour, he is able to find few examples from 
the published research of a vital sensemaking process 
that derives from or effects our daily lives. And yet this is
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precisely the claim that sensemaking scholars implicitly 
make.'
(P.247)
In this work we offer our own contribution to ameliorating the problem identified by 
Kilduff through citing case studies from the lives of actors within public and private 
sector organisations grounded in the rituals of their daily lives - devoid of major 
calamities; e.g. the large canvases upon which Weick tends to paint his examples of 
sensemaking: the Bhopal chemical leak, (1988), Tenerife air crash (1990) or Mann 
Gulch fire (1993).
There is also an issue with Weick for the practitioner. He utilises simple cues and 
messages, but, in his desire to extend the boundaries of our conceptual 
understanding, simplicity tends to be shrouded in complex indexing that the 
experienced may find ‘brilliantly sustained’ (Mangham, 1995 p. 27) but for others can 
be both difficult to teach and understand. Weick has important things to say to 
managers but he does need translating’ (Colville, 1994, p. 220), a task undertaken in 
large measure by Peters and Waterman (1982) in their defining work: In Search of 
Excellence. We believe that Weick has messages that can inform the practitioner and 
theorist; in this work we try and knit the two together in a way that makes sense for 
both; not only do we walk the talk, we talk the walk, we will see if it is a talk done well.
Van Maanen (1995), states that the purpose of theorising is to provide maps; the 
theory of sensemaking is part of a map of change that enables academics and 
practitioners to navigate through organisational processing and understand better 
how actors make sense of their world. The problem with change is that you never 
know where you are until get there, however, understanding sensemaking helps 
travellers understand how they got there. Whilst our work is grounded in simple
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actions they are simple actions that we link to sensemaking and from which we will 
seek to draw learning by visiting new places.
Weick uses the map analogy to synthesise the sensemaking model into 
organisational activity as we have seen from his tale of soldiers being lost in the 
Alps (p.24).
‘Strategic plans are a lot like maps. They animate and 
orientate people. Once people begin to act (enactment), 
they generate tangible outcomes (cues) in some context 
(social), and this helps them discover (retrospect) what 
is occurring (ongoing), what needs to be explained 
(plausibility), and what should be done next (identity 
enhancement). Managers keep forgetting that it is what 
they do, not what they plan, that explains their success.’
(Weick, 1995, p.55)
When Weick likens maps to strategic plans we need to emphasise that he is not 
saying that maps are similar in direct function to strategic plans but that they are 
similar in indirect function -  both serve to provide ‘an excuse for people to act, learn 
and create meaning’ (Weick, 2001, p. 311)
Starbuck (1993) takes a similar theme emphasising that it is what managers do 
rather than what they plan that explains their success. It is this notion of ‘the doing of 
managing’ (Mangham & Pye 1991) that we feel to be of consequence and it is this 
area of action that we have positioned our research. We reflect activity against the 
sensemaking model largely as described in Weick (1995) and draw down extensively 
from the theory of his earlier work (1969 &1979), adding our own twist to explore 
sensemaking during times of adaptive change by highlighting other aspects of the 
sensemaking arena; requisite variety (a method of treating complex environments
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with equally complicated processing) and future perfect thinking (viewing future 
activities as though they had already occurred).
In his earlier (1979) work The Social Psychology of Organizing Weick concern was 
to formulate his own approach to organising processes among people (Kilduff, 
1996). In this text Weick simplifies the sensemaking process into a clear model: -
Ecological change -> Enactment -> Selection Retention
(The statement of a problem) (Doing something) (Interpreting) (Remembering good ideas)
Figure 2.
Figure 2 above represents Weick’s Enactment Selection Retention (ESR) 
sensemaking framework, he suggests that outcomes can be modelled after it, 
however, then he ponders what the sensitive manager might say; ‘Go ahead and 
do what we’ve decided, but it may not be the whole story, so be open to the 
possibility that our conclusion right now is incorrect’ (p.260). Essentially we are 
drawn to conclude that the world may not be what we thought it was, we may not 
have all the information necessary to make a correct choice and maybe success is 
not always built on previous success. In this way the organisation or a part of the 
organisation may operate in the following manner: -
+ +
Enactment ^  Selection ___________ ^  Retention
Figure 3.
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Weick describes this process as discrediting, or the introduction of randomising to 
improve the adaptability of organising. The problem for organisations is that they 
prefer order and stability (based upon past success) and in Weick’s terms this 
means they tend to prefer plans to maps in the belief that life can be linear and 
predictable.
If sensemaking only occurs when the normal flow of social activity is recognised, 
through discrepant cues (Weick, 1995), organisations become vulnerable to changes 
in their environment when the ground on which they base their selection shifts 
unnoticed as ‘people who select interpretations for present enactments usually see in 
the present what they’ve seen before’ (Weick, 1979,p.201). A view shared by Fischoff 
(1980) ‘While the past entertains, ennobles, and expands quite readily, it enlightens 
only with delicate coaxing’ ( p.335).
Having concluded early on that the sensemaking model literally made sense of the 
data we had started to collect, we were able to focus on key aspects. Firstly we 
needed to regard sensemaking as an interpretation of symbols or cues and 
memory/history as a series of previously interpreted symbols or cues. This enabled 
us to focus on the process of sensemaking; we knew where to look and from our 
data we were able to identify a profusion of contradictions, unforeseen outcomes and 
frustrated actors. We had to be careful at this point for as Weick (2001) points out 
‘symbols carry only partial information that needs to be verified by other means’ 
(p.449) and so, having confirmed the basic tenets of the sensemaking process by 
watching it at work, we then had to ask the question ‘but what does this mean for 
organising and leadership that is doing its best to make sense of an unpredictable 
world?’ We had to return to the field in order to drill down and confirm our initial 
impressions and then consider linking the data to theory that could inform practice.
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Starbuck & Milliken (1988, a) describe the causal sequence whereby good and bad 
outcomes inform retrospective explanations that are often flawed by over 
determinism:-
‘Because retrospective analyses oversimplify the
connections between behaviours and outcomes,
prescriptions derived from retrospective understanding 
may not help executives who are living amid current 
events.’
(p.36)
They are suggesting that retrospective explanations of past events encourage 
academics to overstate the contributions of executives and the benefits of accurate 
perceptions or careful analyses. This became an area where we strove to shed 
some light through use and extension of the sensemaking model by watching the 
unfolding of events over long periods of time. We had, for practical purposes, to call 
a halt to our data collection but experience taught us events that appeared easy to 
categorise and trace to their origins often revealed influence that appeared absent 
upon first or second reading. If we were to make sense for the academic and 
practitioner we had to start with the practical common sense activities of our actors, 
reflect and abstract that activity through the sensemaking model (we will describe 
this later as common sense of a higher order) and return it to the practical common 
sense of the practitioner, it is to the way this journey was undertaken we now turn.
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Section 3:
The how: but not as we know it
‘....science is rooted in what I have just called the whole 
apparatus of common sense thought. That is the datum
from which it starts, and to which it must recur You may
polish up common sense, you may contradict it in detail, 
you may surprise it. But ultimately your whole task is to 
satisfy it.’
(Whithead, 1929, p. 110 quoted 
in Heider, 1958, p.6)
Bate (1994) warns us against the dangers of determining a beginning or an end to 
organisational processes when discussing organisational change in these post 
modem days; yet we tell stories based upon the principle of a beginning, a middle 
and an end -  though not necessarily in that order! In our introduction we have 
shaped the ambiguity of our beginning, later we talk about the bit in the middle and 
finally the point at which we step out of the stream [of events] -  which is as close to 
an ending as we feel comfortable making.
Convention may demand that we submit to the scrutiny of detailing how we gathered 
our story together and attempted to make sense of it -  an interesting point in its own 
right as Weick would no doubt say that we are enacting our own demands and our 
own rigour -  interesting... but not for today. We therefore lay bare the ambiguity that 
is the how we detailed our story.
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The purpose of this section is to:-
•  illustrate the settings of sensemaking that we have chosen
•  relate the journey that we took
•  detail the philosophical and practical difficulties that we encountered
•  advance the analogy of impressionist watercolour painting as an appropriate 
metaphor through which to detail our case studies
•  explain the means of analysis
• set out our proposition for extending current theory
In 1991 the author was -  and still is - employed as a business consultant working 
across a wide variety of disciplines and organisations with access to high level 
decision-making groups. It was at this time, whilst working for IBM, that ‘contracting 
out’ took our interest. An application was made and accepted to research this 
phenomenon for a Ph.D. and we started to gather data from host organisations in the 
private sector: IBM, Sainsbury’s, Norwich Union and others.
The process conformed to the methodology advocated by Glaser’s (1992) approach 
to grounded theory, in which the researcher engages the subject without pre-existing 
ideas or frameworks. After a year of gathering data in piles of tapes and notes the 
dryness and limited appeal of the work kicked in and it became apparent that 
‘contracting out’ was the detritus of another process, the leftovers of prior activity. 
Painfully numbing though it was for those who lost their employment, it was not for 
us. This, together with business, family commitments and flagging interest, resulted 
in the project being abandoned.
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In 1994, with the benefit of some gentle coaxing from the author’s supervisor Ian 
Colville, more than one or two pints of fine ale and any number of stimulating 
conversations (Colville looking aghast at the general deportment of corporate guests 
in the hospitality suite at Bath Rugby Ground and enquiring of them ‘what do you do, 
why -  how does that work? Then responding in kind, but with disarming frankness - 
me? I’m a friend of Mike’s I’m only here for the free beer and food’) we set off again.
We set off this time looking for how events happened not what events happened, 
more interested in how the journey developed rather than where we were going. 
'Sensemaking is about continuation, journeys rather than destinations’ (Weick, 2001, 
p. 176). Data was gathered but with a distinct difference -  the search was on for 
further examples of organisational surprise, shock, confusion and disturbance that 
had led us to contracting out in the first place as the principal focus, the output being 
of secondary importance and indeed evidence that we were too late in the process.
Crucially it was also decided not to overstate the position as researcher but rather to 
retain the primary role as business consultant and when activity took our interest to 
consider extending the remit into a more ethnographic role in order to follow through 
the processing of the activity that we had noted. Schein (1987) distinguishes 
ethnographic and clinical methodologies as distinct methods of inquiry each of which 
involves different forms of: initiation (client led in the case of consultant and 
researcher led in the case of ethnographer), access (consulting tends to be on behalf 
of more powerful actors able to grant wide ranging movement, ethnographers tend to 
get what they are given) and knowledge of what is really going on (consultants get 
the backstage issues because they are paid to help by understanding cause and 
effect, ethnographers are more often than not presented with front stage activity 
which may or may not reflect reality). Schein summarises the key difference thus:
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‘It is easier for the clinician [consultant] with access at the 
top to learn what the impact of high-level decisions is at 
the lower levels than it is for ethnographers who see life in 
the middle or at the bottom of an organization to infer and 
decipher what decisions may have been made at the top 
that led to what they observe’
(p.44)
For the majority of the time we occupied the role of consultant but celebrated the 
access this gave us rather made excuses for it, naturally this raised ethical issues 
that we comment upon later in this section it also meant that when we wanted to 
move into more detailed inquiry we had to adopt the ethnographic role and seek the 
usual permissions. Access was easily obtained although > as we detail later -  it was 
not always fruitful. Rather than occupy either consultant or ethnographer role as 
detailed by Schein (ibid) our method of inquiry was situated in more of a twilight zone 
of mainly consultant and partly ethnographer.
In this way we went back to the field a little more certain of our intent. Whilst one 
search was on another commenced and this time is was to consider a framework 
through which to consider our data -  this led us to the sensemaking perspective that 
appeared to fit the data.
Having walked around with the sensemaking model taking root in our consciousness, 
as a principal tool of analysis our methodology swung closer to Corbin’s (1990) 
approach to research, which allows for the use of existing theory to guide the data 
collection. In reality this entailed being ‘live’ to opportunities and then -  when spotted 
-  following their trail. This could lead to the researcher being thought of as being too 
close to the action and the data being too live. To counter this argument (and maybe 
it is one we are having with ourselves) we see sensemaking akin to spotting smoke
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on the horizon, by the time you get to the source what you actually saw has drifted 
out of sight or dispersed, to be replaced by something else -  but not the same. 
Sensemaking - as a process - really is something that needs to be identified at 
source if the richness of the process is to be appreciated and experienced. We mixed 
our focus of sensemaking from the referent of closeness and touch to the referent of 
distance and context -  the individuals at work to organisations at work.
A contradiction of terms?
‘Organizational theorists bite off too little too precisely 
and we’ve tried to encourage them to tackle bigger 
slices of reality’
(Weick, 1979, p.234).
Denzin (1994) describes 'thin description’ as ‘simply the reporting of facts, 
independent of intentions or circumstances’ (p.505). Thick description’ on the other 
hand 'states the intentions and meanings that organized the experience’ (ibid). The 
work we carried out here attempted to embrace the thoughts of Weick (above) without 
spreading ourselves too thinly or too thickly! For us the importance of our work was to 
know the lives of those we describe in sufficient detail that we can confirm in a 
piausible way, from a sensemaking perspective, what is going on -  in order to be able 
to put ‘in place a set of ideas and ways of seeing that may generate additional 
findings and different styles of finding’ (Weick, 1979, p.234). In so doing we are 
acutely aware that ours is an (not the only) understanding of events (Czarniawska- 
Joerges, 1997). Again we emphasise that we are seeking a plausible link between the 
models of sensemaking and our own thoughts enabling the agenda to be taken 
seriously and forward rather than attempting to prove the theory of sensemaking. As 
such we agree with Guba (1990), that reality can be approximated but never fully
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apprehended. This gives our audience something of a problem as identified by 
Mintzberg (1973):
‘....the reader is asked to show great faith in his [the
researcher’s] honesty and reliability  Can we be
sure that the researcher captures all parts of the job, or 
just what interests him or catches his attention?’
(P-191)
On Mintzberg’s first point we agree, some faith, or at the very least suspension of 
disbelief, is required in order to engage the research - but this is the case with all 
research even of a high paradigm (Robbins & Johnston, 1976, Collins & Pinch, 1982). 
On his second point we do not recognise this as being a weakness. We were 
interested in behaviours that caught our attention, i.e. they informed the sensemaking 
process which, after all is a low paradigm, not it should be emphasised, as a form of 
tokenism but certainly where interpretation and data could happily co-exist; ‘a 
bricolage, a complex, dense, reflexive, collage like creation that represents the 
researcher’s images, understandings, and interpretations of the world’ (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994, p.3).
In the knowledge that the coherence of our case stands or falls by the fragile nature 
of its resonance with our audience, we felt it important to note at the onset (above) 
the distance we have travelled from a traditional research route. Before we go into 
the process of gathering and fit it into [or up] established referents we need to add a 
further issue. The data was gathered live, that is to say, it was information gathered 
in the course of routine organisational activity. It only became data when we called it 
data -  we, and only we, enacted that process, and, as we have seen, enactment is 
the result of sensemaking -  it happens after the event. This caused us problems -  
not least of which being the attempt to seek permission from our actors to gather
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information or more accurately to classify information already gathered (in the 
course of consulting) as data.
W e had a difficult proposition to sell if we were to tell the ‘whole truth’ as we 
discovered with a police chief superintendent on one occasion:-
‘Have you seen any yet?’
’Seen any what?’
‘Sensemaking’
*1 am not sure how to answer that’
‘I can its all a load of bloody nonsense if you ask me’
The problem with sensemaking is that not only is it hard to see [in process], 
because it is too obvious, it is difficult to explain, because it is too simple -  
something akin to an ‘in joke’ that involves some kind of unmasking, illumination or 
short-cut to understanding, but only if you are in can you share the joke. The 
plausibility of sensemaking being regarded as nonsense, as a research topic to the 
field being all too apparent, yet within this dilemma much of our work dwells. Schutz 
(1964) differentiates common sense and infers what Munroe (1955) describes as 
common sense of a high order. To the chief superintendent our interest fell outside 
of his pragmatic ready-made constructs for understanding action (common sense), 
we were aiming to explain the structure of the social world (or at least a small part of 
it) for which reason may also be taken for granted (again common-sense but of a 
high order). The notion of sensemaking may be simple but this does not make it 
simplistic, neither does it make it easy to explain for as Wittgenstein (1968) warns 
us the things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity 
and familiarity.
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In the event the deliberate research trawls (as ethnographer) were the least 
productive and resulted in [our opinion] the least informative data. It was, invariably, 
unexpected moments that took us by surprise when the most illuminating material 
was gathered. Hardly the stuff of high paradigm research -  but very real and this is 
our point it was not our role to create activity but to be there, record and reflect.
As a consequence, data was gathered over a six year period, from a variety of
public and private organisations with the following levels of commitment and
knowledge of the actors: -
•  No knowledge -  we were there for business purposes, research would not 
have been tolerated
•  Implicit knowledge -  we were associated with a research project and 
individuals realised that some activity was noted for ‘other purposes’
•  Explicit organisation knowledge -  but ‘do not tell them [the actors]’
•  Explicit organisation and individual knowledge
Overlaid upon this is equal diversity in the commitment to publication that ranged 
from (effectively) ‘publish and be damned’ (the Police), to ‘lock it up and throw away 
the key’ (we cannot quote the source - that was the other demand!).
So intertwined was the data that we have had to face an initial dilemma namely the 
ethical issue caught well by Punch ‘...how honest do you actually have to be about 
your research purpose?’ (1994, p.80). Would access have been allowed anyway? 
Would the interviews have been as wide ranging? Could time have been spent within 
the organisations observing normal business activity? Would these 
organisations/actors have permitted some of the information that was gained to be
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used, even in an unpublished Ph.D. thesis? The answers being yes, maybe and no in 
equal measure.
One of the high street retailers, as a matter of standard business practice, levied a 
charge on other organisations for just quoting their name. The bureaucratic swamp 
of negotiations necessary to fulfil the researchers requirements and the control 
safeguards for many of the research sites would have consigned the research to the 
‘too hard to do pile’ - for as Punch also puts it ‘divulging one’s identity and research 
purpose to all and sundry - will kill many a project stone dead’ (ibid p.90). This may 
be a cop out but it is also fact. In the event we have gone with what we have and 
built in the safeguard of changing the names of the individuals, one small 
organisation and restricting access to this thesis for three years. Not a perfect 
solution but one that we could live with. We crossed and re-crossed the boundaries 
of research and practice to the point that the stories we tell are as much about us -  
the researchers - as about our actors, we were there together, if further comfort is 
needed we find it with Weick (1995): -
'Research and practice in sensemaking needs to begin 
with a mindset to look for sensemaking, a willingness to 
use one’s own life as data, and a search for those 
outcroppings and ideas that fascinate’
(p. 191)
Our use of the personal pronoun we rather than I is worthy of further clarification. At 
the beginning of this thesis we described the journey taken by the author, however, 
this was not a journey travelled alone, it involved others and it evolved through 
others. The purpose of using we is so as not to disassociate ourselves from what has 
been a social activity, whether that be the direct support of the project supervisor, 
discussions with the actors -  or indeed discussions within ourselves. At one level, we
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therefore lay claim to the literal interpretation of working with and through others in 
the generation of this work at another level we acknowledge Mead et al of the 
symbolic interactionist school that within social settings we are determiners of and 
are determined by the actions of others.
Van Maanen (1988) takes the view that we engenders distance from data: ‘a studied 
neutrality’ (p.47), whereas I engenders closeness to data, in another life the author 
was a serving police officer well attuned to the presenting of evidence where I was 
used as a clinical disassociation of self from others intended to protect evidence from 
anecdotes and hearsay. We have no such desires, neither are we bound by the rules 
of evidence; the pronoun suits our purpose and intent just fine.
In the end we understand the underlying principle that the researcher has a 
responsibility to both actors and audience alike. For which Glaser and Strauss 
(1974) counsel the researcher to ‘sort his values and obligations and weigh them 
repeatedly’ (p. 61). We weighed them heavily and repeatedly.
In the ‘real world’ (wherever that may be) sitting around organisations waiting for 
something to happen is not likely to create any great understanding or opportunity 
especially if, when asked 'what is it you are hoping to identify' all you can say is - 'I’ll 
know it when I see it’. Our first task was to understand the organisations that we 
visited -  to be able to share and be in their jokes, dress the part, talk the part but not 
go native. We then attuned ourselves to the sounds of gathering sensemaking 
action, some were more obvious -  large scale organisational change, others were 
more subtle requiring a careful and informed eye to the horizon but often it was a 
case of being in the right place at the wrong time (unless you like surprises) and 
having a ‘tool kit’ ready to go.
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The tool kit
We started with the data and returned to the data, we started with common sense 
and we returned to common sense. We immersed ourselves in, and grounded our 
perspective from, first-hand data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). However, we were 
always aware that we straddled the divide of participator in and observer of our host 
organisations’ activities (Spradley, 1980). The problem for us being that it was only 
after the event -  (and sometimes a long-time after the event at that) - we knew 
whether we were participant or observer or both. Again, here we turn to 
sensemaking ‘How can I know what I value until I see where I walk?’ (Weick, 1995, 
p.183).
How can I - know what I value - until - I see - where I walk
I I
data  ► seeing  ► (is) valuing
How can I - make sense - until - I select - the value (I already hold)
Figure 4.
In Kierkegaard’s (op cit) terms how could we place a specific value and reference on 
action until we looked back (however imperfectly) and set it alongside what we 
deemed to be other examples of sensemaking activity.
Whilst in our case studies imagery is applied quickly we had realised, at the time, 
this would only be possible from protracted periods of observation from which small 
vignettes could be seen to be representative of the context, otherwise our
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presentation of sensemaking would become a caricature providing nothing more 
than distorted imagery. For good order and discipline (i.e. we learnt from our 
mistakes) note taking was prolific, and habit forming but also a strain; listening to 
content but detailing interpretations of process -  how is the respondent taking 
meaning, what information are they drawing upon, what sense are they making?
We have relied heavily upon the data collected by one researcher and recognise the 
consequential issues of objectivity. Whilst vulnerable to such a question we mitigate 
in our own defence. Ideally we would have worked with the full cross-referencing of 
a dual-researcher (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Two key problems emanate here, 
firstly, as we have discussed already, we did not know when it was going to happen. 
Secondly, even if we had, access would have been limited to the sites where the 
actors were fully engaged with the research and there were not many of those, once 
again Schien’s (1987) point that access is easier for the consultant than the 
ethnographer is relevant.
As compensation the following points are worthy of note. Colville (1985, 1989) had 
already researched extensively into the Police and whilst not the insider/outsider 
method proposed by Evered & Louis (1981), Bartunek & Louis (1996) we identified 
(rather unkindly, or so he claimed!) a fellow consultant, working for the Foreign 
Office, a former senior civil servant, who stood accused of ‘going native’ (by his own 
words not out of his own words). As suggested by Bartunek & Louis (ibid), he was a 
person who tended to attribute workplace problems to organisational arrangements 
rather than to the actions of the people themselves, this was fine as it made us 
qualify our thinking and forestalled us from taking activity for granted (in a perverse 
way we did not take for granted issues we knew he had).
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Context building took place through the face to face interviewing of staff, the 
collection and assimilation of published material, press coverage, access to 
electronic mail messaging, event planning and delivery, observation of board 
meetings and training programmes. The minimum period of time we had contact 
with any of the organisations cited here being 3 years -  the longest being 5 years. 
Whilst these periods could not be described as pure immersion time, considerable, 
dense, contact time was spent with all the organisations to the point that significant 
social and business contacts were established - and still endure - with many of our 
actors.
Analysis
In developing our understanding of the organisations we worked within we set our 
data against a first level of analysis based upon Pettigrew’s (1985a) contextualist 
model of organisational change, divided into the categories of context, process, and 
outcome (detailed fully in section 6).
Pettigrew (ibid) makes the point that given the types of problems and kinds of 
questions asked by qualitative researchers are, by their nature, likely to be more 
indefinite it is unreasonable to expect them to conform to the procedures adopted by 
researchers engaged with quantitative approaches. Nevertheless, this does not 
absolve the qualitative researcher from the responsibility of trying to describe what 
they have done (p.286).
Use of the Pettigrew model allows us to address the point made by Weick (1995, 
2001), and Mintzberg (1989) that diagnosis of a system has to take account of the 
environment in which it operates, a duality that creates and limits meaning.
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Having determined the broad outlines of context for our case study organisations we 
then take the notion of adaptive change (one designed to bring about a specific 
organisational change and outcome) to ask: ‘How does sensemaking appear to 
operate in these very different sites during times of adaptive change and how might 
the concept of sensemaking better inform the decision-making of our actors?’
In order to break into this cycle we separate out sensemaking and define it within 
the constraints of adaptive change -  not routine activity. To assist with this process 
we start Weick’s (1979,1995) model of sensemaking and then extend it into the 
enhancement of an active process described by Gioia & Chittipeddi (1991) as 
sensegiving -  the point where leadership can attempt to exert influence upon an 
organisation. Sensegiving for us is broken down into: knowledge, symbols and 
language. We identify characteristics of these qualities in each of the organisations 
as they impact upon the adaptive change process. We then add a further level of 
analysis by viewing the adaptive change process through the concepts of future 
perfect thinking and requisite variety in order to clarify the ways in which our actors 
have shaped the sensegiving phase.
W e add to the philosophy of sensemaking by suggesting that whilst meeting 
equivocality with equivocality (requisite variety) is an important processing function 
of good sensemaking that may appeal to an expansionist perspective, future perfect 
thinking (a method of refining activity into probable outcomes by planning from the 
future) may appeal to a reductionist perspective. Our contention will be that the two 
are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive. Taken together they can aid the 
sensemaking and sensegiving process at times of adaptive change.
44
Presentation: Art but not for arts sake.
Our methodology was one of qualitative research but one that was ‘sensitive to the 
value of the multimethod approach’ (Denzin & Lincoln, p.4) so that nothing was 
dismissed for want of strict adherence to ‘the cannons of rigor1 (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967, p.224) of a single methodology, rather the various data were stored for later 
consideration. Whilst we would assert our claim to the generation of theory from the 
data we cannot claim that it had been 'systematically gathered and analyzed’ 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p.273), we gathered but seldom did we do so with a stated 
outcome in mind. How could we when much of what has caused us to synthesise 
data into theory has been rooted in the notation of ‘boring little stories’ (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977) across a wide range of organisations, many of which only made 
sense once we had revisited them in the light of information gathered elsewhere.
At mid point of this research we had recognised the difficulty of describing activity 
from our case studies in a manner capable of sustaining the need for both context 
and complexity. We had seen, and wanted to say a lot yet we had to narrow the 
information down to providing context and complexity where necessary, and give 
impetus to adding to the sensemaking model. Whilst the description might be simple 
it would also need to be capable of sustaining scrutiny without compromise to the 
notion of superficiality. For this reason the medium had to be convincing and 
enduring.
We liken our delivery style to that found in impressionist watercolour painting where 
the artist attempts to deliver an interpretation of ongoing activity to his audience.
Van Maanen (1988), contrasts the ethnographic styles of realist and impressionist 
presentation of data. He comments that the realist will distance him or herself from
45
the activity of the actors in order to gain some form of critical or objective distance 
between the data and author of the narrative. The impressionist, on the other hand, 
conveys a highly personalised perspective of everyday scenes the skill (using the 
metaphor of art) being to enable the audience to see what the artist sees (p. 101).
It is not our intention to debate, at length, management as art -  but, if management 
can be enacted as a form of art then we contend the possibility of it being depicted in 
an artistic way and there is some support for both positions: -
Chester Barnard noted, in discussing management, that:
The terms pertinent to it are ‘feeling,’ ‘judgement,’
‘sense,’ ‘proportion,’ ‘balance,’ ‘appropriateness,’ It is a 
matter of art rather than science.’
(1938/1968 p.235)
We would merely liken Barnard’s comments to those applicable to the evaluation of a 
performance where empathy for the orientation of the subject has more to do with 
creativity than wholly objective analysis. If Barnard regards management as an art 
form Morgan (1986) takes the interpretation as an art form, ‘Effective managers and
professionals in all walks of life have to become skilled in the art of ‘reading’
the situations that they are attempting to organise or manage’ (P.11). And closer still 
to where we are heading; Denzin (1994) ‘I call making sense (italics added) of what 
has been learned the art of interpretation’ (p. 500). The art we hope to use is that of 
processing and displaying the content of our observations. ‘There is real artistry and 
imagination in creating and telling a story’ (Mangham & Pye op cit p.124). Here, the 
researcher is seen as finessing interpretation with the audience seen as part of a 
collaborative process, that is, we provide the story but we may ask our audience to 
provide the imagination and extend the plausibility. Who, whilst not necessarily in
46
accord with the interpretation, are at least offered the opportunity of exploring their 
own meanings.
‘[Krieger] paints that history with the loving brush of one 
who knew the culture, was part of it, and wants to. 
describe it in a way that neither destroys the uniqueness 
of the radio station, demeans the lives involved in it nor 
compromises the standards of a professional social 
scientist. It is not an easy task.’
(March,1992, p.9)
Krieger uses ‘thick description’ in her detailed account of the rise and fall (and rise 
again) of a San Francisco radio station in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. Yet, by 
her account, reduced an 800 page doctoral dissertation down to a 300-page 
textbook that tells a series of stories within a story. March offers further comment; 
‘without artifice and pseudonym, it tells a story; and it tells it well’ (p.9). In 
releasing the text Krieger has, in an art form, created an abstract capable of 
multiple audience interpretations all of which can make sense without the need for 
inducted conclusions.
Krieger paints a very large single canvas, we choose to paint a series of small 
canvases by providing plausible accounts of activity, emphasising the perspective 
of sensemaking. Plausibility accentuated through the extension of our analogy into 
watercolour painting. In the style of Weick we particularise not generalise (Van 
Maanen, 1995) sensemaking by drawing attention to the repeated phenomenon in 
shifting contexts.
‘I feel that the artist’s job is to get the essence of the 
scene, cutting out superficial detail and putting down on 
paper a distillation to transmit to the audience, be it a 
morning mist on the river or a hot, sunny, cafe scene. This
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actually means taking the audience into partnership, 
treating them like intelligent people and letting them use
some of their own imagination too.................. To me, that is
impressionism in watercolour.’
(Ranson 1984)
A description somewhat removed then from what Leonard (1977) describes as a 
‘zeal for description’ (p.3) where detail is detailed for the sake of detail.
Of the mediums available to artists the most demanding is that of watercolour; a 
technique with which there is very little room for mistakes. The translucent nature of 
the imagery gives one opportunity to engage activity in a convincing manner or throw 
the canvas away. Oils and acrylics are very much more forgiving; make a mistake- 
cover it over (as x-rays of many of the great masters works have shown). Our parallel 
here is that we do not rely upon multiple indexing and cross-referencing to hammer 
the point. Rather ours is a form of impressionism to be found in the whole, not in the 
detail.
Ranson’s comments as artist are given further expression by those of Meredith as 
social scientist in a poem quoted in Weick (1995): -
‘Language, the dark-haired woman said once, is like 
water-color, it blots easily, you’ve got to know what 
you’re after, and get it on quickly.’
(p.197)
As a framework for viewing life we would suggest that the metaphor works. It enables 
each canvas to represent individual studies that can be imbued with contrast through 
subtle combinations of tone and hue. We take further note of Meredith who goes on
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to warn us not to allow our contrasts to run together they ‘must not be allowed to. 
They’re what you see with. Keep your word-hoard dry’ (ibid)
As we look from one canvas to the next it is the relationship of subject to context that 
holds the interest of the audience, if the impressionist’s view of the world is 
convincing his speed will allow us to absorb greater volume. If the audience takes the 
time to stop and look their experience should be enriched by significance rather than 
impoverished by superficiality. This is not to say that our canvases can be arranged 
in sequential transactions of sensemaking, there are gaps between the canvases that 
merit explanation but as Weick (1995) points out, ‘it may be the very existence of the 
gaps between exemplars in a paradigm that enables people to build a consensus 
around it’ (p.120).
Taken as a whole, prior to analysis, our efforts resemble a collage of colour and 
imagery and yet -  ‘this lies in the nature of every interpretation - but it also reveals 
relatively unprocessed fragments that might give an intimation of the original whole’ 
(Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992, p. 5). It is within these ‘unprocessed fragments’ - the 
taken for granted - that we hope to discover form in the manner of sensemaking and 
the extension of sensemaking into sensegiving.
In utilising the metaphor we will ask our audience to work with and trust us. We may 
make mistakes but honest brush stokes that attempt to convey meaning and context 
to organisational situations to which we, and we alone, for that moment in time, have 
been present.
Rory makes the point: ‘In a mature science, the words in which the investigator 
“writes up" his results should be as few and as transparent as possible’ (1992, p.94) 
yet, for us at least fewer words may make for better sensemaking. The lighter the
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touch the more transparent the message. For us the message is very much about the 
meaning rather than the detail. It is from this frame of reference that we present our 
collection of canvases in the school of sensemaking each of which is used to 
illustrate rather than argue different facets of the theory.
Watzlawick et al (1974) inform us that methodology is the philosophical study of the 
plurality of methods applied to various disciplines. It always has to do with the activity 
of acquiring knowledge and differs from method which is the specification of the 
steps which must be taken in a given order to achieve a given end. In presenting our 
thesis we have had to acknowledge the limitations and trade offs necessary to 
sustain (ultimately) the grounded nature of common sense and yet demonstrate how 
we acquired knowledge through different events across different timescales.
Sensemaking -  understood as a narrative process helps us to understand the 
restraints of timescales, for whilst it is difficult to determine where action starts and 
where it ends we know that the sensemaking process reduces action into intelligible 
pieces, the narrative process spans allotted time, tamper with time and you tamper 
with the meaning and the action becomes something else. As we paint in the detail 
we do so according to the allotted time of the action we witnessed, not according to 
time expanded or truncated to meet the needs of research convention.
Why do we concentrate on providing rich background to the police yet focus on 
detailed foreground activity at Parvin-May? Because that is what we saw -  this was 
the symbolic representation of Lautrec (strictly speaking a sub-impressionist) sitting 
with his easel at the Moulin Rouge, he painted subjects that took his interest, he gave 
an impressionist view of ongoing action as it unfolded, in the allotted time the action 
took place. To have asked a dancer to stop and pose would have altered the 
meaning of the action and his work. As we have already indicated we realise that
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ours is but one set of views capable of multiple descriptions, however we set up our 
easel and the perspective is set by the combination of time, action, good fortune, 
associated meaning and the limitations of our impressionist ability depicted through 
the narrative process.
One of the most difficult skills for an artist to master is that of perspective, the theory 
is not so difficult it is a matter of understanding geometry and the principle of 
‘vanishing points’. Execution, however, is a different matter entirely as the theory 
remains the same but the perspective alters according to elevation and distance. The 
unique quality Lautrec brought to his subject matter was considerably enhanced by 
his unusual perspective -  he was of dwarf stature and painted activity taking place, in 
the main, above himself!
Weick & Quinn (1999), Weick (2001), remind us that taking a view of any system is a 
matter of first setting a perspective (p. 386) or distance from the subject matter under 
inquiry, there is an optimum distance that must be taken from the subject in order to 
achieve a desired view. If we are very close we may see great detail but within a 
limited range of subject matter, if we are far away we may see a wide range of 
subject matter but discern little detail. We have set out our work as a collection of 
scenes that we will seek to analyse from within the school of sensemaking. In order 
to achieve this we need to use words as colours yet also indicate a bounded 
perspective identifiable within the school that is neither too far away from nor too 
close to the subject to make sense.
General, accurate & simple
Geertz (1973), suggests that a rule for theory building should be ‘not to generalize 
across cases but to generalize within them’ (p. 10). For us, given the methodology we
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outline here, there had to be some trade offs, a position for which Thorngate (1976) 
invokes the postulate of commensurate complexity which says that it is impossible for 
a theory of social behaviour to be simultaneously general, accurate and simple. You 






Weick (1979) takes this concept and depicts it as a clock face (above) that he calls 
the GAS model. In this model it is possible to work through the postulate and 
understand the research dilemma inherent in trying to secure any two of the qualities; 
generality, accuracy or simplicity that automatically excludes the third. The example 
shown indicates research at the 2 o’clock position that is both general and accurate, 
the trade off being that it is cannot also be simple. Weick’s definition for 2 o’clock 
inquiry being multiple results being explained by minimum behaviour or intentional 
over determination. Six o’clock inquiry, on the other hand, being simple and accurate 
is case specific, therefore not general and best suited to context driven case studies. 
Finally, inquiry that is simple and general but not accurate is to be found at the 10 
o’clock position, this is best understood through concepts that are not detailed or
52
accurate such as ‘loose coupling’ (Weick, 1979), ‘eight stage [change] process’ 
(Kotter, 1996), ‘stick to the knitting’ (Peters & Waterman, 1982) and ‘doing more with 
less' (Kanter, 1989).
If one sets out to collect data in a specific way then not only are we determining 
which position we wish to take on the GAS model but also how close to the data we 
are going to get e.g. do we ignore anecdotal evidence in favour of directly reported 
conversations. Taken as a unit of research our own offering contains elements of 
inquiry that is general, accurate and simple, it is only when we seek to interpret 
discrete sets of action that the different positions on the clock face become relevant. 
This is the point at which the GAS model better illustrates and extends our artistic 
metaphor.
Earlier we explained that it was the data that drove our interest and not our interest 
that drove our data, thought of in this way it is easier to identify activity that took (and 
shaped) our interest. We could have chosen to use one case study, or at least 
positioned ourselves to research within one organisation but it was not our intention 
to appropriate and apply the sensemaking model on data rather it was our intention 
to expand the philosophy of sensemaking having sighted and detailed new instances. 
The perspectives of the activity we gained were, in the main, the ones we were 
handed, not necessarily those we would have chosen -  such is the nature of the 
sensemaking phenomenon.
It is possible to locate on the GAS model the appropriate method of viewing the data 
from which it can then be rendered. Thus the model performs another task in that it 
allows us to discuss and interpret the data from a common platform. The model 
becomes our pallet from which we select words as colour to depict tone, hue and 
contrast.
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Events caught in time (impressions) become our scenes from organisational life 
(canvases, shown as narratives), depicted according to subject, perspective and 
setting form a flexible but bounded repertoire (GAS model as palette) containing a 
finite medium (words as colours). The sense of ‘school’ is given by the combination 
of time, scene, perspective and bounded repertoire (sensemaking). The extension to 
the school (theory) is to be found in the new [organisational] settings and the manner 
in which we utilise colour (extension to theory) to add to the bounded repertoire 
(ways of understanding sensemaking in organisations).
An important point for us to reemphasis here is that it was not our intention to design 
a methodology in order to confirm or refute the sensemaking model. We saw our 
role as one of collecting descriptions of events, nostrums of sensemaking that might 
provide an alternative way of seeing the role of leadership in adaptive change on the 
premise that if our analysis is accurate (or only half accurate for that matter), there 
exist latent opportunities within organisations to improve the quality of decision­
making through an enhanced understanding of the sensemaking process.
In fairness to the reader we need to clarify the possible confusion created by our 
philosophical preference for the personal pronoun we and separate out the function 
of data collection from the activity of being part of and contributor to the social action 
that we describe within this thesis.
In the next section we will detail the way in which access to research sites was 
acquired, the time over which data was collected and with whom. At times this 
would, in the literal sense have been that we visited, conducted research, consulted 
and worked with the actors.
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As author, I was present at all research sites on all the occasions noted within this 
work, further more I was responsible for the: detailing (by handwritten notes or tape 
recording) of interviews, transcribing (where necessary), analysing, collection of 
artefacts that appear as appendices (press releases, minutes of meetings, agendas 
and the like) and drafting of initial discussion notes that, in turn, led to the drafting of 
this thesis. When acting in the capacity of consultant on the occasions relevant to 
this topic I had acted as the lead and negotiated access. This was also the case on 
all but one of the pure research visits (see AES in Colville, et al, 1999) where there 
had been joint negotiation together with Colville (ibid).
Given these qualifications and those that follow the pattern of divergent interests 
and opportunities to create data - for this was nature of the emergent process - is 
clarified. In the Police explicit permissions had been obtained to tape record 
interviews whereas in all other organisations, whether entered as consultant or 
researcher (and this distinction is commented on in the next section), 
contemporaneous note taking provided the mainstay of recording conversations and 
interviews. We would also take note of ‘incidents’ or rather activity for which we had 
no convenient label but where we wanted to take heed of context and form for 
reflection at some later stage.
Whilst the detailing of ‘incident’ data in this way may seem, on the one hand, 
disciplined (as ethnographer) and on the other hand somewhat gauche (as 
consultant) the origins and method of this lie not in consulting or research activity 
but as a personal style developed as a career police detective. Hence notes taken in 
the course of this project, whether in the guise of researcher or consultant, would 
often appear as shorthand jottings in the margins of reports, agendas or even the 
back of paper serviettes. This was not as a means of disguise but as a means of 
protecting -  as far as was possible - the natural flow of events that tended to occur
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at times of their own choosing rather than ours! Inevitably consulting assignments 
included gathering legitimate contextual information by interviewing different 
organisational members and stakeholders from which informed advice could be 





‘Let us begin by committing ourselves to the truth, to see it 
like it is and tell it like it is, to find the truth, to speak the 
truth and to live the truth’
(Richard Nixon)
The irony of Nixon’s words are not lost on us but the espoused principles hold to the 
point of Oscar Wilde’s warning that truth is never pure and seldom simple as we set 
out the data for the next section of our thesis and seek to tease out the 
sensemaking process grounded in the daily lives of our actors.
Whilst we may make comment on models of social change, these are not our central 
interests; this is reserved for the order of adaptive change viewed as a sensemaking 
process. It is not a theory of how to create change but one that examines where 
change takes place and what precipitates change. We are mindful of Colville et al 
(1999); 'there are no grand strategic maps of the future that can be handed down 
from the top, there are only local ones' (p 142). We suggest that our audience views 
the data as a series of local maps from which we have selected areas of terrain to 
explore.
Actors from within the organisations we observed attempted to change the way their 
people interpreted meaning and thus influenced their actions. Sometimes it worked 
sometimes it did not. Often the outcomes were not those anticipated; sometimes 
they caused consternation or surprise. Our purpose here is to draw out such 
examples as may infer a tangible link and then ask 'what is going on here?' (The
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activity or common sense). We then go deeper and yet ask the same question 'what 
is going on here?' (The sensemaking of the situation or common sense of a higher 
order).
The following case studies ground a view of the situations in which our actors found 
themselves allowing us to see sequences of activity that highlight aspects of existing 
theory. We believe this allows us licence to probe wider from our data when we 
discuss links and possible extension to theory in the work that then follows.
We draw our data from four different types of organisation, the sustaining link being 
that they all try to cope with first-order (Watzlawick et al, 1974, Weick & Quinn, 1999) 
adaptive (Fox-Wolfgramm, et al 1998) change. However, they also differ, 
significantly, in the drivers for change, as do the units of examination.
It is our intention to detail the case studies then compare and contrast them through 
a model of contextual analysis developed by Pettigrew (1985). We then seek to draw 
out what we see as the key components of the cognitive processes at play in our 
case studies and seek to link them to Weick's (1995) model of sensemaking. For us 
Pettigrew's model provides the macro social agendas, existing at the time of 
organisational change, whether or not they are reflected at a micro level of social 
activity, specific actors have awareness or at least tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1958) of 
the adaptive response required in asking the question 'what is happening here' we 
note that our actors have an active knowledge of the requirements and make 
cognitive choices - it is what they do as a process that takes our interest. We 
suggest that the choices our actors make are based on what Weick (2001) describes 
as a process of ‘triangulating’ (p.446). In this case the application of different 
measures: information, symbolism and retention, to determine meaning and literally 
make sense of phenomena.
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We then seek to analyse the data through what appear to be the primary elements of 
sensemaking as they are reflected in our data, i.e. noticing (Starbuck & Milliken, 
1988, a), requisite variety (Weick, 1979) or active search Argyris (1996) and future 
perfect thinking (Weick, ibid). Here where we ask 'what is happening?' from the 
sensemaking perspective we draw conclusions about awareness levels of our actors 
based upon their observed responses to phenomena.
Finally we discuss the implications for studying sensemaking in times of 
organisational change and consider how this research might be further developed.
The primary units of study vary between the case studies and each takes account of 
wider data for the purpose of defining context and grounding activity. Detailed below 
we comment on the nature of the organisations, our reasons for being there and how 
the dimension of time (Pettigrew, et al, 2001) affected our perspective of the 
changing nature of the organisations and our relationships within them.
Parvin-May: here we concentrate on the actions of Stephen Reading the chief 
executive. We see how over a period of 6 years, 1994-2000 (data collected 1997- 
2000) Stephen attempts to influence the development of his banking operation in the 
City of London. His initial activity centres on salvaging an under performing 
organisation before it folds.
By 1998 Stephen, aware that Henry Simme, the chairman and major shareholder, 
wishes to retire and divest his shareholding, embarks upon a five-year plan to ready 
the organisation for trade sale/merger (Stephen holding 1% of the issued share 
capital). Furthermore, by 2000 he is already planning on how to take the 
organisation beyond sale and 'take the next set of shareholders for a ride as well'.
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The only executives aware of this plan are Stephen and Henry and although 
Stephen thinks that he has a sense of the organisation he needs to develop in order 
to meet this plan - he does not confide his objective - rather he tries to influence the 
activity of directors and staff by providing cues he feels will lead to the behaviours 
that he seeks. Unfortunately we conclude that Stephen preaches risk taking but 
practices risk reduction and this has consequences for our actors.
Access to this organisation had developed from a request by their Human 
Resources Manager to tender for the delivery of functional training activity; 
presentation skills and the like. In turn this led to meetings with Stephen and senior 
members of the board, it also included as part of the ‘sniff test’ a formal lunch in their 
dining room. An unusual process but experience taught us that this was an 
organisation that cherished relationships. One where people needed to feel 
comfortable with new insiders and new outsiders who were to be given access to 
insiders. As it transpired this also reflected the view we took that this was a tightly 
coupled organisation where senior management took an active (literal sense) role in 
most aspects of decision-making.
Only Stephen who, with his senior team, has remained in post throughout this 
research knew of the dual role of the author. Other consultants have been drafted in 
to provide additional services in training and development but the role of the author 
has developed into that of coach/facilitator assisting the leadership to consider the 
future of the organisation on occasions such as their annual strategy weekends.
The Police: whilst similarities may apply in other countries this study looks at the 
genre of policing in the United Kingdom and how, since inception the tradition of 
policing by consent of the people (Mark, 1978) has closer reflected the Police acting
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in a politicised manner where their consent is of a political nature (Reiner, 1983, 
Giddens,1996).
The prime driver for change that we discuss is a social agenda - the reduction of 
crime by reducing tolerance to crime - enacted through a political agenda; the 
manifesto/mandate of a newly elected Labour Government in 1997. We also note 
how the Police have dealt with requirements in the past to change/moderate/re­
define their output, yet have remained, largely, resistant to internal structural change 
or changes to the way in which staff are managed. Although we have conducted 
specific research on the police before (Carter, 1989) our interest was reawakened by 
the symbolic ‘call to arms' (above) of the incoming Labour Government in 1997 and 
ran through until 2000.
As a former police officer who had attended the Police Staff College on the 
accelerated promotion scheme (and who had written about the police as an insider, 
Carter, ibid) access to former colleagues (by then in senior positions) had been 
negotiated through long standing personal relationships in a number of police forces. 
All but a very limited number of respondents were aware of the research purpose 
(indeed a case could be made that they knew too much of the purpose!).
The context of policing rather than any particular force was our primary unit of 
examination and to some extent this ameliorated the potential distortions of time in 
that we were able to track officers into new postings in different locations whilst 
maintaining our focus on large-scale cross-boundary organisational changes.
FCO Services (FCOS): we focus on the executive body of FCOS the largest of 
sixteen divisions or commands in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) as it
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deals with the requirement by Central Government for greater financial accountability 
from public bodies and to better reflect the organising of private industry.
The research in FCOS spans a five-year period (1995 -  2000) and culminates in 
activity following publication of the Government White Paper - Modernising 
Government in 1999. Whilst the requirement is for FCOS to undergo first-order 
adaptive change we note that despite calling for such change themselves our actors 
appear unable to move from the abstract of thinking to the activity of doing. 
Essentially this is a story of no change where our actors appear to risk enacting an 
environment of crisis through active inertia (Sull, 1999).
The author entered the FCO with primary responsibility for maintaining a business 
relationship that involved several different consultants, however, the research 
interests of the author and supervisor (who also operated in a consulting capacity) 
were known and accepted by the senior director responsible for sponsoring the 
business workload.
Fortunately this director provided a high degree of continuity and appears in much of 
the data, however, by the time the research had been completed she had been 
posted out of the command. Our data collection, nevertheless, continued and by this 
time some junior managers had also become aware of the research area and 
expressed interest in its outcomes.
EMI Recorded Music - whilst we ground most of our data within one music company, 
during the period from 1997 -  2001, the unit of interest stretches to the level of the 
whole music industry but, such is the nature of the driver for change - advances in
62
technology -  even this is subject to redefining into a content/entertainment/delivery 
industry.
This is a case study that tracks the context of the music industry from the early 
1960s era of the Beatles through the 1980s & 1990s periods of mergers, when 
music companies merged and acquired most independent labels in order to 
establish copyright ownership to huge depth of back catalogue. It discusses the way 
in which the industry has developed building to the point in 2000 where only five 
'majors' remained: EMI, Sony, Warner, Universal and BMG. At this stage we pick up 
the activity surrounding the concept of copyright and see how this core asset for the 
music industry is negotiated into a support function for a new style of business for 
which the central platform would be electronic communication.
Within this research site the author was the sole link and the research interests were 
known only to a small number of executives who wished to remain anonymous. A 
large proportion of this case study has been compiled with material available within 
the public domain. Where we have taken direct quotes from our research data these 
have duly been anonymised with different names. This case study has also been 
assisted by the settled nature of the principal respondents who remained constant 
throughout the period of research.
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Launching the theme
As a precursor to our case studies we wish to introduce a graphic scenario to 
illustrate just how important, in certain circumstances, the concepts of sensemaking 
and crediting can be to the process of organising.
In April 1970, just nine months after man first landed on the surface of the Moon, Jim 
Lovell and the crew of Apollo 13 set out to repeat the feat of Apollo 11. Some 
200,000 miles into space mechanical failure in one of the fuel cells brought near 
disaster. Information gathered after the flight suggests that, in the nine months 
following the first successful mission, space travel to the Moon had already become 
systemised into ‘routines’ based on previous success -  or over crediting.
•  None of the network TV stations carried live coverage of the astronauts 
sending pictures to Earth; it was old hat, not news
•  The first response to the developing failure of the spacecraft was to regard it 
as instrumentation failure -  mechanical failure of the magnitude being 
reported was not thought possible
•  It was unknown whether the lunar landing craft rocket motor was sufficiently 
powerful to use as a back up for the damaged spacecraft
•  The oxygen filters in the lunar landing craft and the spacecraft were not inter­
changeable; the need had never been considered
In the event the astronauts were returned safely to Earth, but only by improvising a 
new mission and using equipment in ways for which it had never been designed.
Starbuck & Milliken (1988, b) detail how past successes lead to beliefs about future 
success. ‘Organizations often interpret past successes as evidencing their
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competence and the adequacy of their procedures, and so they try to lock their 
behaviours into existing patterns’ (p.22). They further define this process as ‘fine 
tuning the odds until something breaks' (ibid) or what we night refer to as if it ain’t 
broke don’t fix it’. Weick (1979) describes such activity as over crediting; we take 
information from past events and process them in unequivocal ways. In Apollo 13 this 
meant that multiple power loss had not been considered, and equipment capability 
was not designed on a contingent basis, but on a proven basis -  the lunar landing 
craft lands on the Moon and life support is operated as independent systems, one for 
travel to the Moon and the other for landing on the Moon. Insufficient regard was paid 
the equivocality of the input -  that is to say - the previous missions had been 
successful because nothing had gone wrong but the opportunity for something to go 
wrong had always been there, hence any deviation, whether it be mechanical failure 
or change in operating conditions, could have triggered the failure, as indeed 
happened.
Thirty-one years after the event, the transcript based Hollywood film ‘Apollo 13’ is still 
powerful enough to demonstrate how ‘routine’ activity can turn to near disaster and 
how difficult it is to reverse the process once we take such matters for granted.
‘On 13 April 1970 astronaut Commander Jim Lovell made 
one of the great understatements of the last century - 
‘Houston, we have a problem’ - and though we’re waiting 
to hear Tom Hanks say it 50 minutes into this film version 
of that fateful moon mission, it still retains the ability to chill 
us. This is a compelling picture that grips despite our 
knowledge of the outcome, and what makes it remarkable 
is the human factor - the way people retained control over 
themselves, how they improvised, refused to give up, and 
collaborated altruistically’
(Philip French, Film Critic, The 
Observer 21 January 2001)
65
This film is used extensively (under licence) by the author to illustrate to students, 
that once organisational systems lock into routine processing they take remarkable 
effort to change. However, this was a near disaster in terms of loss of life but an
actual disaster in terms of organisational processing. Unfortunately it appears that
the former was celebrated and the latter neglected. Not that such processing is by 
any means restricted to space travel -  the basic tenets of failing to notice and over­
crediting are liable to occur in all forms of organising: -
‘the Barings system threw up loud enough signals to alert
any management: any management, that is, which hadn’t 
lost control in another, deeper sense - understanding 
what’s going on. Most financial collapses result from 
ignorance coupled with inaction in the teeth of mounting 
alarms.’
(Heller, 1995)
The Barings situation grew out of routine processing that Perrow (1984) explains 
thus:-
‘Warning of an incomprehensible and unimaginable event 
cannot be seen, because it cannot be believed1
(p.23, emphasis added)
Weick (1979) suggests that the reason it cannot be believed is that it cannot be 
seen, effectively trapping actors into existing meanings. It is against this bias 
towards seeing is believing and the consequences for organising into routine 
processes that we ask for our case studies to be read.
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Section 5:
The canvases: applying the brush strokes
In this section we provide detailed accounts of our host organisations outlined as 
case studies. To differentiate this and the following sections (6 & 7) we will take an 
abstract of the Weick (1979) GAS model described in section 3 and overlay differing 
perspectives using the existing terminology of general/accurate/simple. Here we, 
therefore, look at data from the six o’clock position that is both accurate and simple. 
At section 6 we look at the information from the ten o’clock or simple/general position 














The descriptions in this section are accurate in that the information provided is taken 
from direct conversations, manuscripts or personal accounts from our actors. The 
information is, however, simple in nature and presented devoid of analysis or 
structure.
Following our earlier stated intention of using the GAS model (or at least our variant 
of it) as the palette or medium from which we would chose words in the school of 
sensemaking at the beginning of each case study we indicate the area of 
sensemaking, that shaped our interest in the organisations and compelled us to 
research further. From our root metaphor we might suggest that these were the 
moments that took us by surprise or caught our imagination and had us reaching for 
our brushes!
At the end of each case study we look back and suggest how sensemaking formed 
part of the activity we have recounted, why it is important for leadership in 




The principal point of interest here is the way that decisions were rationalised or 
confirmed in retrospect, our interest was taken by surprise/disturbance created by the 
following activities:-
•  The slow emergence of the Bank from a position of rescue to potential sale 
brought about by the need to compete effectively and the growing realisation 
of the CEO that ‘his’ strategy had worked (but not with the results he 
expected)
•  Whilst in the anxious state of motivating his staff to greater profitability the 
CEO lays down what he believes to be clear cues for individuals to take 
individual responsibility (without expressing his reasoning) as a result his 
senior team make sense of the situation and come up with a different 
conclusion to the surprise of the CEO
•  A group of senior managers (later known as the ‘magnificent seven’) press for 
greater autonomy and authority, the response by the CEO and chairman is to 
issue titular directorships leading to dissatisfaction on both sides. The overall 
thread linking this and the previous issue being the mismatch between the 
apparent wishes of the CEO and the actions taken to achieve his objectives 
leading to a series of surprises and disappointments for both parties
The case study largely centres upon the efforts of Stephen Reading; Chief Executive 
of Parvin-May, in his endeavours to transform a traditional former merchant bank into
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a profit focused private bank and then, without the knowledge of his directors and 
staff, prepare it for sale/merger.
Many of the 'high street' banks sell a broad range of services to retail clients 
(members of the public) and corporate clients (businesses and institutions). Some of 
these will have private banking, divisions or subsidiary companies specialising in 
private banking.
Examples would be Barclays, who operate Barclay Premier Banking, and Nat West 
who own Coutts. The target for these organisations are termed 'high net worth 
clients' - quite literally those individuals with high levels of disposable cash.
Smaller banks tend to focus their activities on 'Merchant Banking' (arranging the 
funding requirements of corporate clients - quite often for the purposes of raising 
funds or potential floatation on the Stock Exchange) or 'private banking' (described 
above). In 1999 Rae Brothers, the only other UK independent bank specialising in 
private clients was sold, leaving Parvin-May in the unique position in the City of 
London of an independent private bank with a full listing on the stock exchange.
Stephen’s view was that it was necessary to make the transition from 'merchant 
bank' to 'private bank' in order to ensure the long-term viability of his organisation. 
His rationale for this being that, as a small bank, Parvin-May simply did not have the 
resources to compete in the domestic corporate arena, let alone the international 
corporate arena.
In its revised format the Bank focus was restricted to four primary areas: -
1. Banking - including the taking of deposits and placing of loans
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2. Treasury - placing of funds in the money market and speculating in foreign 
exchange transactions
3. Investment - placing clients funds into share portfolios and managing Parvin-May 
own investment funds
4. Off shore trust activity - based in Guernsey and the Bahamas where trusts are set 
up for clients to maximise the tax shelters offered in these territories
A number of tensions existed between these areas and Stephen had to maintain the 
balance. The Bank of England heavily regulated the banking operation; its activities 
were driven by risk aversion and conservative principles. At the other extreme the 
Bahamian operation (a new enterprise) actively sought opportunities to 'do deals' and 
organise complex trust arrangements - banking would often challenge the quality of 
these deals thus slowing down the process.
Senior staff held Stephen in high regard. He had been with Parvin-May since leaving 
university, he was very bright and seen to be totally committed to the staff and Bank. 
Notwithstanding this comment, some of his senior colleagues saw the world in very 
different ways, often frustrating his efforts. Many did not want to change. Neither did 
they like risk and adopted a highly conservative approach to business.
An example of the way in which tension and mutual dependence existed at one and 
the same time can be seen from the following example: -
In order to extend its loan book (often driven by the off shore operations) the Bank 
has strict guidelines on the funds it must have on deposit to cover loans. One 
solution to this was seen to be the generation of a new 'retail product' - essentially
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the terminology used for any sales pitch to the public. The particular 'product' was a 
high rate of interest with the advantage of a shorter 'lock in' period than its 
competitors. This 'product' attracted the attention of the weekend popular financial 
columnists. As a consequence Parvin-May opened 10,000 new deposits.
The tensions that this caused included: -
- What was seen by some to be a move away from the market of 'high net worth 
clients' (typically the Bank saw this as depositors with cash of more than 
£100,000 to place, or investors with portfolios of not less than £300,000). This 
was against the new product set at a minimum level of £10,000.
How to manage an unprecedented number of new customers that had completely 
swamped the infrastructure of the business.
- The inability of the organisation to differentiate these new clients in order to pick 
those of high net worth and - leading on from this - cross sell more profitable 
activities to them.
Much of the activity will be seen as tightly coupled to formal structures that appear to 
be used by managers to guide the actions of those working for the organisation. 
Whilst many of the senior staff justify this tight coupling on compliance procedures 
required by the regulatory authorities (Investment Managers Regulatory Organisation
- IMRO and the Bank of England), Stephen’s view was that these were excuses used 
by people who 'have landed in a fur lined rut and refuse to move'. His concern was 
that the Bank was failing to achieve an equitable return on the investment of 
shareholders. As such, the Bank was vulnerable to take-over and the staff to job 
losses.
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As a result of Stephen’s frustration, in 1997 he held the first of what he intended to be 
annual Strategy Weekends for Directors and Assistant Directors of the Bank. This 
occasion was the first formal attempt by Stephen to raise awareness, albeit, slowly 
and carefully, that the staff needed to change their focus and move away from what 
he saw as their ‘comfort zone’.
As we move through the study of particular note is the deliberate way in which 
Stephen avoids specifying his central concern. Whilst he felt that the Bank was on 
the cusp of either great success or failure, he feared that if he defined the issue - as 
he saw it - his fellow directors would panic and/or see him as manipulating the 
situation for ulterior motives. 'I have got to be careful here - some of them are like 
rabbits gazing into the headlights whenever something new comes along - others 
think that I am trying to sell the Bank from under them'.
It should be noted that whilst a fully listed public company on the London Stock 
Exchange the chairman, Henry Simme, and his family, still owned some 28% of the 
equity. Stephen had to fulfil multiple roles as a functional manger, interface with the 
City and go-between for the Bank with its more powerful stakeholders.
The activity that we follow spans a four-year period (1997 -  2000) in which Stephen 
attempts to influence his colleagues. We would venture to suggest that Stephen’s 
intention was that his directors’ thinking would fall in line with his own if they also 
picked up cues from the wider environment. We would also suggest that the context 
Stephen saw and worked within was different than that experienced by his staff even 
though each was both a product and result of the other.
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W e look at the way in which Stephen Reading, as CEO, delivered organisational 
change in transforming the output of the Bank and the issues he faced when 
attempting to change the way in which the output was created. As the activity moves 
on we note Stephen’s increasing level of frustration and anger at what he saw as his 
team's deliberate and foolish reluctance to face his definition of reality and share his 
sense of meaning.
Stephen avoids, until mid-way in the four-year period of this study, describing to his 
team the world as he sees it. Then, to Stephen’s astonishment, having done so, they 
do not, apparently understand his solution to the problem and appear transfixed by 
his frustration.
As we later discovered, following research in the Bank's Bahamas operation, the 
style of business and behaviour described by Stephen had actually evolved in small 
pockets of the Bank over the period of study, but this had not been recognised by 
senior managers in London.
A start up operation in 1997, the Bahamian subsidiary had moved from T-shirt and 
jeans with no computers or customers' (Bahamas Managing Director) to a profitable 
part of the Bank's business employing a much flatter management structure that had 
started to push its London and Guernsey offices for faster signing off decisions.
Our focus is the difficulty of creating meaning with at least a minimal overlap, 
common definitions and thus - joint sensemaking - our posit being that we do not all 
see the world as one, neither do we notice or place value on the same cues.
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Minimal overlap = No overlap = no shared meaning
shared (not equivalent) meaning
Figure 7.
In this work we recount occasions where meanings are shared by minimal overlap. 
‘Connected in some way’ (Weick, 1995, p. 129) even though this may entail 
advantage to one party to the disadvantage of another. W e shall also see situations 
where there is no overlap of meaning and the consternation (even anger) this 
generates.
Stephen seeks to transform his organisation but in a controlled and evolutionary 
manner. In choosing this method he avoids alienating his senior team through shock 
tactics, he also avoids compromising the Bank's conservative disposition. However 
he also invites his staff to enact their own environments. By the time we finish this 
case study he ends up with, in his opinion, two extremes neither, of which meet his 
requirements. The London and Guernsey operations are still tightly coupled to 
structure, hierarchy and conformity; the Bahamian operation is risk adept with a 
growing reputation amongst its clients for innovation and creativity but 'in need of 
control'.
Parvin-May started the Bank in 1919 and the Joseph family ran it until 1963, when it 
was sold to a management team that included Henry Simme. In 1971 the Bank 
obtained a full listing on the London Stock Exchange.
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Until 1994 the organisation was called 'Parvin-May Merchant Bankers'; its activities 
included: banking, treasury, investment and some corporate deal making (organising 
finance for small acquisitions raising loans for capital projects etc.).
Between 1990 and 1994 Joint Chief Executive Officers: Stephen Reading and John 
Edwards ran the Bank. Stephen’s background was that of a mathematician whereas 
John’s was that of a traditional stockbroker. In 1994 Stephen, frustrated at the 
inability of both to agree upon a strategic direction, and increasingly concerned about 
the Bank's financial status, suggested that the Bank focus on areas where it was 
strong and made money. In the main this was through banking and investment 
activities. John agreed with the results of Stephen’s analysis but was reluctant to re­
define the Bank's activities. When pressed he shocked Stephen by divulging that he 
enjoyed the excitement and involvement of deal making.
As Stephen put it 'I could not believe what I was hearing. The figures proved that we 
were standing on the brink of a precipice, the next step could well have been our last, 
we did not have a good track record in deal making, someone would come to us and 
we would try and cobble something together, normally not very well.'
Stephen and John each made a presentation to the board of directors on their 
respective visions for the future. The board chose Stephen’s version and John left 
the business. Stephen believed that the Bank had created a blind spot by its previous 
commitment to 'merchant banking', a ‘one way street to nowhere’ as he saw it. He 
decided to create a new commitment to 'private banking' not as a definitive route to 
success but the only viable possibility for saving the Bank. The change of definition 
immediately brought with it a feeling of reinvention from the employees, most of 
whom later recalled the process as changing the direction of the Bank. In reality it did 
not change direction or add to its service areas it merely stopped operating in the
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loss making areas (commercial) and carried on with investment and banking for 
private clients.
The public commitment to 'private banking'; created a new expectation and a 
perceived need for skills training in areas such as customer care and product 
development. In this way Stephen identified both the debilitating and development 
potential associated with the enactment of words used to describe the activities of his 
organisation by using the potential strategic ambiguity offered by the interpretation of 
'merchant banking' and 'private banking'. He was able to attribute blame to one and 
solution to the other.
The majority of the employees working in the Bank were not aware ether that a 
problem existed (because nobody had described the situation as a 'problem') or that 
there was a difference of view between Stephen and John. Having raised awareness 
of staff to the 'problem' the 'solution' won immediate support. Furthermore, Stephen 
was viewed as a brave leader with vision, despite having played a significant role as 
a senior manager in the Bank for several years previously.
As a young man (mid 30s) Stephen had identified a potential problem in the Bank's 
liquidity. He acted when it appeared that there was a very real chance that he may 
have been associated with the failure of the Bank and that this would jeopardise his 
future career prospects. Divesting the Bank of commercial work was a form of risk 
reduction in Stephen’s view; not risk taking. Equally he saw the challenging of his 
fellow Joint Chief Executive as risk reduction. 'If I had stayed and said nothing we 
would have failed. If I put a different option to the board and they had gone with John 
I could have left before the Bank failed. I did not want to be associated with failure so 
either I stayed and changed things or went before it failed, either way was better for 
me than doing nothing'.
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At the time we started to draw upon live data Stephen had started to become 
increasingly anxious about the Bank's vulnerability. Shares in the Bank were held by 
the ageing chairman, three city institutions and the remaining 20% by employees and 
public shareholders.
The Bank's vulnerability stemmed, in part, from a poor return on capital (7%) and it's 
unique position as the sole independent private bank. Stephen’s concern, which he 
kept to himself for fear of frightening staff, was that if the Bank was taken over, whilst 
under-performing, (he saw a return on capital of 20% as being acceptable) all staff 
would be vulnerable to dismissal. The gap between 7% and 20% return on capital 
was, of course, large, but interestingly, when set as a five-year plan this was never 
questioned by staff who saw more difficulty in increasing the share price from £6 to 
£18 over the same period (this provides us with a clue to the sense of worth staff 
placed upon the Bank, they were not convinced that it would be an attractive 
investment in the eyes of the City market makers -  those that influenced the share 
price based upon performance and potential).
As a consequence, without being specific about his agenda and concerns, in 
September 1997 Stephen gathered his directors and assistant directors together for 
a 'Strategy Weekend', the aim of which was to concentrate the attention of his senior 
team on making greater profits.
NB: the context for this case study has been re-written to include a wider perspective, 
not only Stephen’s relationship with Henry the Chairman, Henry’s, relationship with 
the rest of the Bank, but also a further agenda that had emerged for which we had 
previously noted but had not understood. We had been informed of Henry's history 
with the Bank, the role he played in dealing with other principal shareholders and 
mentoring the development of Stephen’s career. We would also now add, with the
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benefit of four years observation, that, whilst often spoken of as 'old school' and 
'autocratic', Henry’s influence was far more pervasive than we had realised. This 
influence made him a significant aspect of the prevailing context against which our 
activity was to be played out.
•  Henry was extremely intolerant of under performance and only two, possibly 
three, of the senior management team (including Stephen) met his exacting 
intellectual standards - those who did not could and did find themselves on the 
wrong end of a shouted outburst
•  As a consequence of his lack of faith in the managers Henry expected Stephen to 
maintain a detailed knowledge of the workings of all departments
• The only involvement in yearly strategy weekends (see below) would be to arrive 
for a formal dinner at which he would make a brief speech without any 
understanding of the discussions that had taken place
• He was unable to relate to most of the staff
Stephen summarised the issues himself:-
'You have to remember that Henry was born rich - an only 
child whose parents died when he was young. He had the 
strangest of upbringings surrounded by servants - he 
does not see why he should not treat the staff here in the 
same way - if they do their jobs well, that is what they're 
paid for if not give them a damn good bollocking. It is not 
that he does not mean well. Far from it, he simply does 
not understand any other way and thinks that he is doing 
his bit for the cause'
Weick (1979) articulates the contrasting influences at play for Stephen by suggesting 
that a bank is a living contradiction. It both encourages people to save and be thrifty,
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whilst owing its survival to the encouragement of people to borrow. Stephen wants 
and needs both, which means the message to the organisation and customers is 'It is 
good to save and bad to borrow, it's good to borrow and bad to save' (p.222). This is 
a fragile enough balance but Stephen needed to discredit the existing balance in 
order to change it - whilst maintaining the underlying theme. Lend better and take 
more deposits without exposing the Bank to unacceptable risk.
The synthesis of the discussion at the first Strategy Weekend is given at Appendix 
'A'. The result of two days of discussion being that the senior team agreed to form a 
new committee, named the 'Marketing Committee'. To put this into perspective the 
following is a list of the committees by then in existence in London alone where only 
80 staff were housed at that time: -
Credit Committee 




Group internal audit Committee 
Group Executive Committee 
Remuneration Committee 
Group IT Committee
In addition the Bank retained non-executive directors to oversee practice and policy 
and was also subject to visits and scrutiny by IMRO and the Bank of England.
Stephen chaired this new committee but after six months he felt that little progress 
had been made: -
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'All that seems to be happening is that we walk the issues 
around the table, no one grabs one of the ideas and says -  
‘hey I like the idea of this new credit card, I will take 
responsibility for getting it sorted.' All that happens is that 
an idea is thrown in, people say that’s good but nothing 
happens'.
Two months later this frustration had deepened still further: -
W e have been meeting now for eight months and not one 
initiative has been developed, don't these people realise 
that someone has to do something? Unless I take on the 
responsibility nothing changes, nothing is done. Now I 
have more than a sense of what we need to do but if I say 
do this or do that they will just say that I am running my 
own agenda. I see 7% return on capital our shareholders 
see 7% return on capital, what do they [the committee] 
see? They worry about looking after their departmental 
budgets, about making sure they have enough of the cake'.
Another month passed and Stephen started to discuss the next Strategy Weekend: -
'I have got to focus them [the directors and assistant 
directors] on profit, but I have got to do it in a way that 
makes them feel that it is their idea, if I just say - its about 
making more profit - they will say that I've carved up the 
weekend. If I say what is on my mind it would scare them 
shitless but these fucking people just do not see it. I could 
just blow my top and say - come on you lazy bastards, you 
get off your backsides and stop leaving it to me. If we do 
not turn this around someone is going to come along and
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do it better, they make the shareholders an offer, they are 
pissed off so they take the offer. What happens to the 
staff? I'll tell you what happens to the staff they get sacked 
and who wants a bunch of failures? It might work out for 
them but as CEO there is nowhere for me to go and I am 
not going to sit back and let it happen.'
As a result Stephen then sent out a circular to the directors and assistant directors 
soliciting their views on what the major strategic discussion points should be and the 
theme the forthcoming weekend should take.
A total of 88 suggestions came back to Stephen. Of these 15 were related to 
business development or cross selling whilst the remaining 73 covered subjects such 
as career planning, communication and the role of the Bank.
Stephen’s reaction was one of continuing frustration: -
'I just cannot believe some of the issues that these people 
have suggested, one of them has asked us to consider 
creating more regular communication with the Bank of 
England - if that’s what they want why don't they just get 
on and do it? It's very disappointing some of the trivia 
being raised.'
In terms of 'strategic direction' there is a clear indication here that Stephen and his 
team struggled for some form of mutual understanding. Stephen, by sending out the 
invitation for suggestions to be made, wanted co-operation and the involvement of his 
senior team. They, by sending in 88 responses, clearly wanted to be part of the 
conversation - the difficulty being that the meaning both took from 'strategic direction' 
was different. Possibly due, in large part, to the fact that Stephen did not want to 
'frighten' his team by sharing some of his concerns for the future. Unfortunately it
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would appear that the dependency created by Stephen compounded the issue. The 
following might be a reasonable view of the cycle they found themselves in: -
- Why could they not see the bigger picture?
- Because Stephen attempted to restrict their view of it
- Why would he do this?
- Because he did not want to frighten them
- Why would this be a problem?
- Because they had little experience in dealing with the bigger picture
- Why?
- Because Stephen would not let them see it
Stephen’s response to the return of questionnaires was to send around a draft 
agenda for the weekend set out in the following manner: -
'Overall theme: - PROFITABILITY. How do we maximise both short-term profitability
and long-term growth?
The issues that have been raised by all of you in relation to the strategy weekend all
have a bearing on profitability, and can be clustered into the following four broad
headings. These issues will form the context for the weekend: -
1. Product development and client base growth: - How do we develop products 
more effectively, and increase growth with the right kind of clients, and how do we 
strike the balance between growth in the client base and individual client and 
product profitability?
2. Client profitability: - how do we cross-sell more effectively and increase the 
lifetime profitability of our clients to the Group?
3. Operational efficiency: - how do we increase the quality, efficiency and cost 
effectiveness of our internal operations?
4. Staff effectiveness: - how do we improve motivation, co-operation, teamwork 
and communication across the Group?
Stephen then sent out the draft agenda to all those who would be attending the
weekend, inviting them to examine the subject matter through case study material of
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specific projects that had gone well, or not so well, in order to establish the 
underlying issues at play.
The Strategy Weekend opened formally on a Saturday morning in September 1998, 
the group having gathered the night before from London, Guernsey and the 
Bahamas.
The minutes of the weekend (Appendix ‘B’) reflect a frustrating period for Stephen 
and his team. The meeting started off with a recap of the previous Strategy Weekend 
and the resulting set up of the Group Marketing Forum. This was followed by a 
presentation by Stephen (Appendix ‘C’) in which he, once again, sought to 
emphasise the financial imperative to generate a better level of profitability in order to 
satisfy shareholders and provide appropriate rewards for staff.
As a complete break with tradition at the conclusion of his presentation Stephen 
informed the group that he would not be present for their discussions, but would be 
available at the beginning and end of each session as a resource, if requested. 
There followed a protracted series of discussions held within smaller groups where a 
number of case studies were evaluated. This evaluation then resulted in an 'Action 
List' of six projects that the group felt able to address: -
The creation of a template for project management
1. Finalisation of a company data base
2. Conducting a time use analysis to identify charging levels
3. Identify new products
4. Elimination of unprofitable business
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5. Issue and tabulation of questionnaires to enhance the performance of the 
business
Stephen, who had kept his distance from these discussions, but was briefed on the 
outcome of each session, became increasingly agitated at what he saw as the 
reluctance of any individual to take the initiative and responsibility for profit centred 
activity: -
‘What is the fucking matter with them, not one of them has 
the balls to take on the big issues I am waiting to hear - 'if 
we do not do X we are gone, finished out of business, 
therefore I propose to do X about starting today' - I feel 
passionately about this why don't they? What is it with 
initiative and profit that frightens them?’
The following morning this point was used as the catalyst for further discussion 
and the question was put to the whole group: -
'Stephen feels that yesterday was spent, largely, avoiding 
what he sees as the important issues for the Bank. He also 
feels that people are avoiding taking individual 
responsibility.’
The group, once again, split down into smaller units and in this phase Shane, one of 
the senior directors, made private comment. ‘People do not know how to deal with 
taking initiative - this has always been seen as risk taking in the Bank and these 
people and the Bank are 'risk adverse'.
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Once back in the wider setting of the main group there was a distinct shift in both the 
pattern and tempo of the contributions made by individuals with a more direct style 
that had not previously been evident.
A selection of the contributions made included the following statements: -
‘Non-executive directors are a waste of time and energy, 
whole days are lost in preparing for their visits at the end 
of which nothing is achieved and the business is no 
further forward.’
‘Is Stephen really serious about change?’
'Stephen may want to devolve things, but do the people 
above him want to? - Is he restrained?’
‘Stephen is keen to make a profit, but he is part of the 
culture of caution.'
Stephen:- ‘You talk about devolution of power - you can't 
devolve into a vacuum - if you don't take it up it cannot 
happen.’
Matthew:- ‘If people don't deliver they have to be 
accountable to Stephen.’
Stephen:- 'That won't get us anywhere - this group needs to 
make it clear to the person doing the task they will get the 
task done.’
Simon: There is no mechanism to do these things.’
Stephen: ‘Create a bloody mechanism.’
86
Stephen, who by now had gone red in the face with anger, stormed out of the 
room leaving a highly animated group behind. In Stephen’s absence, within an 
hour, the group had decided to scrap the Marketing Forum and create a Profit 
Committee. Furthermore they had appointed representatives from all parts of 
the business, set their first meeting and formulated a mission statement: -
To implement strategic direction by taking collective 
responsibility for delivering revenue related projects by 
effective prioritisation of resources and effective 
communication on a group wide basis.’
We specifically draw attention here to the term taking collective responsibility: A point 
reinforced at the end of the day by Shane:-
‘This is not just an issue of profit it is a question of what 
people will run with, committees they understand 
individual action they don't, it is not something that they 
know how to deal with’.
In the course of the following four months individuals from the Profit Committee had 
taken responsibility for leading a number of projects that were either directly or 
indirectly related to creating profit or generating further revenue:-
□ The issue of 'Gold' cards
□ Scheduling meetings with recognised intermediaries: solicitors, accountants' etc.
□ Creation of a 'wrapper1 product that would package together a number of 
services
□ Targeting of charitable institutions to offer a range of specialist Banking 
opportunities
□ Sponsorship of niche activities - international bridge competitions etc.
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At the end of this 4-month period Stephen expressed satisfaction but also 
puzzlement at the performance of The Profit Committee: -
'I do not really know how or why it turned out like this but
the change in attitude has been remarkable. I now have
some apparently genuine interest from people in moving 
the Bank forward.'
We might suggest that his staff always had an interest in moving the Bank forward
but there was a gap in understanding as to how this might be achieved and why it
was so important. For Stephen it was a clear case of individuals taking responsibility 
and taking on projects that would add value to the business of the Bank. No such 
logic prevailed for his staff as this activity created a risk for the group, none of whom 
had experience of taking risks or initiatives outside of a group forum, where collective 
responsibility could be claimed. Indeed the Bank had many built in controls to 
prevent just such action above and beyond the various Banking and investment 
committees listed earlier: -
• Parvin-May Board - to oversee shareholder matters
• The Group Executive Committee responsible for the formulation and execution of 
the Group strategy
• Parvin-May Board - responsible for the management of the Group's London 
activities
• Parvin-May (Guernsey) Board - responsible for the management of the Group's 
Guernsey activities
• Parvin-May (Bahamas) Board - responsible for the management of the Group's 
Bahamian activities
• Non - executive directors to oversee practice and policy
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Stephen and his managers struggled to accommodate each other's needs and 
ambitions. For Stephen it made 'common sense' to use initiative, try out new ideas. 
For his team the thought of 'leaping before looking' made no sense and was, 
therefore, nonsense. Stephen had the information to show his staff where and why 
they were leaping but had withheld it from them.
Seen in the conservative nature of Parvin-May 'initiative' was perceived to be risky, 
both at an individual and organisational level. Decisions were taken, new ventures 
initiated but by committee - not individuals.
As far as Stephen was concerned the 'penny must have dropped' - how else could 
the final result be explained?
The turning point came when Stephen gave the group permission - or rather 
demanded that the group 'create a bloody mechanism'. A 'mechanism' could be 
something other than an individual putting him or herself on offer - the most obvious 
'mechanism' was, of course, a committee. Stephen was happy with the progress 
made, although somewhat bemused by the method by which it was achieved.
Twelve months later at the following Strategy Weekend in September 1999, Stephen 
was faced with a further situation when the Director of Investments -  Shane, and a 
group of the assistant directors, started to make noises about a lack of recognition. 
Shane wanted promotion from the Group Executive Board to the Parvin-May Board - 
together with an enhanced title.
The assistant directors wanted promotion to director and seats on the Parvin-May 
Board as this held the prospect of greater levels of autonomy and authority for each 
of them.
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At the time of writing the total establishment of the Bank was around 200 the 
promotions sought would have taken the total directorate to 14.
In one of the discussion phases of the weekend, Shane made the comment: -
The time has come for the appropriate recognition to be 
given to those who have done so much for the Bank'.
Whilst in syndicate discussions Justin, one of the assistant directors, commented:-
'not much has changed -  Stephen still says get on and do 
it but then holds [sic] the power to himself and the Board.'
Later; in trying to resolve the issue Stephen made the comment: -
'It has more to do with what Shane (the Director of 
Investments) can tell his pals at dinner parties or on the 
7.30 [train] into Waterloo. It has bugger all to do with the 
efficiency of the Bank.’
Shane put it differently: -
'You have a Holdings Board mainly made up of old has- 
beens' that have not got a clue what is going on around 
them for the most part [key shareholders]. Then we have 
Stephen and Henry, we [the directors] just get wheeled on 
to do a party piece but most of them do not know what is 
going on. We should be there - we have the knowledge 
and have made a difference to the Bank.’
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Stephen, after much discussion with Henry decided to promote seven assistant 
directors to director: - Shane to Group Managing Director - Investment and John, 
who had been Director of Banking, to Group Managing Director - Banking and 
Treasury.
In justifying these actions Stephen explained - 'this is the norm in the City - it is the 
way it works almost anyone is a director - and the title of managing director for Shane 
and John will let them do their thing more effectively - it is the title that counts.’
Shane's elevation to the Holdings Board was also agreed - but suspended for a 
period of 12 months.
The newly appointed directors 'The Magnificent Seven' (Financial Times April 2000), 
were elected to the Parvin-May Board. However this board was now to sit every three 
months rather than every month.
Two months later a pole of opinion was taken from the new directors who made the 
following comments: -
'Interestingly at a strategic level a couple of the guys think 
that the structure of PM is a block to growth - I certainly 
see the need for accelerating change and shedding the old 
skin ASAP.'
'Still too much working in silos without the transfer of 
information across the group'
'Information flow and the quality of the information are 
dependent upon the Board member - knowledge is power 
still an issue'
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The jury is still out on this - the Sons Board now sits every 
three months -  Stephen has said that this is not a 
decision-making forum we are just there to listen'
'I knew something was amiss when we did not get 
sandwiches - the old Sons Board - met monthly and had 
sandwiches. We don't get the sandwiches, we would not 
be there long enough to eat them - it has got to be 
something of a joke around here we are the Board without 
to the catering staff.'
At an interview shortly after with the Chairman, Henry, this situation was 
explained to which he responded: -
'They should realise that they are not there to make 
decisions in other peoples areas it is not a forum for taking 
action - oh no definitely not, no they are there to do the 
same jobs as before - that must be made clear to them'
In the midst of this situation a management development company had been 
contracted by the Executive Board to deliver a range of management training 
modules to directors and assistant directors these included: -
- The nature and changing shape of organisations
- Moving from dependent to interdependent working
- Leadership as leading productive change
- Use of responsible initiative
This initiative led to even further frustration as those who attended agreed with 
the nature of the input but saw little scope for turning theory into practice at 
Parvin-May.
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On the 11th July 2000 Parvin-May issued a press release (Appendix ‘D’). 
Within that release, increases in performance across a series of measures 
were announced and Henry made comment about the reasons for those 
results: -
The positive results of our strategic decision five years ago 
to focus on private Banking are now visible. The financial 
services industry has now recognised that ours is a fast 
growing market. However, it is not possible to create an 
integrated private Banking business overnight and, whilst 
we are small, we have the advantage of having a proven 
structure and culture which will allow us to make further 
progress in the future.'
The theme of the next Strategy Weekend (October, 2000) had not been set at the 
time of writing but many in London and Guernsey had become increasingly 
frustrated that their concerns were not taken seriously, and any limited change (e.g. 
the Profit Committee) had been despite the prevailing culture and structure not 
because of them.
Meantime in the Bahamas over a period of three years, a start up fund management 
operation that was started with three experienced managers had grown to some 
twenty-two staff and had developed a fast growing client base.
Evident amongst staff was a strong belief that the organisation was responsive to its 
client base. Senior managers were able to act quickly and decisively; junior staff 
were supported and enabled to take appropriate levels of risk on their own initiative.
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Whilst this style had taken three years to evolve and appeared to capture much of 
the behaviour called for by Stephen, it had also moved away from a perceived 
dependency relationship this, by now, caused further tensions.
'Risk management is something of an issue for Stephen,
I do not really believe that he knew what he was getting 
into here [The Bahamas] things work in a very different 
way. This means that when we put a complex deal 
together and ask Guernsey to take on the banking side 
of it we are treated as though we do not know what we 
are doing - sometimes I get the feeling that we are seen 
as the enemy'
(Janet Martin, Managing Director, Bahamas)
'The positive influence of London is that if we can get it 
past John (Head of Group Banking) we know we can run 
so we use that as the hurdle, that's great so we just go 
as off beat as possible and see if it gets past John'
(David Head of Client Services, Bahamas)
"Whilst they [London and Guernsey] do not understand 
that the risk tolerance is different here and they create 
real procedural burdens they have given us a framework 
and structure. We can use that because when we narrow
down the options there is a well defined track to move it
on very quickly'
(James, Trust Manager, Bahamas)
The overarching feeling here was that the operation had been started by Stephen as 
a method of expanding the business of Parvin-May without true understanding of 
how business operated in this off shore environment. Whilst the initial decision­
making had been supported by London based managers, the start up phase had
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been replaced by a structure and style of management developed to the needs of 
the current context and not based on an historical structure and style handed down 
from the head office.
As a direct consequence Stephen was now seen to be 'micromanaging' and 'risk 
adverse' - in essence perpetuating much of the behaviour he had been trying to 
change for the preceding thirty months.
Our case study is now given an added dimension, realised only in the later stages of 
our research.
We have noted Stephen’s frustration that he was unable to generate the types of 
behaviours he sought out for the Bank. We have also noted that he talked of risk 
taking yet practised risk reduction.
The Strategy Weekend of 1998 had been the launch for a five year business plan 
and we have noted two of the key objectives set for that plan in terms of return on 
capital and increase in share price. We also noted the comments made by Stephen 
(above) and the likely consequences for him of the acquisition of the Bank whilst it 
was under performing.
We are now able to build on our data based upon subsequent disclosures. In 1998 
Stephen, in preparing for the Strategy Weekend, had made the comment 'we have 
got to look at 2003 as the limit - we have to be in the right shape by then at the 
latest'.
Early in 1999 Stephen made comment that 'Henry’s children are not interested in the 
Bank - they are quite co-operative and we tell them what is going on but that will not
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be where it ends up'. Later that year Shane, the head of investments, was promoted 
(detailed above) after putting pressure on Stephen and Henry. A further comment on 
this subject also noted at the time:-
'This is not the time for us to take the risk of losing Shane 
- it is not so much the principle we know what that would 
have been it is more that we do not have the time to put it 
back together should he go'.
As we have also seen seven new directors were also created, then early in 2000 the 
whole of the directorate were given substantial salary increases of up to 30%. 
Stephen explained this as 'necessary to keep them where they are - we are on the 
way but it is fragile so we have to be competitive.'
In April 2000 the Bank declared its end of year accounts to the stock market in which
it had taken the full charge for the relocation of its London offices in that financial
year rather than spreading the cost over five or even ten years. To this Stephen said 
'It’s a hit this year but it clears the decks'. Shortly after this comment he made a final 
disclosure:-
'Henry goes [retires] in March 2003 that is when the plan 
runs until. The likely outcome is that we will be taken over 
that is what we are shaping up for. We [Henry and 
Stephen] have been positioning the Bank so that the right 
buyer goes for the whole team - that is why we have to 
keep them together. I see it that the directorate will be 
given shares and told carry on and grow it more. Then 
they will sell again only this time we get real money out of 
this as well as the shareholders. This may run to 2003 but 
the way these things go I would think eighteen months to
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two years is more likely, in fact we are having lunch with 
one possibility today but they will not come to anything'.
Stephen was then asked a question:-
'Will any of the team at the Strategy Weekend be briefed 
in on this?
He replied:-
'No it is not something we can discuss but I rather hope 
that if I make the right sounds they might conclude this 
outcome for themselves.'
With the benefit of this disclosure we are better able to make sense of the preceding 
three years, albeit that the senior team were still to be kept away from this 
information and yet be expected to behave in a way that would enhance the 
prospects of achieving Stephen’s aims whilst ignorant of the prevailing context.
Concluding note
For us sensemaking was evident at a number of different levels. The central theme 
being the development of an organisation that took actions to prevent collapse yet in 
so doing defined the basis for which the Bank became an attractive proposition for 
sale. Inadvertently Parvin-May shaped its environment by moving into private 
banking as it did not have the competence to survive in merchant banking. The 
number of independent private banking operations reduced and their attractiveness 
to large institutions increased. At the same time, again for the sake of survival, the 
profitability of the Bank increased and this further fuelled the interest of potential 
buyers. The combination of internal and external activity had served to develop a
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wrapper that could be described as a 'successful, niche market private banking 
operation with a full London Stock Exchange listing’.
The learning for leadership here is firstly; reinforcement of the sensemaking 
phenomenon that sense is made retrospectively and therefore effective outputs may 
be better judged by understanding the inputs. Secondly attempting to create sense 
for others (Stephen laying out clues for his senior staff) is problem laden and made 
especially difficult when part of the information that led leadership to reach its own 
sensemaking is withheld from other actors. This becomes even more significant later 
when we examine the role of leadership as ‘sensegivers’.
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Service: the Police Force
Here we use a case study about the Police. We look at the historic development of 
an organisation that has led to a particular style of behaviour and thus part of the 
context upon which action is based. Our interest was re-awakened in this 
organisation (following earlier work in the late 1980s’, Carter, 1989) when UK 
politicians in 1997 started to make public comment about the need for less tolerance 
to crime (see below) we have therefore taken a sighting of>
•  resistance to certain forms of adaptive change (core values and structure)
•  acceptance of other adaptive change grounded in reduced tolerance to crime 
(although we shall point out that this was more a case of bringing to the fore 
suppressed behaviour rather than a change to behaviour)
W e look at the strains that Government influence can create when the significance of 
contextual issues is underplayed leading both to resistance - in the creation of a 
service based philosophy and acceptance in the creation of a zero tolerance based 
philosophy. We also examine the way in which what actors notice can be influenced 
by political agendas and, finally, the effect of failing to recognise the element of 
consent required for sensemaking to achieve endorsement and wider social 
enactment.
From inception, there has been disagreement about the main or central functions of 
the Police. For Sir Robert Peel, founder of London’s Metropolitan Police, their main 
task was 'crime prevention1. Sir Richard Mayne extended this, in his 1829 
instructions to the New Police of the Metropolis in which he singled out 'the 
prevention of crime, the protection of life and property and the preservation of public 
tranquillity1 as the core policing duties.
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In the early 1980s unprecedented public riots in London, Bristol, Liverpool, 
Manchester and other large conurbations led, in particular, to the inquiry by Lord 
Scarman into the April 1981 riots in Brixton, London, from which he concluded the 
Police had used excessive force in the enforcement of the law. Further still he stated 
that, in the event of a conflict of aims between the maintenance of public tranquillity 
and enforcement of the law, the former should be the responsibility of the Police.
In the middle of the 1980s tactics employed by the Police during the miners' strike, 
often in front of television camera crews, had a dramatic effect on not only the nature 
and style of policing, but also on the public perceptions about the Police. The image 
of Dixon of Dock Green (a 1960s TV drama series about policing in London) style 
policing (if, in reality, it ever existed) was lost forever.
Towards the end of the 1980s the Police were faced with increasing scrutiny due to 
continuing increases in crime and well publicised miscarriages of justice, the 
Birmingham six, the Guilford four etc., Public support for the Police had dropped to 
an all time low and the Government response was to try to apply private sector 
management values and measurement to the issues of policing.
In particular, emphasis was placed upon the need to provide a public service rather 
than apply force to uphold the law. In the late 1980s we made comment (ibid) that 
the duality of force and service were not sustainable and that an organisation such 
as the Police would need to bias its activity within one of these metaphors at the 
expense of the other. Furthermore for any real level of congruency to take effect 
behaviours best fitting the prevailing metaphor would need to be encouraged at the 
expense of the other.
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The problem for the Police was that the use of legitimate force, albeit to maintain the 
peace, had always formed a substantial part of a Constable's behavioural repertoire. 
Furthermore our research provided evidence that so pervasive was the notion of 
force that a quasi-military structure and system of management ensured that it was 
sustained.
Bittner (1980), comments that there are three levels at which force is legitimatised. 
Firstly each individual may use force in self-defence (although definition of this term 
is often ambiguous). Secondly specifically deputised persons are authorised to use 
coercive measures against named groups or individuals. Here we might think of an 
army at war with a foreign country or, on a domestic front, prison officers restricting 
the activities of inmates. The third method to legitimatise force, Bittner holds, is to 
form a Police Force that uses ‘essentially unrestricted' force, that is to say, they 
operate within a legal framework and act by circumstance rather than the identity of 
an individual or group of individuals. Bittner therefore contends that the Police are de 
facto a force not a service. The principal role is to use coercive but legitimate force, 
not to provide a service. In finding agreement with Bittner we would extend that 
interpretation to all aspects of organisational activity internally as well as externally.
Whilst senior police officers provided public declarations of support to service 
orientated behaviour and community based initiatives, the system of management 
that was to bring about this change of orientation remained one of compliance based 
upon the principles of hierarchy and authority.
Experience of policing outside the UK did not demonstrate successful parallels from 
which learning could be drawn to support substantive change. Indeed, one of the 
most symbolic aspects of policing in the UK - that officers were not routinely issued 
with firearms - was at odds with policing in all but a very small minority of countries.
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In France, Germany and the USA, where parallels are often drawn, the Police are 
armed, provided with protective equipment (body armour, CS gas and long batons) 
and are generally regarded as enforcement agencies that take a much tougher line 
with perceived offenders. It is no coincidence that part of the joke that defines heaven
and hell positions a heaven Policed by the British and a hell Policed by the Germans!
'Jokes involve some kind of unmasking, and belong to the 
family of satire, parody, caricature, cartoons, etc. but are 
distinct from all these. Their effects, when successful, 
always seem to include some flash of recognition and
illumination, understanding and perhaps self-
understanding caused by an abrupt switch of a train of 
thought to a different track. Perhaps, like intuition, a joke 
achieves this result through a kind of short cut that avoids 
reflection and reasoning, though it may well stimulate both.
Its essence is a sudden jolt or twist that deflates our 
expectations and both expresses and releases our 
anxieties.’
Lukes & Galnoor (p.x 1985)
Far from starting from a position of strength, most officers would have identified with 
this joke and saw themselves under-protected and under-resourced in the face of an 
increasingly violent society (Rawlings, 1995, Morgan & Newbum,1997).
Subsequent changes and the overt symbolism of arming the British Police on a more 
routine basis combined with training to deal with public disorder and the investment 
in the prevention and detection of major crime, took place in the same time frame as 
attempts to shift the emphasis towards a service orientation. The language and 
symbolism actually accentuated the pre-eminence of force and whilst maintaining a 
necessary accommodation for a service element -  part of the structure, part of the
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language, part of the reporting and part of the delivery - this was tolerated as long as 
operational effectiveness was not compromised.
More recently the previous Government in its White Paper Police Reform (1997) 
signalled its intention to return to an earlier model of policing, one that gives greater 
emphasis to 'fighting crime'.
The 1996 election manifesto the Labour Party picked up on the same theme when it 
committed itself to being 'tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime'. This was 
quickly followed by an experiment by the Police in Middlesborough based upon the 
doctrine of zero tolerance policing. Police Commissioner William Bratton and Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani received international press coverage after pioneering the 
philosophy in New York.
The concept was a simple one that challenged the traditional orthodoxy of 
concentrating resources on serious crime. It rested on the premise that a culture of 
contempt for social order existed which allowed lawlessness to take root. It 
suggested that if policing efforts were used to combat petty crime, vandalism, theft 
etc., they would also find that many of those engaged in petty crime were also 
involved in more serious offences. It would demonstrate a greater commitment by 
society to combat all levels of crime and encourage members of the public to report 
anti-social behaviours, thus reducing the levels of tolerance.
The policy reduced crime in New York by 17 per cent, halved the murder rate and 
restored a degree of personal freedom for those living in areas of high crime. It also 
led to a doubling of complaints against the Police and an increase in the prison 
population.
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This reversal of emphasis is in direct conflict to the notion of community policing 
according to which policing is based upon consultation between the Police and the 
public as a means of informing operational policing. This is emphasised by such 
reports as the Operational Policing Review (1990) that found that most respondents 
preferred to see police officers working with local people to solve the problems of 
crime rather than detecting and arresting offenders.
The Police are caught between in the dichotomous position of providing both service 
and force as an enactment of their responsibilities. This is set against the shifting of 
political orientation from the use of enforcement policies in the early 1980s, the 
development of wide ranging cautioning policies in the late 1980s and back to 
enforcement policies in the mid 1990s'.
In the late 1980s' our research (ibid) suggested that the level of expectation placed 
upon police officers caused considerable tension between an internal management 
style, largely regulated and authoritarian, and the rather more liberal policies that 
senior officers supported and encouraged as an output of the organisation and which 
drew heavily upon the emphasis of Central Government for a service ethos in public 
agencies.
For the rank and file culture of the Police this created discontinuity between theory 
and practice, principally because, in the main, they had remained resistant to the 
theory and attempted to maintain the practice - with a bias towards acting as a force 
Manning (1997).
In a sense it could be suggested that force (as a metaphor) was being used in an 
attempt to deliver a service, and, however uneasily this sat with rank and file officers,
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it provided sufficient agitation to displace a good deal of the previous 'traditional1 
policies of enforcement.
In our current research we revisited the Police who appeared far less anxious to 
appease libertarian influences and far more focused upon a results based criteria 
that is grounded in the numbers of arrests, conviction rates, quantities of drugs 
seized and stolen property recovered. These are the issues that now guarantee 
national newspaper headlines rather than the community based activities of the late 
1980s'.
At the same time complaints about the attitude of police officers rose and the 
experimental policy of zero tolerance in Cleveland was, in part, discredited by the 
suspension of the head of the Criminal Investigation Department. Concern was 
voiced that officers may have improved detection rates through manipulation of crime 
statistics. Even worse were investigations into officers allegedly handing out 
controlled drugs to informants in exchange for information.
Despite this emerging context, politicians were apparently drawn to the strong 
rhetoric that zero tolerance invokes:-
'Tony Blair will call today for a policy of zero tolerance as 
part of a new law and order initiative. Under a "hot spot 
policing" strategy in 25 towns and cities, Police will be told 
to get tough on burglary, car break-ins, drunkenness and 
other anti-social behaviour*
(The Daily Telegraph, September 29,1998)
These comments of the Prime Minister need to be juxtaposed with a different 
meaning.
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'Zero tolerance is often misunderstood. It does not mean 
jackbooted Police officers dragging vagrants off the streets 
or sending shoplifters to the gallows.'
(Nick Ross, The Times 14th October 1998)
Ross makes a point by adding that 'many of the remedies to crime are not within the 
gift of the Police'. Yet it is to the Police that responsibility for enforcing zero tolerance 
will be delegated.
The model that Ross argues for suggests that crime can often be forestalled before it 
occurs by improving the quality of service; cutting costs, improving co-ordination, 
reducing duplication and being more professional at collecting and analysing data to 
discover crime patterns.
An aspect of zero tolerance that has been underplayed in the literature suggests that 
the fall in crime in New York was the result of a combination of factors, including 
changes in the drugs market and the de-centralising of operational power to the local 
commanders of the NYPD (New York Police Department). In Bowling (1996) Police 
Commissioner Bratton contends that it was the organisational changes to the 
bureaucratic structures of the NYPD that had the most impact on the fall in crime. 
Whilst this supported the view of observers such as Ross (ibid), politicians did not 
focus on this perspective. They preferred to talk in terms of combating anti-social 
behaviour through direct Police action.
In the United Kingdom attempts have been made to change the organisation and 
system of control of the Police including calls from within the service. Prior to and 
during the Sheehy Inquiry (see below) Sir John Woodcock, Her Majesty's Chief
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Inspector of Constabulary made repeated calls for changes in the culture and 
structure of the Police service: -
'While it is making much progress, the service is in danger 
of falling behind public expectations'
(1991, p.238)
The second [challenge] is the demonstration of flexibility in 
the approach to the management of the Service. I believe 
that parts of the present rank structure are inappropriate 
for the late 20th Century'
(1992, p.9)
'The Police Service is ripe for change and there is a 
chance that many old structures will be swept away'
(1993, p.7)
Between May 1992 and June 1993 the Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and 
'Rewards (Sheehy Inquiry) examined deficiencies in internal management rather 
than the defects perceived in Police governance. The inquiry identified a top-heavy 
management structure, and called for the abolition of three ranks and more flexible 
pay structures. Rank and file Police (ranks to Chief Inspector) resistance to much of 
the report was swift and determined resulting in the then Home Secretary, Michael 
Howard, announcing in October 1993 that he rejected significant sections of the 
report, in particular the methods of administering performance related pay. He did, 
however, endorse the reduction in the number of ranks and the principle of devolving 
decision-making to basic command units.
The most immediate and visible effect then of the Sheehy Inquiry was the removal of 
the ranks of Deputy Chief Constable, Chief Superintendent and Chief Inspector.
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Since 1993 these ranks have been gradually reinstated until, by 1999, the rank of 
Chief Superintendent was also restored. The reasons given in each case being that 
the spans of control for the remaining ranks had been too great. This has returned 
the Police to a structure that carries a minimum of nine ranks for police forces 
numbering from as few as 1,000 officers.
In attempting to alter the structure of the Police, Sheehy went straight to one of the 
most symbolic aspects of the Police organisation, linked to a series of rituals that 
sustained the ‘structure’ of the Police in its existing form for many years through 
deep-rooted behaviours. The symbols and rituals addressed here are those 
associated with the separation of rank within the Police. Certain symbols are easily 
identified and owe their origins to the quasi-military beginnings, the more obvious 
being the style of uniform and badges of rank. Most police forces, certainly those in 
the provinces, clearly distinguish between the ranks of Sergeant and Inspector, 
whereas Constables and Sergeants wear the same style of uniform with their force 
numerals clearly displayed (the only uniform difference between the two ranks being 
that a Sergeant wears chevrons). Inspectors and ranks above not only wear different 
badges of rank but the uniform is of finer cloth and different style. The Constable and 
Sergeant will wear blue shirts whilst the 'senior officers' wear white shirts (this 
particular distinction is gradually changing throughout the UK but certainly remains 
current for many forces). Also universal in the English and Welsh Police Forces is the 
practice of senior officers wearing flat caps, rather than helmets, and not displaying 
force numerals.
Many of the material symbols, such as car parking, salary, office size, the quality of 
fittings, secretarial support and even senior officers toilets, associated with rank are 
not so obvious to the casual observer but are common to all organisations that 
distinguish between employees' positions. In addition there are subtle distinctions
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that serve to separate positions of rank, such as different retirement ages with those 
in the senior ranks being able to remain in employment longer than those at junior 
level, different expense scales and enhanced holiday allowances.
Ranks between Constable and Chief Inspector are known as 'federated ranks', these 
officers are eligible to join the Police Federation. Officers at Constable and Sergeant 
ranks are able to claim overtime payment for working beyond their eight-hour shift. 
On promotion to Inspector a salary increase is provided but overtime is not paid. 
Many of these officers will, however, be able, depending upon their duties, to claim 
allowances for the purchase and maintenance of private motorcars used in 
connection with their duties. If policing can be described as a profession then there is 
an argument that it comes at the rank of Superintendent (Greenhill, 1981) and 
officers of this rank may also become members of the Superintendents Association, 
another representative body. Assistant Chief Constables and above belong to the 
Association of Chief Police officers (ACPO).
To know the rules of conduct between officers of different ranks requires knowledge 
of their backgrounds and previous association. In general terms the following would 
be common. Officers working closely together on a small unit or in a department will 
often be on first name terms whilst in private or within their own group. Rarely, but 
occasionally, this will extend between officers separated by two ranks and this can 
often be traced to a long-term relationship, joining the force together, friendship etc. 
Protocols are improvised but on a negotiated theme that protects, when necessary, 
rank separation.
To those not familiar with these rituals a different meaning can be given. Colville 
(1985), interpreted the arrival of senior Police officers in full uniform at a Police 
Authority meeting as a display of power rather than a mark of respect for the Police
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Authority. Power may have been part of the issue but equally as important was the 
notion of respect. Junior officers are drilled at training schools on the wearing of 
uniform and the correct rituals to be adopted. Uniform officers would rarely go inside 
a court, let alone give evidence, unless in full uniform, as a mark of respect to the 
Crown, not to usurp the power of the court. Detectives -  even those working 
undercover -  would normally give evidence when wearing a jacket with collar and tie. 
This is not the case on the continent but it certainly holds true for the UK.
One UK Chief Constable Richard Wells, had reached senior rank in the London’s 
Metropolitan Police (Deputy Assistant Commissioner the equivalent rank of Deputy 
Chief Constable) on a number of occasions he had failed to secure Chief Officer 
posts. He was a very intelligent Cambridge graduate who had made considerable 
efforts to build links with the media and community groups. He also refused to allow 
the type of rank separation described above to interfere with his own values.
Richard was, eventually, promoted to Chief Constable of South Yorkshire where he 
regularly disarmed his junior officers by insisting that he, rather than they or an 
assistant, would pour coffee. He would go to great lengths to diminish his positional 
power whenever he was trying to build relationships or communicate effectively. He 
told us that promotion had been gained ‘despite [Sir] John Dellow (then Deputy 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police) telling anyone in ACPO who would listen -  
‘good guy it’s just a shame the way he [Richard] holds the rank’. Richard had (with 
some justification) thought that this was one of the major reasons why it had taken 
him so long to gain one of the top positions and it certainly ruled him out of returning 
to London as commissioner.
As a manager those around him in South Yorkshire respected Richard’s vision and 
intellect. They also respected his integrity, but his senior management team also
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knew that the behaviour described above -  in the eyes of Sir John Dellow and some 
of Richard’s own junior officers - diminished his office and authority and this led them 
to trivialise many of the changes he attempted to bring about. He literally did not act 
as a Chief Constable was expected to act within this type of organisation and the 
result was that he eventually faded into obscurity and retired having failed during six 
years in office to leave any lasting impression on the style of management behaviour 
-  reinforced by the fact that his replacement was more comfortable with a traditional 
command and control style of management.
Changes to the political control of the Police have had a more lasting impact. Until 
the 1980's constitutional control of policing was reasonably well established, Chief 
Constables acted within wide discretionary boundaries and defined their own 
'operational' policing issues. The Home Office and Police Authorities provided 
funding; both these bodies could and did attempt to exert influence. Whether such 
influence had any effect, largely, depended upon whether Chief Constable’s 
supported their views and often whether or not they chose to use their 'operational' 
discretion as a means of avoiding such influence.
This situation effectively tended to shift the tripartite relationship and gave Chief 
Constables the opportunity of focussing the activities of their officers without 
necessarily the unqualified support of the Police Authorities or the Home Office. At 
best, therefore, the level of participation in the initiatives detailed here in the 1980's 
through to the mid 1990's was patchy and of short duration.
The relationship now appears to have shifted, and with it the flexibility of Chief 
Officers to select activity or choose to notice and define aspects of social behaviour 
as being of legitimate concern to the Police has been reduced.
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The Police may define activity as being of legitimate interest but the Home Office 
and Police Authorities have developed their ability to influence and even forestall 
policing activity through financial restraints and a direct role in the career 
development of Chief Officers.
In the following section we detail discussions that took place between senior police 
officers attending the Strategic Command Course at the Police Staff College, 
Bramshill. These officers had all successfully completed the six-month programme 
and would soon be taking up Chief Officer rank posts. In essence, they formed part 
of the next generation of Chief Constables.
The experience and views of the British officers is given added support by the 
presence on the programme of a Deputy Chief (Ron) from a Canadian force. The 
discussions imply changes to the relationship of power and detail a range of controls 
being used to encourage Chief Officers to notice some activity and ignore other.
John The relationship that formerly existed - as a tripartite
form of power sharing has changed. It used to be the 
case that Chief Officers could and did rationalise their 
own policy issues. Now we have much more of an 
interventionist Government and the pecking order is 
the Home Office, Police Authority and then Chief 
Constables.'
Robert 'Constitutionally the situation has not changed but... .all
Chief Officers either are, or will be, on short-term 
contracts added to which Police Authorities will be 
conducting annual appraisals of Chief Officers'
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'Annual appraisals that must factor in over 100 policing 
priorities set by Home Office Circulars, Home 
Secretary's letters and HMI Thematic Inspections.'
W e are going the same way as Health and Education 
with the production of league tables'
'Okay that can give you a difficulty as I see it [as a 
Canadian officer] you are being told to concentrate on 
low level crime, drugs, auto theft, youth and public 
order crime. Certainly that is the message that I took 
from the Home Secretary's speech at the start of this 
programme. In Ontario it can go a stage further 
because the Municipal Council can say you can have 
more Police officers but we want them engaged in 
traffic duty ticketing speeders because that is a 
revenue generator for the City'
'Much of what we now do is judged against 'The 4 Cs' 
Challenge, Consult, Compete and Compare - a fifth 
one has been added Collaborate. Twenty years ago 
offences were investigated now the pressure is to 
judge the relative merits based upon compare and 
contrast'
'In other words commercial crime involving a single 
theft to a value of £150,000 is just that a single crime. 
Twenty cars broken into in a car park is twenty 
separate crimes - there is no reward in the system for 
investigating the single offence based upon monetary 
value - even though individual officers would love to do 
so'
This is really where I came in - we ran an operation 
called 'Project 88' this was initiated by the Chief who 
decided that rather than deal with low level crime we
would target top level corruption. This had not been 
looked at before and it was not really understood 
where it was going. Anyway we start to get into corrupt 
officials, rigged contracts and the like. All of a sudden 
everyone is interested because we started to bring 
down some heavy weight politicians. The mistake that 
was made was not to recognise the consent line. There 
is a dynamic relationship between Honesty & Purity on 
one side and Corruption & Dishonesty on the other.
The Police are expected to define the consent line with 
all the pressures on either side. We moved that line 
towards Honesty & Purity but without the consent, so 
even though these were high level crimes once it was 
realised what was involved they [the Police Service 
Board and Municipal Council] pulled the plug.
John 'How extensive was the problem?'
Ron 'We could have done nothing but this, you cannot
believe just how far this thing stretched but once it was 
laid on the line people were scared to death of it. They 
just wanted it to go away, they were intensely 
interested in who was next to go down but in the end it 
was just too big to contemplate'
Noticing a pattern of social activity, labelling and creating an overlap of meaning - the 
essence of sensemaking - does not, so it would seem, necessarily mean that the 
conclusion will be welcome. It may be possible to accentuate the importance of 
timing by suggesting that the more politically sophisticated actors could do a lot 
worse than gauge the sense of occasion of their prospective audience. Story telling 
connects meaning, it does not replicate meaning - we each take from it something 
different.
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The stories told by Ron became too problematical for the audience to support once 
meanings were extracted and the ramifications of this piece of sensemaking were 
realised - for which the interests of a wider public audience may not have been best 
served, different timing and a different sense of occasion may have led to a different 
outcome.
The stories about zero tolerance on the other hand seemingly presented meanings 
[combating rising crime] that were just too attractive for some of the audience to pass 
up - for which the interests of a wider public audience may also not be best served.
Concluding Note
A number of lessons can be learnt and connections made with sensemaking from 
this case study.
The lessons for leadership are that adaptive change can be a slow and precarious 
process which can be completely undermined and lead to an overreaction if what is 
thought of as a reversal of behaviours is in fact the re-enforcement of a deeply held 
pre-existing set of behaviours (the change from service based behaviours that had 
not taken root to ‘zero tolerance’). Leadership needs to understand the context in 
which they are operating and the true nature of what they are attempting to influence.
In order to complete the process of adaptive change and make sense for people 
there is more to the process than changing knowledge or language or symbols or 
behaviour and yet this is the route chosen by some in the role of leadership.
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Modernising: Foreign & Commonwealth Office Services
'Change, change, why do we need change? Things are 
quite bad enough as they are'
(Lord Salisbury)
The basis of this case study is the way in which senior management of a department 
within the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) finds itself caught (and caught out) 
by a shift in its environment to which it is seemingly unable to respond. Our interest 
was taken not so much by the nature of sensemaking (although this was evident) it 
was more the surprising difficulty the organisation had with translating sensemaking 
into recognisable activity, despite an apparent wish to do so.
We look at the history and context of change attempts within the Civil Service and 
then link this to ongoing passages of activity by our actors within a five-year period 
(1995-1999). The activity is multi-layered and seemingly paradoxical as long awaited 
shifts in policy emerge whilst our actors continue to wait and then seek to perpetuate 
the very behaviours they would wish to change. Told retrospectively the events 
recounted form a simple and logical sequence of activity, taken in real time actions 
were far more haphazard and confused - it is a sense of this confusion that we 
attempt to convey.
'All the efforts of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
are directed towards ensuring that the United Kingdom and 
its dependent Territories are secure and prosperous and 
that British Nationals can live in a decent and stable
world  We are committed to securing maximum
value for the money granted by Parliament'
(Malcolm Rifkind, Foreign Secretary'1996 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual 
Report)
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Few within the FCO would argue about its purpose, indeed it has changed little since 
the 17th century when colonisation of the former British Empire began. The structure 
is very hierarchical the explanation for which is given as the number of overseas 
missions required to be headed by a senior diplomat and attendant support staff.
•  The FCO comprises 6,050 UK and 7,440 locally appointed staff
•  It has responsibility for relations with 183 countries and 11 Dependent Territories
• The FCO utilises 13 Civil Service grades from Support Grade 2 (SGB2) through to 
Diplomatic Service 1 (DS1)
•  The grade structure is split between Diplomatic Staff (designation DS) and Home 
Civil Service (designation HCS), in the main the DS staff are appointed to foreign 
postings
The grading structure in the Civil Service broadly follows a numerical banding, the 
most senior posts being at grade 1. The FCO grades up to DS4 equate to one band 
below the Home Office equivalent - e.g. DS4 = HCS5. DS4/HCS5 is also the level at 
which staff are graded as Senior Civil Service (SCS), this grouping has separate pay 
review procedures and contractual arrangements.
Each of the grades listed is subject to additional separation that will indicate seniority 
within grade or specialist/technical roles. The complexity of the grading structure is 
such that 110 different designations are represented within a total of 6,014 staff. 
Some 450 are to be found in the ranks of the Senior Civil Service grades, of these 
some 420 are diplomats - Ambassadors, First Secretaries, Directors and the like.
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As recently as 1992 Oxford and Cambridge University graduates accounted for 79% 
of successful fast stream (to Grade 7D/8) applications; all fast stream entrants within 
the FCO are inducted into the Diplomatic Service.
The Foreign & Commonwealth Office comprises sixteen divisions called 'commands' 
each headed by a director. These in turn report to the Board of Management led by 
the Permanent Under-secretary (PUS) and his deputy the Chief Clerk.
Whilst the structure of the FCO has not changed for many years the second of 
Rifkind's quotes (above) is a relatively new requirement of all Central Government 
departments and agencies that has its origins in the early 1980s.
Colville & Tomkins (1990), Colville, Dalton & Tomkins (1993), Colville & Packman 
(1996) note, in their examination of change within the Customs & Excise Service, 
how successive Governments since the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime 
Minister in 1979, have demonstrated that they are committed to securing maximum 
value for the money granted by Parliament through a series of Government White 
Papers: -
The Financial Management Initiative (1982)
Improving Management in Government The Next Steps (1988)
Competing for Quality (1991)
The Role of The Civil Service (1993)
Private Finance Initiative (1993)
The Civil Service: Continuity and Change (1994)
The Civil Service: Taking Forward Continuity and Change (1995)
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These Government publications have recurring themes of encouraging cost 
reduction through the promotion of effectiveness and efficiency. Variously achieved 
through a range of initiatives that Dowding (1995), Oliver & Drewry (1996) describe 
as a process of chipping away at the established Civil Service until it's managerial 
techniques better mirrored those in the private sector. The underlying ideology being 
that market forces would, through competition, drive the process of greater 
efficiency.
This pressure for change was overlaid in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the 
Civil Service was rapidly and radically transformed from a straight-forward 
hierarchical line structure to a complex form, with a core of policy-making civil 
servants in Whitehall, surrounded by a periphery of policy executing agencies.
By its own admission, many senior managers within the FCO had resisted much of 
the change evident within other Central Government departments. Certainly the Next 
Steps programme of the 1980s, and the creation of executive agencies had left the 
FCO unscathed. Evidence eventually started to emerge in the mid 1990s that 
changes elsewhere in the Civil Service were influencing the thinking of some senior 
managers, albeit much later.
Some would feel that Central Government had failed to provide a clear 
understanding of what was expected of civil servants: -
'It appears from this [Public Accounts Committee’s] report 
that a major issue, arising from the Report, concerns the 
extent of misunderstanding among public servants about 
the quasi-private sector environment into which they are 
moving; rather than pinpointing - and blaming - 
inappropriate moral stances, held by private sector
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incomers. This misunderstanding may stem from 
politicians’ inability or unwillingness to spell out the 
meaning and implications of the new environment. Thus, 
some public servants’ inaccurate perceptions of private 
sector values and practice may have led them into actions, 
which are unacceptable in either code. At worst, a minority 
may have sought deliberate advantage from a changing 
values system, and been found out - perhaps not all the 
‘spivs’ have been imported into public services 
management some of them were already there!’
(Harrow & Gillett, 1994, pp. 4)
In 1995 Gillian Archer, Head of FCO Management Development initiated a series of 
change management workshops for the middle management group within the 
General Services Command (the largest of the 16 FCO divisions comprising some 
1,800 staff).
'I have serious concerns for our people. We have long-term 
officers who are being expected to change that's okay. But 
what are we doing to support them - how do they cope, 
how do they deliver these changes to their own staff. We 
need to identify how other successful organisations expect 
their managers to behave'
A training needs analysis followed and this highlighted a number of behavioural 
attributes where the management group was thought to be deficient; measured 
against what were thought to be successful commercial organisations: -
•  Little use of initiative
• Plenty of support for officers but little challenge or holding to account for 
performance
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•  Autocratic management style
•  Lack of flexibility
•  Poor communication skills
•  Reluctance to work across departmental boundaries
•  Top down decision-making
A three-year roll out programme of 22 workshops followed in which some 300 
managers at grades DS9 to DS5 (or HCS equivalent) took part, using the training 
needs analysis as the development focus. The programme was entitled Managing In 
a Changing Environment (MITCE).
The responsibilities of those attending included heads of newly established business 
units, those conducting bench marking and market testing of services, managers of 
support functions and diplomats on home postings (typically of 2-3 years duration).
At appendix ‘E” we list a summary of the comments made by delegates during the 
first and the last MITCE programmes in January 1996 and November 1998 
respectively.
Managers were asked under five broad headings: the change process, staff, 
management, skills and direction to comment on issues that impeded development 
in the FCO.
It will be seen that there was commonality in the comments made by delegates 
despite the 33 months separating the workshops. Many could identify new structural 
alterations, the re-naming of departments, examination and reporting of costs. Little 
evidence was found to confirm any change in attitude or behaviour amongst senior
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managers. Over a period of time this created resentment amongst staff who felt that 
the content of the MITCE workshops did not fit the organisation and worse still 
attempting to enact behaviours discussed within the workshops could have 
endangered careers.
Whilst this period covers a limited period of time, the information gathered bore out
anecdotal evidence that the FCO had largely resisted intervention by Central
Government. Below we note conversations that took place between members of the 
senior management team of the General Services Command in response to 
feedback from the MITCE programme as it reached its final stage of delivery in 
November 1998.
Peter W e have to decide what we can do within the command 
that does not have to be given the all clear by the Chief 
Clerk'
George 'There are a lot of people out there that are looking at us - 
we have built this up but we have to ask whether we have 
delivered'
Janet 'It is a problem - fortunately we can do quite a bit but only 
at the micro level. One of my officers put together a really 
good paper that went to the Chief Clerk. She outlined 
much of what we have heard, positioning it against best 
practice in other Civil Service units. He wrote over the top;
'interesting report but I do not feel that it reflects 
widespread feeling in the office'
Susan 'That is not surprising, the PUS always says that we are a 
special case and that he sees no need to change the way 
we work. Last week I heard him say that Rifkind (the 
former Foreign Secretary) had told him that in his view we
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were a special case and the real problems came from the 
Treasury'
Peter 'Well that makes sense but it still means that we are telling
our staff manage this way or that way but do not get 
caught'
Janet 'No it does not! It means wait for the right opportunity - then
run with it, until then we have to be honest and tell people 
where we are at with this'
Gillian 'Sooner or later the dam will burst. What he [the PUS]
refuses to understand is that he is just playing into the 
Government's hands. They will, eventually, just replace the 
lot of them with their own people'
Unknown to the managers above, shortly after election to office in 1997, Robin Cook 
the incoming Labour Party Foreign Secretary, had already given forewarning of a 
potential new agenda: -
'The Chief Clerk has said that Cook (Foreign Secretary) 
has told the PUS that in line with other departments he 
wants specific proposals on how we intend to change our 
management style. He has also said that he wants to see 
what those on the ground think. He [the PUS] may not like 
it but he knows he has to roll over; the Cabinet Secretary 
has been put on notice by the PM that this is not going 
away. There is no way out this time and 'call me Tony' (the 
Prime Minister) is not going to tolerate talk of special 
cases'
(Matthew Phillips Head of FCO Change Unit)
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In late 1998 the PUS formed the 'Foresight Group1 a project team tasked with 
soliciting feedback from FCO officers throughout the World. It reported back in 
November 1999 with a comprehensive series of findings (see section 1 ‘key findings 
at Appendix ‘F’) that considered how the office needed to function and how it should 
manage its staff.
To recap, prior to 1999 the public focus of Government on public service reforms 
were based on outputs: cost, efficiency and effectiveness. This had been reflected in 
a series of Government White Papers (listed above). Whilst many Central 
Government departments had devolved much of their function to agencies, or even 
privatised their function, the FCO had avoided such actions. In response to the calls 
for output reform (on a fiscal agenda) they had variously introduced business units, 
bench marking and market testing of services and even labelled some activity as 
'business process re-engineering'. However senior managers of the General 
Services Command and indeed their staff had believed, despite the change of labels 
and the introduction of new processes, there had been little change in management 
behaviour. Neither had permissions for such changes been given by the PUS and 
the Board of Management, indeed they had hard evidence that such change was not 
to take place citing the squashing of internal reports that recommended alterations to 
structure and procedure.
Reform of public sector organisations changed with the publication of the White 
Paper Modernising Government (March, 1999). After eighteen years in opposition 
this was a formal opportunity for the Labour Government to make a profound policy 
statement that received widespread publicity and comment from public sector 
organisations across the spectrum, from defence to health, social services and the 
Police. For the first time the focus became the way public bodies managed.
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W e live in an age when most of the old dogmas that 
haunted Governments in the past have been swept away.
We know now that better Government is about much more 
than whether public spending should go up or down, or 
whether organisations should be nationalised or privatised.
Now that we are not hidebound by the old ways of 
Government we can find new and better ones'
(P- 9)
'Management over the past 20 years, various 
management changes within the public service have
improved value for money But too little attention has
gone into making sure that policies, programmes and 
service across the board are devised and implemented in 
ways that best meet people's needs, where necessary by 
working across institutional boundaries.
(p.11)
The theme was continued at an individual level calling for less 'risk averse' and more 
inclusive management that focused upon ‘public service users, not providers' (p.6).
The White Paper also made it quite clear that all departments and agencies were to 
walk this talk. The introduction by the Minister for the Cabinet Office -  Jack 
Cunningham -  summarised this as follows: -
'To improve the way we provide services, we need all parts 
of Government to work together better. We need joined-up 
Government. We need integrated Government (emphasis 
added). And we need to make sure that Government 
services are brought forward using the best and most 
modem techniques, to match the best of the private sector 
-  including one-stop shops, single contacts which link in to
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a range of Government Departments and especially 
electronic information-age services'.
(P- 5)
In April 1999, coincidentally, but nevertheless, shortly after publication of 
Modernising Government, the General Services Command was re-designated as 
FCO Services (FCOS) and the process began of separating out non-core support 
services from the 'main' FCO office. This can be viewed as the delayed reaction to 
the structural change agenda of Next Steps et al. (detailed above). Certainly the 
majority of those serving in what was now FCOS were not part of the diplomatic 
service, the minority that were held the right to transfer back to the main office.
Opinion on the viability of a group of different service providers coming together as 
FCOS varied. Many saw the move as distancing them from the 'real' FCO and 
private opinion from the board was that this was a move by the PUS and 
Management Board to sacrifice its support activity as a response to the continuing 
call for efficiency savings and reforms (the agenda based on outputs), whilst 
protecting its policy-making status as a Central Government department.
In November 1999 the Foresight Report (see key findings Appendix ‘F’) was 
published and, following internal circulation, the PUS forwarded a copy to the 
Cabinet Secretary and the Foreign Secretary. The research for the report straddled 
the publication of Modernising Government, yet many of the themes paralleled the 
modernising agenda and indeed went beyond it in areas such as: flexible working, 
taking responsibility and relationships with ministers. To many in the FCO, it came 
as a shock that the report was published but more so that the PUS came out in 
public support of it.
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There is no going back now you would think that
modernising was his [the PUS'] idea! I am not sure if it is
for real or not but he is certainly saying the right things. In 
fact he is asking how we can speed up the changes.1
(Jim Rogers -  Director, Medical Welfare)
Meanwhile the directorate of FCOS was deciding how to formulate its strategic plan 
for submission to the Chief Clerk following the department's formation. To assist with 
this process, consultants were engaged to review the first draft. A key aspect of the
debate being whether to mention the possibility of FCOS separating from the FCO
by acquiring 'executive agency status', thus freeing up their options to create a semi- 
autonomous enterprise with far greater viability and flexibility: management, pay and 
development of staff with options to sell services to a wider market.
Gordon (Head of Finance)
‘In many ways it would be the right decision - it may 
happen anyway at the prior options review in 2003 
(evaluation point of FCOS) - that will be a decision for the 
Board of Management’
Irving (consultant)
‘Where do the staff think that you are on this?’

















'Well maybe not but there has always been a lot of 
discussion amongst staff about where the department is 
heading wouldn't this be a good opportunity to let them 
know one way or the other?'
The truth of the matter is that the Board probably think that 
we should go the executive agency route but I cannot see 
Ray (the CEO) putting that in his executive summary'
Who writes the summary?’
'I do'
Well if we are going to write a draft for the Board to 
consider how about putting it in and seeing how Ray and 
the others react?’
‘Its worth a try - not sure what the Chief Clerk or the PUS 
might think though'
‘Glad you mentioned that - we have read your first run at 
the strategy document - to be honest it tells us what you 
have done but not what you are going to do’
‘You could even say that this strategy has no future'
W hat do you mean?’
'Well there is no mention of the Modernising Government 
White Paper and no apparent relationship to the 
'modernising agenda', which seems a pretty pivotal Central 
Government concern’
Donald ‘Ah - 1 forgot about that, I have seen it of course, but no it's 
not there’
Irving ‘I think you might find that it gives you the platform to put
forward the executive agency idea, provide a coherent 
business case and commit to being in a position to convert 
to executive agency status at Prior Options in 2003’
Martin This way you could consider the executive giving a public
commitment to the staff, at least they will know what you 
want to achieve over the next three years’ '
Over the course of the following month a draft strategy document was written by the 
consultants and sent to Donald at FCOS. The CEO's executive summary was 
drafted to include 'aiming for executive agency status by the time of the Prior Options 
Review in 2003' and extensive reference made to how the department could be 
managed in line with the 'modernising agenda'.
There then followed a further meeting with the consultants.
Martin ‘Did you circulate the draft that we prepared?’
Donald 'We circulated it all right - it frightened some of them to
death, we were told 'under no circumstances are you to 
show this to anyone’
Gordon The overall response was fear mixed with excitement’
Donald ‘Some of those from former General Services Command
with 'real' business units - printing transport etc welcome 
the move others e.g. security, procurement have been told 
to join the Services group - they are confused and do not
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think that they have businesses or that they should be part 
of this process’
Irving ‘Just why did you decide to write the plan?’
Donald ‘We are obliged to write one. The Board thinks that there is
a need to convince central FCO they see us with 1,800 
people. 'Lots of people must have lots of cash to cut' - put 
all the support costs in one place then remove the budgets 
and give them to the customers (central FCO), then what 
do we do?’
Gordon 'We are professionals we can create funds for FCO - 
selling to Whitehall - some want to sell to Europe and 
others but there is a sense of frustration we are being lined 
up as a business but not as a business’
In November 1999 the FCOS executive met (previously described above as the
senior management team of the General Services Command with Ray the CEO) to
discuss their response to the draft strategy document, by this time all had had access
to the Foresight Report
Ray ‘Okay it seems to me that right thing to do here is go back
and decide whether we actually want to go for executive 
agency status - is it the right thing for us?’
George ‘I am not sure that we can just do that - what if we say yes 
what about the Chief Clerk and PUS?’
Gillian There are some that would rather this did not happen at
all’
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Ray ‘Well it has happened we are operating as FCO Services
whether we like it or not’
Susan ‘What happens if we do nothing and just keep our options
open?’
Janet W hat happens is that in 4 years time they tell us what we
do’
Gordon ‘I do not know if you are aware but most civil servants are
now operating as agencies they find that they have much 
more flexibility’
Ray ‘Is it right for us?’
Peter ‘I have a lot of people who are asking to be let off the leash
they want this to happen and the sooner the better1
Ray 'Lets hold it there we have circulated the papers - we will
take a vote based upon 'is seeking executive agency 
status the best way of developing FCO Services?' where 
are we on that?’
There then followed a process where each stated a case for or against the
proposition. The result being a unanimous vote to aim for executive agency status.
Ray That was clear enough - we can now say - whatever the 
outcome that we feel this is the right way to go, the next 
issue is how we go about it, I am still not sure that we can 
put this on paper’
Janet W hy not?’
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George This is major change - 1 do not know what the Chief Clerk 
or PUS would think about it’
Ray 'It is a matter of timing - when is it right to go public on
something like this?’
Janet The time is now - it has never been a better time - the
PUS has gone with the Foresight report - he has endorsed
it and sent it to the Cabinet Secretary. We should make the 
most of it and run off that agenda - this is change for the 
benefit of the office’
Peter ‘Janet is right you know we can actually use the
'modernising' agenda to take some control here’
From that point onwards the tone of the meeting changed and became much more 
expansive as the directors developed a range of ideas that made the strategy plan 
far bolder than the consultants had previously drafted.
A first submission to the Chief Clerk was accepted within two weeks without 
amendment and then on 15th December 1999 the Cabinet issued a press release 
(Setting the agenda for the Civil Service of the Future CAB 307/99) referring to Sir 
Richard Wilson’s Report to the Prime Minister on Civil Service Reform.
This report was built up from a number of sub-group reports prepared by groups of 
senior civil servants and these included Vision and Values and Performance 
Management
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The Report was clearly a follow up to Modernising Government, but whereas the 
White Paper was very much a Government publication giving political level direction,
this latest report came from within the Civil Service and in the name of the Civil
Service. It sought to interpret and put specific action against the more general 
concepts in Modernising Government. The reform programme sought to achieve the 
following over the next 3 - 4  years (paragraph 2.):
•  Stronger leadership with a clear sense of purpose
•  Better business planning from top to bottom
•  Sharper performance management
•  A dramatic improvement in diversity
•  A Service more open to people and ideas which brings on
talent
•  A better deal for staff 
Vision and Values
The Report summarises these as follows (Annex A):
The Civil Service -  Making a Difference
Our aim is to help make the UK a better place for everyone to 
live in, and support its success in the world. We want to be best 
at everything we do In support of successive administrations, we 
will: -
•  Act with integrity, propriety, and political impartiality, and 
select on merit
•  Put the public’s interests first
•  Achieve results of high quality and good value
•  Show leadership and take personal responsibility
•  Value the people we work with and their diversity
•  Innovate and learn
• Work in partnership
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•  Be professional in all we do
•  Be open and communicate well
As general statements these flowed fairly naturally from the concepts of Modernising 
Government and they were by this time echoed in the FCOS Strategic Plan.
The Vision and Values report began the process of interpreting these into actual 
behaviours and in its Annex ‘B’ it included a series of positive and negative 
behaviours under each of the above headings - (see Appendix ‘G’).
Performance Management
The aims for business planning are included in the specific Performance 
Management Report (Paragraph 5) that sets out 5 building blocks.
1. Bold aspirations: the first step is to define and 
relentlessly communicate a compelling and stretching aspiration 
for the future. The new aims and objectives, which are set out in 
Public Services Agreements (PSA’s) by all departments, must 
be part of this process. It is critical that the aspirations are clear 
and consistent over time. Bold aspirations serve as the rationale 
for aggressive targets and goals.
2. Long and short-term targets: the next step is to 
translate these aspirations into measurable long and short-term 
targets against which performance and progress can be 
measured:
•  Long-term targets are specific 3-5 year targets linked to the 
aspirational aim and objectives. These are the targets which 
should feature in the PSA’s
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•  Short-term targets are annual, derived from the PSA targets, 
and should be cascaded to an operational level. These must be 
quantifiable and measurable, or measure the completion of a 
specific task.
The system must be integrated and related so that the 
achievement of short-term targets contributes to the 
achievement of long-term targets, and targets contribute to the 
meeting of aspirations/objectives.
3. Ownership and accountability: once the overall 
direction and targets have been set, organisational ownership 
needs to be established. Every target, both long and short-term, 
must be "owned”. This can be done either individually or 
collectively (for example, by teams or other organisational units) 
but must result in specific responsibilities for delivering each 
target. Ultimately, individuals must feel accountable for delivery.
4. Rigorous performance review: once accountability for 
delivering against individual long and short-term targets has 
been clearly defined, a rigorous performance monitoring and 
review system is necessary. To be effective, performance 
reviews must exhibit the following characteristics:
•  Personal involvement for all managers including the most 
senior managers in the organisation
•  Ultimately reports to the political leadership
•  Be regular
5. Reinforcement/incentives: reinforcing mechanisms 
must be in place, encompassing an appropriate set of positive 
and negative incentives. In other words, you need a 
consequence management system, with positive consequences
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for success and negative consequences for failure, however 
they might be defined.
There is obvious resonance between the data we collected from managers on 
the MITCE programme, supported by the executive of the General Services 
Command (later FCOS) in November 1998, the Modernising Government 
White Paper of March 1999, the Foresight Report of November 1999, the 
strategic statement of FCOS and Sir Richard Wilson's Report to the Prime 
Minister in December 1999.
Within the space of two years the immediate context for FCOS had changed 
and retrospectively the chronology of events listed above makes sense - that is 
- the result makes sense. However having sought and supported change in 
structure, management style and behaviour, the senior management team 
found great difficulty in interpreting the cues around them into activity.
i) Only after consultant intervention did the senior management team 
grasp that, by declaring their desire to prepare for executive agency 
status, they merely met long-term structural changes, driven since the 
mid 1980s by Central Government, to which the PUS and the Board of 
Management were now providing a delayed response.
ii) After calling for management reform they did not notice when the 
opportunity arose, through the Modernising Government White Paper 
and subsequent agenda, or were unable to act upon it.
iii) The significance of the Foresight Report or more particularly the 
apparent 'U' turn by the PUS on reform appeared not to have been
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linked to the change of focus by Government from outputs to 
management in a sufficiently compelling manner.
It is outside our knowledge why the PUS changed his policy on reform - we can 
surmise that the FCO had resisted structural change longer than all other 
Central Government departments. Although the various Government initiatives 
had been met with symbolic - though short lived - adjustments, the creation of 
business units and the like, we can further suggest that the PUS and the Board 
of Management were sufficiently astute to realise the folly of being seen to 
block the personal agenda of a new interventionist Prime Minister and 
Government. The quotes from Peter and Matthew (below) give one but not the 
only possibility for this situation.
For our actors - they were in danger of being badly adrift from the new agenda. 
Publicly - this would have reduced their currency in the eyes of the rest of the 
office and potentially had them labelled as resistant to the very changes they 
privately sought to bring about. It might also have deprived them of the 
opportunity to enact behaviours they had long discussed.
From our position the most interesting aspect of this study is the apparent 
failure of these managers to notice the importance of cues (the time to act) in a 
changing context or at least move away from an environment of which they 
were critical despite explicit permissions being granted.
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In order to clarify this issue we revisited two of our actors, Matthew Phillips 
Head of FCO Change Unit and Peter Dowding Head of Conference and Visits 







"How is FCOS viewed by the FCO main office?’
‘Patchy, CVG [Conference and Visits Group] he likes but 
opinion of Ray [CEO - FCOS] is low and this clouds his 
view’
‘Ray has created the Balkanisation of the FCO no one 
wants to go to FCOS with him there'
W hy did the PUS do an apparent 'U' turn in relation to his 
views on the modernising agenda when very clearly he 
had blocked such initiatives only a short time before?’
‘Really the changes in the people around him he was being 
told by so many people in the office and Cook's [the 
Foreign Secretary] team that he had little choice. There 
was in the end just an overwhelming depth of feeling that 
he had got it wrong and the penny dropped.’
‘He was told by the Cabinet Secretary - 'this is your last 
chance saloon, if you not shape up you are dead' He has 
another three years to go and wants to go down as the 
man who took the FCO into the new millennium. If nothing 
had changed Cook would have made a direct appointment 
so there was no way the PUS would have resisted change 
any further’
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Q. 'Why despite making a public commitment to achieving
agency status has there been little or no signs of activity 
from within FCOS?’
Peter - That’s not quite the case we [CVG] think that we should be 
an agency in our own right so we are carrying on anyway - 
setting up new IT systems, bringing in training, changing 
the structure. The Language Training Department are 
doing the same. As far as the rest are concerned Ray will 
not spend any budget unless the PUS gives permission 
even though it is his budget. The PUS asks for a 3% 
efficiency saving so that is what Ray delivers - he keeps 
the same structure but does not fill the posts. There are no 
resources in the system to deliver change and keep going. 
To Ray it is a master servant relationship he does what he 
is told so he puts us last even though efficiency can be 
achieved by different means i.e. if he changed the 
structure and improved the systems we would be more 
efficient. Ray went to the Command Briefing and showed 
the PUS the FCOS organisational chart - the PUS said 
’why are you still operating in silos?' Ray waffled for a few 
minutes and said we would be changing soon but the PUS 
just cut him cold and said 'when - just tell me when'. Now 
we are in a situation where Ray is just getting involved in 
projects he has given up on the strategy every time he 
asks the PUS he says no what he does not see is that its 
his budget and he has to call the shots. He even went to 
the PUS to ask if he could run a first year anniversary of 
the establishment of FCOS it would have cost no more 
than £3k and we could have used that for marketing our 
services but because he asked he was told no’
Matthew - 'We know about Ray - as for the others they are putting up 
all sorts of reasons [not to act] - finance, systems people, 
all they do is keep coming up with more lists of things they 
need. I think that some of it is that they fear success
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almost as much as failure so they do nothing as they do 
not know what it would be like and what it would mean for 
them’
Whether Ray did not realise that this time the game had changed and PUS actually 
wanted to see changes in behaviour, or that he simply could not break away from a 
command and control style of relationship we do not know. We can, however, see 
that by being locked into a more limited repertoire of behaviours he was viewed as 
being out of fit with the context of the FCO as it had been re-defined.
Concluding note
It appears to us that leadership of the FCO had become detached from the senior 
management team of FCOS. Even though a consensus for change appeared 
evident the management team faltered and stumbled at the notion of taking the first 
steps (even though quite keen to talk about it). Our understanding of sensemaking is 
enhanced by the knowledge that sensemaking may not always result in action and 
(as we shall suggest later) thinking action and doing action are not the same thing.
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Originalright or copyright: EMI Recorded Music
This case study looks at the issues associated with copyright protection as it affects 
one of the largest five music companies in the world - EMI Recorded Music.
Our interest in this organisation was taken in two sensemaking areas:-
•  The way in which organisation design can assist the flexibility and willingness 
of actors to challenge/change existing assumptions. This is highlighted by the 
negotiation of meaning to determine whether one breach of copyright (parallel 
trading) is good for business or bad for business, impacted by the sense 
different factions make of discrepant cues -  good for export or bad for import
•  The apparent speed and fluidity with which this organisation was able to 
commit to a radical joint venture based upon its understanding of a changing 
environment
Copyright issues are not as straight forward as they may first seem as songwriters, 
publishers, artists and producers will all hold a form of copyright that entitles them to 
a share in the royalties due through the sale or public performance of any given 
material.
Record companies set out to own copyright for as long as possible,
' ...because the only assets a record company has are its
copyrights beneath all the glamour of dealing with rock




Protection of copyright has become increasingly difficult for record companies as 
technology has improved. The method of recording sound, editing, producing, 
formatting, manufacturing, distributing, accessing, purchasing and playing have 
undergone significant change in the last 30 years. If we fast forward from a seven- 
inch vinyl record to a multi-channel video and audio DVD, and then overlay changes 
in society and expectations of the customer base, those changes become even more 
stark.
Music is a truly global product - in sound at least it can be released on one day and 
heard around the world the following day. It is this very speed and the methods of 
delivery that both create demand from a public that hears music, then wants to 
acquire (not necessarily purchase) and produces the highest levels of anxiety for the 
industry. Much like any other successful brand (for that is what The Beatles, the 
Beach Boys and Rolling Stones are) popularity creates a 'must have1 demand from a 
large section of the buying public drawn to that particular material.
Knowing this, those involved in copyright infringement seek to exploit the demand by 
creating faster or cheaper delivery - or indeed access to exclusive material not yet 
released to the legitimate supply chain.
The following are the common types of deliberate infringement (there are many other 
contested areas of accidental or contractual infringement) of music copyright -
• Counterfeit - often sophisticated copies of original products in cassette or CD 
format where attempts are made to reproduce artwork and packaging in order to 
convince the public that they are purchasing an original copy
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• Pirate - the unauthorised duplication of original material, often in a format not 
previously released - e.g. a compilation of tracks from different artists or different 
albums. No attempt is made to replicate artwork and it will be obvious to the 
purchaser that this is not the genuine article
•  Bootleg CDs - unauthorised recordings made at concerts or by technical staff at 
recording studios. These also include unreleased material that is 'leaked' into the 
market
• Grey market or parallel imports. This relates to genuine product that is sold in 
designated territories but re-supplied back through the unofficial market to the 
country of origin, taking advantage of discounted rates in a developing market or 
currency fluctuations
• MP3 digital downloading, this is the method by which music is transmitted across 
the Internet. It has increased the range of pirate opportunities by giving access to 
music through illegal WEB sites, such music being then reproduced onto CD 
format and copied by use of CD replicators
In terms of scale it is estimated that counterfeits and pirate product cost the music 
industry upwards of $7 billion per year. In one case the singer George Michael was 
due to release a new album on the Virgin label only to find that a pirate copy was for 
sale on the streets in Poland 2 weeks before the release date. Furthermore, this 
product bore the logo of an organised crime syndicate - as a deterrent to other 
organisations not to encroach on their pre-emptive 'rights' to the pirate version of the 
album!
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Protection of copyright and the prosecution of those that infringe take up a 
considerable amount of record company effort and keeps legions of lawyers 
employed.
Once the contract with a particular artist has expired they have the freedom to sign to 
a new label, leaving the previous company with the catalogue produced during the 
contract period. The failure rate of new acts is high, however, once an artist has 
established a worldwide following, the bidding for the copyright to future material 
becomes frenetic. In 1991 Virgin won the bidding for a one-album deal with Janet 
Jackson at a cost of $25 million. Although the material had yet to be written, Virgin 
based their decision on the fact that Jackson's previous album had yielded more top 
five chart singles than any other album in history and that the number of the next 
album that could be sold was a predictable calculation to make.
In this way Virgin based its bid - not on the quality of the future material - this was 
unknown - but rather on the strength that the public would buy on the basis of her 
previous success. Whilst this was seen as a radical and huge risk, ($25 million for 
one album) had Virgin offered, say $50 million, for a five album deal, they would have 
taken more risk as the quality of the next album would have had assured sales, but, if 
it proved a critical failure, that would have greatly reduced the potential sales of 
future material.
At the time of writing EMI Recorded Music was in the process of merging with 
Warner Music, bringing together the largest music companies in the UK and USA 
with joint revenues of $8 billion and earnings of $1 billion. The rationale put forward 
for the merger being access by Warner to increased catalogue, including the Beatles 
and the Rolling Stones, but more significantly, the link that this would create following 
the AOL - Time Warner merger.
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The history of the record business has always been one of 
take-over and consolidation, but what has happened 
during the past two years has been of a different order 
entirely. This is not just because the big have grown 
bigger, but because technology is transforming the 
importance of size - and content. From the moment music 
was first digitised, it became 'content that could be 
squeezed 'down the line' alongside news, sport, movies 
and other forms of entertainment'
(Music Week, January 2000)
It was the prospect of not having sufficient content or the ability to send it 'down the 
line' that appeared to create the logic of the merger. However both the size and 
technological logic of the deal was pushing the industry and the regulatory authorities 
into new territory.
'It is making Government's brains ache...Some executives 
involved in the AOL, Time Warner and EMI deals argue 
that the competition authorities are intimidated by the 
complexity of the issues and the uncertainty of the new 
technologies'
(Financial Times, 5th September 2000)
As this merger was underway, so the emphasis on protecting copyright became 
more of an important focus for EMI, in order to protect its assets and profit margins 
but equally as important, to protect its credibility as custodian of those assets.
Here we review two aspects of copyright infringement - how the company started to 
change its policy and attitude towards 'parallel imports' - which affect profit margin - 
and 'bootleg' releases - which affect credibility.
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Both of these categories had caused concern for many years and certainly 
executives regarded them as irritants but they had also been regarded as an 
inevitable and insoluble part of the business. They had voiced concern and 
displeasure and the 'need to take positive action' (Senior Vice President EMI), which 
resulted in memos to staff and anti-piracy units of the trade associations.
Parallel Imports
Music product is broken down into two categories for the purpose of defining its 
market place: -
Local repertoire - where the customer base will be drawn from the country of 
origin
International repertoire - where the customer base will be global
In order for record companies to 'break' new territories or sell into under developed 
countries the price the product is sold to dealers varies widely. The dealer price in 
Indonesia might be as low as $4 whereas the dealer price in the UK might be $16 for 
the same album.
Whilst this price differential is an extreme, it serves to demonstrate the price 
variations that are available. Such price variations can also widen with fluctuations in 
currency. Those involved in the unauthorised trade therefore seek to purchase 
international repertoire in the less expensive territories, and then import it into a 
country where it can be sold through secondary retail outlets for less than the 
authorised outlets.
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In the UK there are offences under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and 
the Trade Marks Act 1994 for sound recordings which are licensed for certain 
territories outside the European Union (EU) to be imported and sold in the UK. Profit 
margins tend to be high but although Customs & Excise officials have difficulty in 
identifying such product (often identical in appearance) the illegal nature of the trade 
tends to restrict the activity to a minority of dealers prepared to be prosecuted if 
caught.
Within the EU price differentials are still maintained but in themselves they are not 
normally sufficient to warrant moving product between territories. What does makes 
this trade viable is the combination of the local dealer price, combined with taking 
advantage of currency fluctuations that move faster than the re-alignment of the 
record companies, e.g. the dealer price in Germany might be fixed at 24 DM based 
on an exchange rate of £1- 2.40 DM. If sterling strengthens to £1- 3.20 DM the 
relative cost to an importer drops to £7.50 from £10, giving sufficient margin to make 
this a worthwhile enterprise.
As the EU is a free trade zone it is not possible, under European anti-trust legislation, 
to outlaw this activity and the only controls are the contractual arrangements for 
dealers to supply product within the official retail market. This is widely ignored and 
results in a two-tier trade that undermines the official retailers who complain about 
independents undercutting their business. In the UK it is estimated that 10% of all 
sales are based on product that has been sourced from this market.
Cautious of the anti-trust law, record companies tend to refer to both EU and non EU 
parallel importation generically as 'imports', relying upon the illegal activity for 
sanction but actually attempting to restrict supplies within the EU by using internal 
discipline.
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In keeping with other global companies, sales targets are separated into geographic 
zones and pressure to meet these targets is intense. Not only in order to drive 
profitability but also market share, details of which are published in the trade press 
on a weekly basis. Market share and size is also thought to create credibility and 
attract major artists to successful labels.
Because of the need to generate sales ’Imports' are seen at one and the same time 
as both a scourge to the overall position of record companies (loss of sales to the 
official retailers who are relied upon for driving most of the profitable business) and, 
unofficially, as a necessary tool for local managing directors attempting to meet sales 
targets.
By way of example the UK sales department of EMI Records will sell to dealers who 
then supply the local market. Some of these also export product to continental 
Europe knowing that the product is destined to return to the UK as an 'import', 
undercutting the established local market price. This causes friction within sales 
departments who complain, on the one hand, that their sales to the local market are 
weakened because of 'imports'. On the other hand they accept bids from exporters 
for stock that is then exported to a territory with lower dealer prices but is sold to 
those in the 'import' market and then re-imported hitting sales in the next cycle and 
so they 'complain' again.
In much the same way, if the currency situation reversed, product would then be sold 
to the local market and exporters who would sell to foreign markets, undercutting the 
local price, thereby damaging sales of a neighbouring territory within the same 
company.
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The following comments reflect the manner in which different employees in EMI 
regard the issue of 'imports': -
'I have my guys on the phone every day saying that the 
indies (independent dealers) are undercutting our retailers 
- it is killing the business'
(John Farthing Field Sales Manager)
'If I can sell the stock and it is goes off my books I have to 
look at that as a result'
(Jane Small UK Sales Manager)
'Overall it [the 'imports' trade] cannot do us any good and 
we should look at stopping it as it hits UK sales in the long 
run'
(Mike Dobson UK Sales & Marketing Director)
'When I was in charge of the UK I used to have a problem 
with them [imports] - they do hit the figures but then when I 
took over Europe as long it was within Europe the sales 
still counted - it is those that come in from outside [the EU]
I have a problem with'
(Richard Penny, European President)
'It's okay for London to take me down when I try sell a few 
thousand units that end up in the wrong place [UK] - but 
when it was the German currency that was strong it was ok 
for the UK to dump all their cheap product in my area. Who 
knows next year they may be at it again but like the last 
time they will not listen to us they will just say its not their 
issue - its just because London hurts we have to suffer'
(Manfred Zumkeller, Managing Director Germany)
149
'Its quite simple - my guys know my feelings on this issue 
they know if they get caught I will have their balls on a 
plate'
(Charlie Potts, President Asia, Africa and South 
America)
Imports are on the edge of copyright infringement; whilst the law is relatively 
straightforward, to those affected it is a matter of perception. To the comments noted 
above can be the view of an established dealer in 'imports': -
'I do not know why so much time is taken up on this, 
everyone knows what happens - I do not understand
why this is seen as important it is the pirates that you
should be worried about - this is nothing it is just trade'
(Ibrahim Khabboul, Middle East dealer)
The next aspect of this case study deals with an area of infringement that is much 
clearer, to those involved as a breach of copyright. It is an unusual case in that it 
questions the presumption the only asset of record company is its ownership of 
copyright.
Bootlegs
As we have noted above, the term 'bootleg' is a reference to music that has not
previously been released. The more successful the artist the more such material is
sought after. This is particularly so if the artist has died or the band has broken up, 
effectively 'killing off the possibility of future recordings.
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The most heavily bootlegged band in the music business is the Beatles. During their 
eight-year career as recording artists 1962 -1970, the Beatles recorded thousands of 
hours of tape in order to produce their 12 official albums, 21 singles and one EP.
In addition to the recording masters (those songs released as part of the catalogue 
above) EMI own something in the region of 400 other original masters that contain 
different takes and some unreleased material.
The sources of bootleg material are many and varied - after recording sessions it 
was common for artists to take home tape dubs (copies) of original masters for 
further work.
Tapes were also supplied for advertising, film and broadcast projects, these and 'out- 
takes' or repeated takes of material were seldom ascribed a value at the time other 
than the leaking of material due for release.
Beatles bootlegs date back to the late 60s when their status in the music business 
had already been well established and by which time many tape dubs had been 
circulating with little or no control.
Out-takes had no value. This was material that had never before had a commercial 
market. Had it not been for the bureaucracy of EMI, recording job sheets and the 
'redundant' material itself would have found its way into the bin. They simply logged 
and stored everything, valuable or not.
In 1973 a 4 - LP bootleg release Alpha/Omega compiled with some of the band's 
best tracks, actually prompted Apple (the Beatles own label) and EMI to release 
official '1962-1966' and 1967-1970' albums.
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In the 1980s the number, variety and quality of Beatles bootleg material continued to 
improve as more and more unreleased material from BBC broadcasts, concerts and 
studio out-takes were uncovered.
In the mid 1980s EMI spent a year preparing for a release titled The Sessions Album 
this was in part prompted by the bootleg companies who were profiting from the 
unreleased material that they were selling at the expense of EMI and the surviving 
Beatles. Unfortunately, just prior to release, The Sessions Album itself was leaked 
and released as a bootleg causing the official project to be abandoned.
By this time all original masters, recording masters produced by the Beatles had 
been gathered in from various insecure locations. The former Elstree Film Studios, 
underneath Smithfield meat market and a redundant indoor tennis court near the 
Abbey Road recording studios and placed in a secure vault in the basement of the 
studios.
Externally, the studios at Abbey Road made world famous when the Beatles were 
photographed outside the studios on a pedestrian crossing for The Abbey Road 
Album has changed very little. At any time of day or night, fans or tourists from 
across the globe can be seen peering into the building or writing a message on the 
wall outside. The paint on the wall is now an inch thick as it has to be re-painted 
every ten days. When it flakes off it is more akin to lumps of plaster than paint! The 
majority of those who visit and stand outside the studios were born long after the 
Beatles stopped recording in 1970.
The material available to the bootleg companies appeared to have dried up by the 
mid 1990s. However interest in the Beatles music and artefacts continued to grow
152
with the original lyrics to I Am The Walrus, a song written on a scrap of paper by 
John Lennon, selling at a London auction in 1999 for £100,000. Then in early 2000 a 
Dutch bootleg company, by the name of Strawberry, released an 11 CD collection of 
Beatles tracks entitled Mythology. These consisted of TV and radio interviews, live 
recordings and studio takes from released and unreleased material, and were sold at 
£140 per set in the UK and £200 in continental Europe.
Of significant embarrassment to EMI was press coverage supported by details 
contained in Mythology that the source of much of this material had been a former 
EMI sound engineer John Barratt who had worked at Abbey Road recording studios. 
John Barratt had been terminally ill with cancer in 1982 when he had been tasked
with compiling a catalogue of all Beatles material in the possession of EMI. In the
process of compiling this material he was also tasked with sending dubs of 
interesting material to the Beatles Committee (a control body used to regulate 
Beatles projects) to determine suitability for future release.
It had been alleged that Barratt had maintained a copy of these tapes, which had 
then been sold after his death in 1984 but had taken 16 years to be released.
Following the publicity surrounding this new release Apple and George Harrison had 
contacted EMI seeking explanations from senior executives - for over 30 years the 
bootleg companies had sought to exploit the Beatles and here was the latest 
embarrassment being laid at EMI's own door.
'I have had George [Harrison] on the phone - he knows the 
score but that is not the issue we have no idea what
happened here it is all too long ago. I am not expecting to
be able to nail anyone - neither is George - but we have to 
come up with some sort of coherent story. So if he phones
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I can say look this is what happened - he may not like it but 
that’s not the point'
(Roger Penny Senior Vice President)
'All I can say is that since 1988 I have been keeper of the 
keys and they [the original masters] have been kept like 
the crown jewels - no one can get to them'
(Adrian Ricketts Recording Engineer, Abbey Road)
'There are two arguments to all this - George [Harrison] 
has a view and I tend to think he has a point - release the 
lot then we just blow away the bootleggers. But it is also a 
matter of pride in what you produce - we would get torn 
apart if we made some of this material a commercial 
release. The quality is just not up to it. I suppose that we 
could release it as a down load from the WEB that way the 
real fans can get hold of it but we cannot be accused of 
trying to profit'
(Malcolm Heath - Vice President International)
'I do not think that Roger would see it this way but in some 
ways the publicity keeps the whole myth going - look those 
who buy the bootlegs still buy what we put out - it is as 
much about people saying 'those tossers at EMI screwed 
up again'
(Gary Hanks, Vice President Business Affairs)
In the event, the internal inquiry launched by EMI was inconclusive save that the 
material was confirmed as having originated from dubs made by Barratt. How or 
when they were leaked was never discovered. Nevertheless we had seen, in the 
vault at Abbey Road Recording Studios, some 1,000 Beatles masters together with 
further masters for John Lennon, George Harrison and Ringo Starr.
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This visit formed the basis of a final debrief with Roger Penny and Martin Clark who 










The Masters were described to me as being protected like 
the crown jewels. The vault is strong enough but it is not 
sealed and seven different people can get gain access. 
Furthermore although the vault is in the basement if there 
is a fire above and water is used the lot could be damaged'
'Yes that’s a good point we should have the digital 
masters [working copies] moved out and keep them 
separate'
'You are still left with the original masters in the same 
conditions'
'Yes I know but in terms of copyright as we now know 
most of it is already out'
W hat about the value of the original masters?'
'We have covered that issue!'
'No we have covered the copyright value - what about 
their value as artefacts?
'What are they worth as tapes?'
'I have been told that in their original Abbey Road Boxes - 
to the right collector they might be worth £100,000 each - 
we have around 1,000 of them. In effect they are the crown 
jewels of the music industry but that is not how we treat 
them*
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Roger 'Yes - I see the issue but in that case it is not even the 
money - the real nightmare is something happens to them 
and people say - 'EMI did what, they were stored in what 
conditions!' No I just do not want to think what would 
happen then it would make the current issue look like a by 
line'
At the time of writing the entire collection of EMI original master tapes - for all artists 
and repertoire worldwide - had an insured value of £10 million. There was no special 
category for Beatles material, which remained in the basement of the Abbey Road 
Recording Studios.
The proposed merger with Warner Music was based on the belief by some in the 
industry that within 5 years protection of copyright will have been rendered 
inoperable. Advances in technology will bring the instant play and recording of the 
newest releases at the highest quality into the collection of anyone who cares to 
operate a small palm held device developed by the computer and 
telecommunications industries known as an MP3. The music industry has yet to 
determine where and of what its next generation of assets will consist.
It is a point worth debating whether the activity we recounted towards the end of this 
case study is still within our first-order change reference. On balance, and with the 
benefit of hindsight (!), we might adjudge that significant actors had started to 
recognise that continuous change had not kept the music industry sufficiently up to 
speed with changes in their environment, particularly technology. They laid the 
foundations for what would have been second-order change that, in the event, failed 
when they did not take due account of other parts of their environment, namely the 
reaction of regulatory authorities faced with a ground breaking deal and the creation 
of a new form of enterprise without parallel in the industry.
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Concluding note
Our primary lesson for leadership and sensemaking taken from this case study is that 
no matter how adept or confident an organisation is at defining its environment a 
compelling vision of the future may not be sufficient to alter the views of significant 
stakeholders within that environment. Leadership - even brave leadership - needs 
both vision and the ability to anticipate obstacles when operating outside their 
immediate area of control. In this case EMI/Warner attempted to shape the future of 
the music industry but failed to understand the sensemaking processes of the 
regulatory authorities. This is important as much of our literature search has 
emphasised the need to complicate organisational thinking to deal with complex 
environments -  well sometimes the complication required is a requirement to provide 
simple (though not simplistic) frameworks that can be understood by others in the 
environment using existing points of reference.
Of equal interest to us but less significance to the organisation was the multiple 
meanings of infringement associated with the issue of parallel importations, the 
continual negotiation of such meanings and what this tells us about the apparent 
looseness of organisational design that tolerated multiple sensemaking processes 




Comparing hue: a search for contrast & sensemaking
In section 5 we have witnessed examples of sensemaking in different empirical 
settings, in this section we look for plausible links between the case studies that 
might allow us to draw conclusions about the nature of the activity. We do so by 
taking our data, comparing and contrasting through a contextualised model of 
change, Pettigrew (1985 a) in order to set up and later link with Weick's (1995) model 
of sensemaking. In doing so we acknowledge Pettigrew's (1985 b) warning to 
'beware of the singular theory of process or, indeed, of social and organizational 
change'.
Poggi (1965) warns us that in creating a way of seeing we may in fact be creating a 
way of not seeing, that the foreground and background detail will affect the activity 
we recount, and further that our actors can manipulate foreground and background 
by their own actions (Argyris, 1976). Burke (1935, p. 70, quoted in Wolcott, 1995) is 
even more strident ‘a way of seeing is always a way of not seeing’ (emphasis added).
We therefore need to take different perspectives in order to create a complete picture 
of the activity and so here we look at the information from the ten o’clock or 
simple/general position. We are trying to determine whether there are any, relatively, 
simple constructs available to us that we can apply in a general sense across the 
breadth of case study material -  returning to our root metaphor we are standing back 
from our actors and attempting to paint a background hue that fits, in an approximate 







In addressing the requirement to contextualise our data (Weick, ibid, Pettigrew, 1985 
b) and link it to sensemaking we acknowledge the need to work from recognisable 
platforms of analysis. However, we shift away from a single model of analysis by 
commenting on the similarities and differences in our analysis with a degree of 
ontological oscillation as we attempt to link our data to plausible events in 
sensemaking both in this section and the next, whether or not, they represent 
different assumptions about social action.
First-order change
As we have noted previously it has been our intention to focus upon organisations 
that, at the time of our research, were undergoing a process of first-order adaptive 
change. First-order in that our data, in keeping with much change (Meyer et al, 1990 
& 1994, Greenwood & Hinings, 1988), details organisations where change, if it does 
occur takes places 'within a given system which itself remains unchanged' 
(Watzlawick, et al, 1974, p. 10). We are clear that the overall typology of
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organisational change noted in our work does reside within the construct of first-order 
change. In order to further inform the contextualised method of compare and contrast 
borrowed from Pettigrew (1985, a) we also make comment on whether the adaptive 
changes fit the Weick and Quinn (1999) criteria of episodic or continuous change. 
Episodic change is described as infrequent, discontinuous and intentional (p.365). 
On the basis that we have cited our search in the area of adaptive change it might be 
assumed that all the cases recounted should fit this typology as the change 
recounted was intentional. However, continuous change also holds resonance from 
our data, organisational changes that ‘tend to be ongoing, evolving, and cumulative’ 
(p.375).
By focusing upon the macropolitical and micropolitical dimensions of the 
organisations we are also able to follow the interplay between the typology of 
change. Weick and Quinn (ibid) suggest that episodic and continuous change are 
really matters of perception -  the further the distance the less notice is taken of the 
detail, the closer the distance the more notice is taken of the detail. This is a useful 
reminder to us to pick up sufficient foreground detail and sufficient background 
context to take a view across the data whilst recognising that we are the arbiters of 
distance and to some extent of whether or not the change is noted as episodic or 
continuous.
Intuitively we are also drawn towards Mintzberg’s description of spurts of change 
(1978) or punctuated equilibrium (Tushman & Romanelli 1985) set within a 
continuum of change (Weick, 1969). However ‘episodic’ and ‘continuous’ change 
differentiates our data sufficiently and as the constructs of change rest in the eye of 
the beholder (Weick & Quinn, 1999) this is where we rest. It is all first-order change 
but it is not all the same first-order change.
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It is also of note that we are attempting to demonstrate that the case study material is 
indeed related and can be analysed as a series of canvases in the ‘school’ of 
sensemaking. We are not attempting to make good our case around a single 
organisational study where the fine grain and texture of the piece can be picked over. 
This may lead us open to accusations that we are providing nothing more than 
sketches and this may be valid, but as long as we succeed in demonstrating a 
plausible link between the studies by this method we can move on to discuss the 
implications for organisational behaviour at the micro or sensemaking level.
Pettigrew warns that the opposite trap to that depicted by Poggi above is trying to 
see everything and thus seeing nothing. He also encourages us to look for ‘continuity 
and change, patterns and idiosyncrasies, the actions of individuals and groups, and 
processes of structuring’ (1985 b, p.272). This is a wide mandate and one he 
suggests can best be appreciated by taking note of variables within the three basic 
elements for analysis: the context, process and outcome components.
A contextualised model
The model developed by Pettigrew was intended to be a theory of method for doing 
process research. We use the model not to outline how we carried out the research 
but to lay out the data and ask if and how the case studies compare and contrast 
with each other. By attending to the model we have been forced to provide for the 
dimension of time in order to link the interdependencies of social action and context 












The view expressed by Pettigrew (ibid) and shared here is that it is not sufficient to 
treat context as just descriptive background or an eclectic list of antecedents that 
somehow shape process, neither should structure or context be seen as just 
constraining process (p.288). In figure (9) above Pettigrew distinguishes the vertical 
levels of analysis as contexts based upon the interdependencies between higher and 
lower levels of analysis impacting across the horizontal dimension of time. The key to 
understanding the interactions between one level and another being to track a 
process such as decision-making by noting the different phenomena at vertical and 
horizontal levels of analysis.
The vertical level refers to the interdependence between higher or lower levels of 
analysis upon phenomena to be explained at some future level, the horizontal level 
refers to the sequential connections between phenomena in past, present and future 
time (Pettigrew, 1995, p. 94).
In considering context we take account of how the organisations relate to their 
environments; that is to say what decision-makers attend to from their environments 
and how this is translated into internal activity Weick (1979) points out that to an
Context
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extent environmental restraint -  despite the apparent contradiction - is largely a 
matter for those within organisations who make choices about the environment they 
wish to notice and enact Environment is an output of organising that only takes 
significance when it is attended to by organisations, otherwise it does not exist 
(Mangham, 1985). In painting the context we are merely describing these areas of 
choice. Although we have covered much of the background issues within the case 
studies here we drill deeper into the macro and micro politics of the organisations 
and note the relationship with the external environment.
Process
We have previously noted that our interest is organisations undergoing adaptive 
change; here we try to understand the origins of the change required, i.e. as a local 
response to perceptions of environmental change. The changes we describe are 
driven and enacted through different levels of the organisation and this has 
consequences, as we shall see, for the actions of our actors and the different levels 
of meaning ascribed.
Outcomes
Here we try to give a qualitative feel for the result of the processes we have 
described, albeit as we have mentioned previously much of this has to be seen as 
breaking into a stream of continuing activity.
Tight and loose coupling
Part of the contextualised detailing throughout the analysis will be the nature of tight 
and loose coupling (system linkages within the organisations, the inner context and 
between organisations and their environments, outer context). Lawrence & Lorsch
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(1969), Weick (1977), Miller (1978), suggest that complex environments are best 
comprehended by organisations based on loosely coupled systems capable of 
differentiation and flexible response. They also note that this can give rise to 
problems of coordination. Weick, (2001) supports this view by suggesting that at 
times of adaptive change loose coupling is a source for adaptability (flexibility that 
can reduce the need for large-scale change (p. 388) but tight coupling can facilitate 
adaptation (the ability to transact). In essence he is making the point that the 
flexibility of loosely coupled systems allows them the ability to recognise and absorb 
shifts in the environment whereas tightly coupled systems should be more capable 
of coordination and control as they have the capacity to carry through change, 
primarily by reducing complexity and negotiation.
In reducing complexity we are really thinking in terms of reducing differences in 
meaning by explicit sanction or instruction. Loose coupling begins at the individual 
level when actions produce different realities through minimal overlap in meaning 
(Weick, op cit p.386). Multiple realities cause loosely coupled systems because 
actors share few variables. Tightly coupled systems on the other hand are those 
where the acceptable realities are defined in order to reduce ambiguity.
Whether loosely coupled or tightly coupled all the organisations we worked within 
had boundaries, controls and conventions that bound their actors into organising 
their output.
As Weick (op cit) points out the notional distinction between loosely coupled and 
tightly coupled systems is, once again, a matter of perspective. At the lowest 
common denominator we -  as individuals - are all (internally) tightly coupled the 
more we look outside ourselves the looser the coupling becomes. The axis of
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tight/loose is, therefore, subjective and arbitrary, it really seems to depend on the 
position from where you look or, in our case, where the easel is placed.
Parvin-May
Context
We have previously noted the nature of external control surrounding financial 
organisations such as Parvin-May through statutory authorities that heavily regulate 
deposits, loans and investment advice. The interpretation of this external control is 
reflected at all levels, exacerbated by the position of Henry Simme as principal 
shareholder/chairman and the small size of the organisation which allowed one or 
two individuals to exercise effective spans of control.
The power of the regulatory authorities in the UK is sufficient to ensure that all 
financial institutions are able to demonstrate tight internal control mechanisms. These 
provide the formal ‘tight coupling’ of policy and practice in such organisations. As 
previously noted Parvin-May was well catered for in this respect with nine control 
committees.
In addition the Bank operated six management boards to control and direct staff who 
numbered less than 200 in total. Day to day management of the Bank was in the 
hands of Stephen, yet the influence of Henry was always part of the context against 
which activity had to be moderated, he, at least, was unequivocal about the 
behaviour that he wanted to see from his staff. Not so Stephen, who demanded that 
his managers exercise initiative yet involved himself in the detail of most ongoing 
projects and sought to channel communication through him -  both complaints made
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period the talk was more of a reaction to sale or the ‘chances of survival in the event 
of sale’. Now this has been reframed into an opportunity -  note Stephen’s comment 
‘we [Henry and Stephen] have been positioning the Bank so that the right buyer goes 
for the whole team’. Whilst this appears to be the opportunity to make a decision, the 
decision was, effectively, made by the situation our actors had created.
There are four principal areas of adaptive change detailed in our data all of which we 
see as interrelated aspects of a process of change resulting from previous, 
cumulative activity: -
1. The change from operating as a ‘merchant bank’ to operating as a ‘private 
bank’ (as a result of near collapse)
2. The need to meet specific financial targets by increasing profitability (in order 
to regain management credibility having saved the bank)
3. The requirement for staff to take more personal initiative in the execution of 
their responsibilities (in order to then grow the bank)
4. The coupling of 1-3 above into a coherent proposition for sale (the result of 
the previous activity that had changed the Bank’s environment)
1 We have no first hand experience of the process of changing from a 
merchant bank to a private bank. We do, however, know that Stephen had 
only recently taken over as CEO; the Bank was only marginally profitable 
and was under resourced to operate in the diverse areas of currency 
trading, banking, and investment, trust management and corporate 
finance (merchant banking).
Stephen was also in a position of reporting directly to Henry Simme, who, 
as we have previously noted, not only owned the single largest block of
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issued shares, but was also chairman of the Bank. Henry made comment 
that Stephen; ‘made a compelling case for the survival of the Bank’. It is 
reasonable therefore, to position this as a necessary change to reverse 
previous decisions made in the Bank and ensure its viability. In the short 
term this meant that the Bank sacked some 30% of staff that were not 
directly connected to the ‘new’ operation.
2 Stephen presented his senior staff with the targets of 20% return on 
capital (from 7%) and a share price of £20 (from £6) in 1998 as part of a 
five-year plan leading up to 31st March 2003. He did so on the basis of 
comparisons shared with his staff that other similar institutions would see 
these figures as reasonable benchmarks for an effective organisation of 
this type. He reinforced this message by implying that, if the shareholders 
did not see an adequate return on investments, they might opt to sell the 
Bank.
3 From our initial research visits Stephen had made overtures to his staff 
and us that he was increasingly frustrated by the relative lack of initiative 
shown by his staff, which resulted in him being overloaded with work. 
Henry supported this view and felt that more of the senior staff should 
shoulder more responsibility for driving the Bank forward.
4 The final change appeared to us to have evolved from what can best be 
described as a decision not to do something, rather than a specific 
decision to sell the Bank. Early in our research, when discussing the 
profitability of the Bank, Stephen had said of Henry Simme ‘he is very 
supportive but has made it clear that he retires in 2003 and does not want 
to leave the family shares in the business when he is not around and that
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opens up various options depending on whether anyone would want the 
shares’.
Following two years of profit growth and successful expansion into the Bahamas, 
Henry decided that trade sale would achieve his retirement aim, release the value of 
his shares and secure the future, principally, of Stephen. For his part Stephen, rather 
than talk in terms of continued employment viewed, a sale ‘to the right party’ as an 
opportunity to develop his career further:
There is always going to be a ceiling as to how far we can 
grow. It is a straightforward calculation of the free capital 
ratio [loan book size determined by profit over expenditure 
retained as capital in the business governed by Bank of 
England Banking regulations]. As we stand we will get 
caught in the small end of the market and because we are 
there we do not generate the right levels of free capital -  a 
classic catch 22 if you like’.
Outcomes
1 The change from operating as a 'merchant bank’ to operating as a ‘private 
bank’
This change was completed successfully -  those employed at the Bank regarded 
themselves as private bankers -  they were attuned to dealing with individual wealthy 
clients and exhibited no discernible regret at giving up corporate deal making. In part 
this may well have been due to the removal of substantial numbers of staff who 
serviced this aspect of the Bank’s business.
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2 The need to meet specific financial targets by increasing profitability
At the time of writing, some two years through the five-year plan, the return on capital 
was running at 12% (on target) and the share price was trading at £8.55 (also on 
target). At the same time the income streams were compounding at 15%, driving 
stronger than forecast net profits.
Interestingly the Bahamian operation started to develop into one of the most 
profitable parts of the Bank and certainly the fastest growing, yet this caused the 
most tension as the antithesis of historic behaviours in the Bank: -
Stephen -  They have more autonomy than the rest of the Bank and take more risk 
... but that’s okay ... I think’
David (Director of Bahamas operation) - *We feel restrained the whole time -  there is 
this great feeling of conservatism that pulls us back in London -  you can feel it all the 
time’
3 The requirement for staff to take more personal initiative in the execution of 
their responsibilities
As we see with the Bahamian operation above, this was an area of constant 
negotiation. The Bank had grown and clearly Stephen found it very difficult to sustain 
active control, at the same time he had been with the Bank for 20 years and had 
been seen as a central and controlling influence over decision-making.
Dictated by restrictions on his time, Stephen sought to unburden some of his 
responsibilities and devolve authority -  but on his terms. As a consequence whilst 
there had been some change in this area, it had been slow and in the main through
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actions of new members of staff such as those in the Bahamas for whom operating 
with delegated authority was a natural continuation of their previous experience. 
From the conversations within the Bank it was clear that but for the distance between 
the two operations control over the Bahamian operation would have been even more 
obvious.
W e are left with Stephen calling for staff to take initiative, in a context (London and 
Guernsey) that had little precedence for such behaviour, but initiative (of a specific 
and defined nature) with which he knew and felt comfortable i.e. tightly controlled. 
The mainstay of change came from what was proving to be a highly profitable part of 
the Bank -  yet for those involved the change was adapting to what they viewed as 
unnecessary, even oppressive, control. They were, nevertheless, successful, and 
Stephen and other members of staff had realised this.
Adaptive change was taking place, people were taking more responsibility but not 
through telling staff to change, more from the introduction of new staff operating in a 
geographically remote (from London) location who were adding to the understanding 
of enacted behaviour (taking responsibility) for the rest of the Bank.
4 The coupling of 1-3 above into a coherent proposition for sale [as it later 
transpired]
As we have noted above, this was not so much a decision to change the Bank and 
prepare it for sale. It was known that Henry would retire and not be happy to leave 
his equity under the control of a 3rd party. The adaptive changes 1 - 3  above were 
seen as part of a survival mechanism ‘lets make us viable for employment’.
Having created movement towards shaping up the Bank (through a variety of means) 
Stephen was then able to have some influence over the process of sale (to whom 
and on what terms). Had movement not been seen in 1 -  3 above change 4, as 
detailed, would not have been an issue, it would be a non-decision, because the 
Bank would have been sold as an under-performing asset.
The Police
Context
The Police Force remains, as it always has, a largely uniformed organisation 
structured on hierarchical principles adapted from the military command and control 
model, however, as communication systems improved, the number of UK Police 
Forces dropped until the local Government reforms of 1974, when the number 
stabilised at 53. However, until 1983, despite the reduction in the number of forces, 
the Police had evolved and responded to social change in their own way, conscious 
of the constitutional autonomy granted to Chief Officers, Central Government avoided 
directly influencing operational discretion.
The consequences of this by the early 1980s were that a number of Chief Officers 
had publicly committed their forces to contradictory aims; working with the community 
or clean up campaigns. Each Chief Officer could, and many did, pursue their own 
interests, often without regard for the aims and objectives of adjoining forces. A few 
Chief Officers recruited the growing interest and influence of the media to press their 
beliefs to the point where they became subject to the ridicule of the same journalists 
they sought to use - such as James Anderton - then Chief Constable of Greater 
Manchester who publicly committed his officers to clearing the streets of Manchester 
of prostitution by invoking the will of God with missionary zeal. There was more than
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a faint whiff of the American model of policing about this where a county sheriff might 
be elected upon his public appeal with and to the local population.
As there was no overarching policy adherence it was entirely possible to see 
variations in the prosecution policy of the same offence in different forces and there 
was little the Home Office could do to intervene without chief officers citing their right 
to operational autonomy. In this way the Police, at a senior level, were loosely 
coupled both to the Home Office and their respective Police Authorities. The system 
of control and funding of the police forces of England and Wales was largely 
established by the 1964 Police Act. This statute formulated a tripartite method of 
running and funding police forces. The chief officer had a direct responsibility for the 
operational running of his force, the Home Office set the national and political 
agendas leaving Police Authorities to administer local funding and accountability.
The case study of the Police suggests a significant change to the context, dating to 
the issue, in 1983, of Home Office Circular 114/83. This was to be the first notion of 
centralised accountability justified on the basis of fiscal effectiveness and efficiency. 
This was not restricted to the Police, for, as we see in the case study of the Foreign 
Office, at a macro-political level the Thatcher Government elected in 1979 had 
embarked on a universal tightening of public expenditure seen largely out of control 
and self-determined.
Much of the change we have described in the case study is hardly micro-political -  
e.g. zero tolerance, but it does sit under a continuum of increasing financial control 
and, as we see, there is a point at which this becomes the mechanism by which 
operational control is leveraged.
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The activities of individual police officers are regulated by procedural legislation that 
sets a framework for their overall conduct (Police Regulations 1964) and the manner 
in which they exercise their statutory authority (the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984, Codes of Practice). Police officers are, nevertheless, individual agents of the 
Crown and in theory each determines whether to use his or her authority.
Chief Officers do not report to higher authority for the execution of their 
responsibilities, but they are required through Her Majesty’s Inspectors (HMI) of 
Constabulary (former chief officers employed by the Home Office for inspection 
purposes) to account for the way in which those responsibilities are carried out, thus 
mirroring the situation for individual officers. However Chief Officers are also 
accountable to their respective Police Authorities for the efficient use of their budgets.
The situation has now been reached, as we detail in our case study material, where 
Central Government publicly commits itself to reducing crime {‘tough on crime and 
tough on the causes of crime’) whilst at the same time effectively attempting to shape 
the Police response by increasing the range of performance measurement 
techniques such as the Best Value Initiative aimed at encouraging Chief Officers to 
justify use of resources.
The loop is closed by Chief Officers now being appointed on ‘short-term’ (up to ten 
year) contracts, renewal of which is judged by Police Authorities, who conduct annual 
appraisals of the Chief Constable partly, at least, against his or her ability to meet 
Home Office efficiency targets.
In this way Central Government can proclaim a determination to reduce a particular 
aspect of crime, e.g. drug abuse, but at the same time distance themselves from 
accusations of political bias by citing the operational autonomy of Chief Officers who
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are only assessed on the efficient use of their resources. If, however, the Police 
Authority judges that the Chief Officer has not reached an acceptable standard 
(based on the Home Office performance measures) they can decline to renew an 
officer’s contract and this is a genuine concern of Chief Officers leading to some 
contentious activity: -
‘A study by HM Inspector of Constabulary found that some 
forces wrote off allegations as “no crimes”... . Last year, the 
forces recorded about 5.1 million offences. The report 
found that 24 per cent of the allegations from the public did 
not make crime statistics...On detection rates, the report 
highlighted a tendency of forces “to trawl” the margins for 
detections and “generally use every means to portray their 
performance in a good light’
(The Daily Telegraph 1st August 2000)
‘In 1995 it was relatively simple. The then Home Secretary 
set four or five key objectives, working with the Police 
Authorities, five years on we have got the ‘policing plan’, 
the ‘efficiency plan’, the ‘best value strategy, the 
'performance plan’ and the ‘district crime reduction plan’.
Now it has been suggested that there will be ‘regional 
crime reduction plan’ and we have 59 'best value’ 
performance indicators. We also have to produce reports 
every three months and the District Audit Commission 
comes in several times a year -  they also look at best 
value on an annual basis. I am spending £200,000 a year 
on accountants and researchers -  the equivalent of eight 
officers on the beat just to man the ‘best value’ team in a 
force of only 1,000 officers’
(Tony Butler, Chief Constable Gloucestershire)
‘W e fully accept the right of the Government to set the 
overall strategy for the service and have a voice in what we 
do, but the danger in this inherent shift to centralism is the 
involvement in how we do it. By all means tell us what is 
expected of us and set priorities -  but leave us to deliver in 
the best way suited to our communities’
(Sir John Evans, President, Association of 
Chief Police officers)
The measures introduced by successive Governments have gradually tightened the 
control of Chief Officers and restricted their options for independent action.
It is worth making this point in that the police can, historically, be described as
operating within a loosely coupled system. Each Chief Constable, effectively, ruling
his (and this was the gender norm) fiefdom. As we have noted this resulted in 
different styles and priorities of policing across the country largely due to the 
individual persuasions of these officers. Internally each force operated tight coupling 
and this enabled the command and control style of management to adapt to the 
requirements of the Chief Constable, whether or not officers agreed with his views.
Today the coupling with the Home Office has been tightened leading to reduced 
flexibility and individual choice for Chief Constables’, however, the process is 
underway to loosen the internal coupling of individual forces by driving down 
responsibility to lower ranks. And this may start to impact on the ability of Chief 
Constables to carry through their own initiatives when policy making is increasingly 
restricted by Central Government intervention and the capacity to influence 
subordinate behaviour is in the formative stages of being eroded. Nevertheless, on 
balance, for the purposes of this work we describe the Police as tightly coupled.
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The above represents the macro-political context of our case study but it does not 
inform the micro-political dimension. At an individual level police officers are 
responsible for upholding the rule of law -  if necessary by force.
In our view police officers maintain an unequivocal bias for action not consultation. 
This historical raison d'etre has a bearing on how they view themselves as a force 
rather than a service. It is true that the demands on police officers in the UK call for 
sophisticated management and understanding, they are required by society to carry 
out their responsibilities with consideration and sensitivity, often switching roles from 
that of mediator in domestic disputes to enforcer in public order situations. Yet it is 
the bias for action that separates the Police from social workers and other public 
servants. W e suggest that whilst necessary it is also a bias that requires 
understanding from those who would seek to influence their actions or, in this case, 
encourage them to adapt to new agendas.
Process
The process elements of the Police case study we intend to comment upon are long­
term attempts at adaptive change.
1 Attempts to change the orientation of policing from force to service then 
back to force
2 Introduction of value for money policies
3 Changes the structure of the Police organisation and devolvement of 
responsibility
1 One of the central tasks of the Police is, and always will be, to catch 
criminals, nevertheless, talk of ‘fighting crime’ more often than not confuses 
the catching of individual criminals -  which is certainly a prime responsibility
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of the Police -  with other activities aimed at preventing or reducing crime. The 
latter is properly the responsibility of many agencies, and there is growing 
evidence to suggest that it will best be tackled if these agencies work together 
(Bennett, 1994).
Any basic analysis of the reasons underlying rises in crime in recent decades 
illustrates the point that overall responsibility for tackling crime cannot simply 
be laid at the door of the Police. The changing nature of crime, and therefore 
of policing, in part reflects broader changes in the socio-economic context in 
which they occur; the break-up of traditional, fairly close-knit communities; the 
globalisation of economic activity and the polarisation of different social 
groups.
There is a multi-layered process whereby new emerging patterns of class and 
status overlay rapid changes in communication and business practice.
By way of example a quarter of all recorded crime is to do with the motorcar. 
As the number, cost and availability have changed so has the direct growth in 
crime. In 1957 there were only 7,500 reported thefts of motorcars in the UK, 
in 1987 there were 390,000 such cases. Additionally the motorcar provides a 
means of transport for highly portable televisions, videos and stereos, which 
are also an output of developments in technology.
The principal focus requiring change by the Police are the new cleavages of, 
age, gender, race and minority interest groups, any one of which can and do 
catch the attention of the media and thus politicians who invariably look to the 
Police to enact new ‘public’ sensitivities.
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In this way we have seen the bedrock of policing questioned and attempts 
made to redefine it, only to then reverse the direction some years later.
The debate started with Home Office Circular 114/83 on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Police and has since continued with the questioning of 
the specific Police role in relation to: -
•  Regulation of traffic
• Control of parking
• Use of Police as administrators
• Manning of rural Police stations
• Use of private security companies
Patrols
Response to alarm activations
Town centre Closed Circuit TV
Any number of authors have examined these matters including, Clark & 
Hough (1984), Horton & Smith (1988) and Southgate & Crisp (1992). The 
overall conclusions being that in the opinion of the authors the Police need to 
prioritise their resource distribution into core policing functions, the difficulty 
being to define what those core-policing functions should be. The 
Government consolidated their position on this matter with publication of the 
1994 Home Office Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks (the Posen 
enquiry), which had responsibility for making recommendations about the 
most cost-effective way of delivering core Police services and to assess the 
scope for relinquishing ancillary tasks.
3 All Police officers start their service as Constables and can progress through 
successive ranks to the level of Chief Constable. There is, currently, no 
mechanism in place to circumvent this practice. Effectively it blocks direct 
entry at senior rank and maintains a hierarchical structure that takes 
precedence over expert knowledge in the decision-making forums.
The effectiveness and efficiency agenda detailed above co-existed with a real 
growth in Government expenditure on ‘law and order* services, in general, 
and policing in particular, at a time when pure cost in many other public 
services had been reduced.
One method of addressing spiralling costs, and the ever-increasing public 
demand for more ‘policing’, was to re-distribute Police numbers by flattening 
the rank structure. The Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards 
(Sheehy Inquiry) took as its mainstay the ‘logical’ distribution of responsibility 
to divisional command units and the reward of individual performance.
The recommendations resonate with the Bartlett & Ghoshal (1995) concept of 
moving away from highly centralised autocracies formed around structural 
imperatives and confirming the importance of de-centralised decision-making 
by semi-autonomous managers operating under the remit of informed 
decision-making.
Prior to the Sheehy Inquiry of 1993 police officers below Chief Officer rank 
took no devolved budgetary responsibility and support areas such as 
personnel and many of the localised specialist functions such as traffic and 
anti-drugs enforcement were centrally controlled.
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The change called for here focused both on the devolvement of responsibility 
and reduction of the structure by 3 ranks.
Outcomes
1 The attempts to change the orientation of policing from force to service 
and back to force
The attempts to change the orientation of policing from what was perceived as one of 
force can be dated from the period of urban riots in the UK in 1980 and 1981 in 
Bristol, Liverpool, London and Manchester leading to Lord Scarman’s 1982 inquiry. 
Followed closely by media scrutiny of the Police role in the national miners strike in 
1983 & 1984.
The concept of community policing was certainly not new to policing in the UK, but a 
distinct change was the level of local collaboration and consultation that started to 
take place with minority interest groups and community leaders. This was closely 
aligned with the reclassification of many ‘minor1 offences, such as the use of 
cannabis, petty damage, theft etc into cautionable misdemeanours on the occasion 
of first offences.
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 consolidated the rights of suspects to fair 
representation and attempted to tighten up the procedural collection of evidence by 
the Police, thus addressing the central criticism of highly publicised miscarriages of 
justice.
By 1994 the representation of policing had aligned itself with the requirements of 
political accountability (Bennett, 1994) and Chief Officers became adept at 
‘implementing’ socially sustainable policy and practice.
Unfortunately in the same period of time (1984-1994) reported offences of theft and 
violent attack doubled. The Police response to this was to increase the sophistication 
of its dedicated criminal investigation and intelligence gathering capability and to 
raise the level of equipment available for the defence of police officers.
In the Bristol riots of 1980 police officers defended themselves with plastic milk crates 
against petrol bomb and stone attack, their only equipment being a short wooden 
truncheon. By 1994 officers were trained in riot control tactics and equipped with 
body protection, riot helmets, batons and shields. Today patrolling officers wear 
knife/bullet resistant body armour and the carrying of firearms by specially trained 
response units has become routine.
Whilst the Police acquired a more acceptable public face, as was the political 
requirement, at the expense of the pursuit of petty crime, police officers were 
concurrently required to increase their individual capability to deliver force and 
vigorously prosecute organised crime.
The balance the Police achieved played to the public and political support for dealing 
with the more serious offences, at the cost of a loss of confidence in their willingness 
or ability to deal with the less serious offences. Most police forces prioritised their 
response to reported crime and simply declined to investigate petty theft, damage 
and even some forms of house burglaries.
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By 1994 through to 1997 and the election of the Labour Party the policy of zero 
tolerance gained increasing recognition in the UK, leading to its political acclaim by 
the incoming Government. Very quickly it was adopted by a number of police forces 
coming under increasing pressure to reduce the levels of reported crime, or at least 
increase detection rates.
Our research contains comments by a Canadian Chief Officer and the practical 
output of zero tolerance policing. Not only did the concept strike a chord with many 
officers, it was welcomed as a means of re-establishing the boundaries of unlawful 
behaviour. The requirement to exercise force addressed much of the latent 
potentiality that had built up for many years -  not surprisingly, therefore the change in 
orientation was rapid -  if indeed it had ever changed in the first place. We would 
contend that the Police had actually legitimised force of a more targeted nature 
(where it would have been publicly supported) and removed much of the ground for 
developing areas of friction by redefining their roles and opening up greater public 
dialogue to understand topical issues. This was fine, as far as it went, but without the 
capacity to act -  sometimes vigorously - the Police would present little deterrent 
value for society.
W e contend that this is a delicate balance -  and one easily destabilised - when the 
Police are encouraged to over enact their forceful purpose as a result of political 
pressure. At senior levels we have a wide understanding that political pressure on 
the Police for reform was linked to ongoing political agendas, such as encouraging 
the service ethos. This was regarded as an inevitable consequence, but one that 
could be dealt with in isolation, leaving traditional styles of policing intact, despite 
pressure brought to bear on them:
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'The Home Office is never happier than when the 
Government gives them something to get their teeth into, 
especially if it means Chief Officers getting it in the neck -  
we just have to rise above that’
(Sarah Higgins, Assistant Chief Constable)
At the time of writing Ann Widdecombe, shadow Home Secretary for the 
Conservative party, was advocating a zero tolerance policy for users of cannabis that 
would lead to the Police issuing fixed penalty notices for those caught with the drug 
in their possession.
The proposed policy was widely ridiculed by opposition politicians, the Police and the 
press as being unworkable. Nevertheless, the policy was widely applauded at the 
Conservative Party National Conference in 2000 and serves notice on the continued 
pressure the Police can expect in their attempts to balance the enactment of their 
responsibilities.
2 Introduction of value for money policies
As we have seen previously from the comments of Tony Butler, Chief Constable of 
Gloucestershire measurement of best value is a fact of life for Police Forces in the 
continuous audit of expenditure and use of resources. The process is ongoing but 
also has to be seen against a backdrop in the continued rise in reported crime.
The Police have, largely, withdrawn from what they have defined as non-core Police 
activities and, where retained, many of these duties are now undertaken by civilian 
staff whose numbers have grown from 35,000 in 1990 to 65,000 in 2000. At the 
same time total Police numbers grew from 108,000 to 120,000.
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The Police have also accommodated the requirement to report on value for money 
policies and that has, inevitably, included the statistical analysis of trends in crime 
and levels of detection.
The consequences of enacting value for money policies have been for the Police to 
‘negotiate’ priorities, based on a complex and dynamic formula that includes the high 
profile crimes of murder and rape - prevailing politically topical issues - but, 
increasingly, specifically excludes the minor offences we noted above, and much 
commercial crime where the victim is a corporate body.
Many of the police officers we interviewed expressed personal distaste for what they 
saw as the ignoring of ‘real’ crime in favour of multiple clear up opportunities that 
would enhance the reported statistics. We revisit Robert’s comments taken from our 
case study: -
1.................. crime involving a single theft to a value of
£150,000 is just that a single crime. Twenty cars broken 
into in a car park is twenty separate crimes - there is no 
reward in the system for investigating the single offence 
based upon monetary value - even though individual 
officers would love to do so'
Whether or not it can be said the Police have adapted to the introduction of value for 
money policies is rather dependent upon the meaning taken from this proposition. 
The Police report on a wide variety of value for money policies, yet they do so by 
diverting budgets from operational policing to gathering statistical information on 
value for money practices. The Police may prefer to focus on ‘real’ crimes but to the 
twenty odd owners of the cars Robert talks of above this is ‘real crime’ and clearly
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politicians will not be blind to the ‘value’ of clearing up twenty times as many reported 
crimes.
The Police have adapted to much of the value for money agenda -  they have focused 
more of their numbers on operational matters - yet it is the process of reporting their 
activity that may inadvertently have had the greater impact on changes to policing.
3 Attempts to change the structure of Police organisations and devolve 
responsibility
Giddens (1996) likens attempts to change the structure of the Police to a process of 
de-traditionalisation. The Police have traditionally been structured on a paramilitary 
basis that has maintained relatively narrow hierarchical spans of control, despite the 
fact that the majority of work is informed by a widely implemented discretion, and is, to 
a large extent, removed from the monitoring capacities of supervisory officers. This has 
not stopped the Police resisting attempts to align them with contemporary 
organisational thinking and reduce the hierarchical levels of their structure. As we have 
noted the change to this structure -  the removal of 3 layers - was reversed within 6 
years of implementation. Our data indicated that in part this was due to the perceived 
inability of those ranks left to exercise sufficient control over the activities of their 
subordinates and, somewhat paradoxically, the apparent belief that those of lower rank 
did not represent an appropriate level of delegated authority to external agencies with 
whom they came into contact.
As a consequence the Police have gradually reinstated the original ranks, thus formerly 
removing the issue of delegated authority. In essence we conclude that officers of a 
more junior rank did not enact the delegated authority that removal of the ranks was
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intended to achieve, this, in turn, enacted a problem for which the solution was seen to 
be a return to the original system of control.
Foreign & Commonwealth Office Services
Context
The process considered later concerns one group of executives working for a 
department - Foreign & Commonwealth Office Services (FCOS) - within the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office (FCO). The overall feeling expressed by this group was that in 
some way the world was moving on in terms of organisation design and management. 
Here we try to understand the specific influences noticed, and commented upon, by the 
executives at various points of our data collection.
•  Universal growth and use of the Internet
The managers within FCOS were well aware of the explosion in use of the Internet in 
the late 1990s. Many managers felt that the FCO and FCOS in particular had been left 
behind by this trend and even at the time of writing few individual managers had the 
equipment in place to send and receive external e-mail messages.
A cornerstone of the Modernising Government White Paper had been the effective use 
of technology to help achieve ‘joined up Government’. As an organisation that prided 
itself on the quality of the information it supplied to Government many felt they did not 
have a basic tool to do their work efficiently.
•  Increase of public-private sector partnerships -  but relative lack of experience 
in managing these relationships
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As a support based organisation managers were under increasing pressure from 
Government to use best value solutions, which in many cases involved private 
organisations with which relationships needed to be negotiated and managed.
Managers realised that there was a basic mismatch in the way that they had, 
historically, managed internal issues on the basis of quality of service and the 
judgement call they were being asked to make on potential suppliers where the 
relationship -  ideally -  was to be quality of service and value for money. This had led, 
on a number of occasions, to managers buying in services and products based purely 
on cost and this had resulted in shortfalls in expectations.
In order to meet this need it was recognised that managers had to be trained and given 
appropriate opportunities to gain experience -  possibly outside the FCO - or be in a 
position to buy in the right level of experience. These solutions required a flexibility 
that senior managers did not readily see available to themselves.
•  Commercial adroitness required to sell services to the main FCO office and 
other parts of the Civil Service
This follows on from the previous point -  managers were well aware that many other 
support functions within Central Government departments had long before developed 
processes for marketing their services to internal and external customers.
This was a step beyond the principles of bench marking services or market testing and 
required an understanding of how to form self-funding services in an environment 
where there was little knowledge of the value and costs associated with maintaining 
the services they delivered, making them difficult to sell within a reliable costing
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framework. Products and services were sold on a small scale but senior managers had 
no idea whether or not they were being sold at a profit or loss.
•  Recognition that a move towards executive agency status would bring with it 
changes in structure and management style
This was to be a department where diplomatic staff was to be in the minority. Within 
the FCO as a whole, the divisions between the Diplomatic Service and the Home Civil 
Service went deep with diplomats (and especially those fast streamed for promotion) 
often regarded as elitist. However, within FCOS the experience of diplomats would be 
of value in understanding the new market place but on an equal footing with other 
‘experts’ in IT, supplies, estate management, fleet management, project management 
and the like. Managers recognised that this new organisation would need to value 
contribution over status if it were to create a flexible responsive and integrated agency.
•  Performance management and career development
It was recognised that the FCO had sustained a family orientated culture for many 
years. A reason given for this being that staff -  especially those serving oversees -  
required additional support and even nurturing if they were to give of their best. 
Children of diplomats receive free private education, extended periods of leave are 
given to prepare for postings, a large medical and welfare department is maintained to 
look after all aspects of the physical and mental well being of staff.
Staff were rarely, if ever, sacked for under performing, except in the cases of dishonest 
activity. Over the period of our research most managers that we spoke with could 
readily identify under performing staff in all areas of FCOS. Many clearly understood 
that this was an issue -  especially if some of these staff were to be engaged in
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delivering services sold outside the organisation - but it was not an issue that any had 
dealt with. A common reason given for this being the high level of bureaucracy that had 
built up in the processes for dealing with under-performance and, ultimately, those who 
ran the course of this system saw the final decision being fudged and the member of 
staff moved into another department.
FCOS operated on well defined centralised control systems and the context was one 
where the definition of meaning was tightly coupled with the actions of the PUS, 
unfortunately when he finally gave the order for organisational change -  FCOS seemed 
unable to respond and yet the perceived wisdom (above) would be that as a tightly 
coupled system the need for change (as was indeed the case) not implementation 
would be the issue. Once the need for change had been understood the system should 
have been capable of delivery, however, it did not.
Process
This was not so much a requirement to implement or establish a clearly definable 
change, this was more taking a whole range of issues involving systems, people 
management, structures, language and symbols that led, ultimately, to behaving in line 
with the views managers expressed about those issues. The process or change we 
monitored was one of enactment -  in a recognisable and qualitatively different manner 
-  to management behaviour we witnessed from the same group in the preceding years 
in line with the Modernising agenda.
Outcome
We saw changes to the language in published documents within FCOS and changes to 
the reporting lines of some departments that had been moved into FCOS. Indeed
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some of those departments had been reconstituted with new departmental names and 
different members of staff as part of the process of setting up FCOS.
At an individual level we noted some senior managers ordering their own IT equipment 
(see comments of Peter in FCO case study) and others arranging management 
training for their staff. However, we saw no substantive change in the way the 
executive body of FCOS acted as a central focus of leadership activity. Such change 
as we have noted above, was in the margins of the organisation as a whole. As seen 
from the comments of our actors, this was variously put down to the lack of available 
funding and the unwillingness of the CEO to engage with any of these issues.
Perrow (1981) talks of overloading individuals at times of change when driven through 
tightly coupled systems, we consider that something of this kind happened at FCOS. A 
situation compounded by the reported conversation between Ray CEO of FCOS and 
the PUS -  essentially he was being told to get a grip of his department and bring about 
organisational change.
Given the available evidence we might venture that the coupling had been over 
tightened and this had induced the sense of inertia, perhaps the inverse of what might 
have been anticipated. Watzlawick (1974) suggests that in such circumstances two 
questions arise equally: ‘how does this undesirable situation persist?’ and ‘what is 
required to change it?’ (p.2). Schein (1996) identifies something of a dilemma here for 
if, as he states, the only real role of the leader is to bring about change; in this 
circumstance the PUS would need to be able to diagnose his own [system] collusion in 
creating the problem and recognise the need to change the system in order to remedy 
the problem.
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If our suggestion is correct and the problem has resulted from over tightening the 
coupling then getting a grip [on the problem] may be achieved through the paradox of 
loosening the grip. Weick (op cit) comes close to this position by expressing his interest 
in the possible ways that the trade off for short-term adaptation (tight coupling) might 
be to gain longer-term adaptability (loose coupling). Counterintuitive though this might 
seem to someone in the position of the PUS this might have been achieved by finding 
a way of letting the organisation find its own level by encouraging it to make its own 




The popular music industry had consolidated the number of ‘major’ music companies 
to five by the late 1990s, the EMI group being one of these. Each of the companies 
operates on an international basis and each owns a number of record labels dealing 
with what is called ‘local’ and ‘international’ repertoire. As an example the Beatles 
released most of their early music on the Parlophone label in Europe and Capitol in the 
USA, both labels being owned by EMI Recorded Music.
In common with the other ‘majors’, the holding company plays a central administration 
and management function under whose authority sits the various record labels 
themselves, each of which will be recognised for its own style of music and artists 
signed to that particular label.
As the 'majors’ have developed over the years they have merged or purchased other 
record companies who themselves hosted a number of record labels that started life as
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independent companies. This leads to complex issues of reporting and authority over 
different parts of the business. For example, Virgin Records owns several labels, each 
with their own managing director and staff. The labels report into the President of Virgin 
Records who then reports to the CEO of EMI recorded music. However, none of the 
EMI Recorded Music executives, with the exception of the CEO, has any authority over 
Virgin even though they control all distribution and manufacturing for Virgin and each 
can influence the effectiveness of the other.
In part this goes some way to explain the apparent lack of consistency in defining the 
relevance or otherwise of ‘parallel imports’ (see case study) -  the business struggles 
for consistency on this issue and even avoids consistency.
There is a dilemma for the large music companies that they are well aware of: -
The problem is one of creativity -  artists are attracted to 
labels because of what they think they represent -  how in 
tune the people are with their music. From the other side it 
means that A&R is about best guessing what new sounds 
are going to make the sales. These can only be calls made 
from the ground. We hope that it works and more often than 
not, it does. Once an artist is broken [successfully releases 
an album] it just becomes a system, until then it is a bit like 
the unknown and yes, we keep it that way.’
(Martina Dury, Director of Artist Relations)
In this way the ‘majors’ attempt to cover the options as widely as possible whilst 
retaining the identity of individual labels. Geri Halliwell left the Spice Girls pop group 
on the Virgin label and joined the Chrysalis label as the style of the label and the 
management suited her better even though EMI Recorded Music owns both labels.
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There is also some recognition that the ‘unique’ appeal of the labels could only be 
achieved with small groups of staff in touch with their marketplace and the artists. 
Richard Branson, when he owned Virgin, made explicit his policy of restricting the 
number of his music label staff to no more than 50 to retain their responsiveness and 
provide staff with an incentive to succeed.
The popular music business is a layering of accommodations. Popular music has to 
break new ground otherwise it looses its appeal to the buying public. Large 
companies understand that this has to be handled by small units or labels and so 
they maintain individual identities and buy up small independent labels as they 
emerge to renew the process. At the same time all the major companies have to 
manage complex, co-ordinated, worldwide manufacture and distribution networks in 
order to deliver product efficiently and at a competitive price.
In the terms of Chesbrough & Teece (1996), the music companies combine the 
virtues of an integrated corporation -  the ability to co-ordinate activity combined with 
a form of in house decentralised alliances - individual labels provide them with the 
incentive to take risks and develop new artists and music. We have, however, 
noticed that the pure models of centralised and decentralised corporations described 
by Chesbrough & Teece (ibid) do not apply. Music companies appear to find conflict 
resolution difficult and there is a deliberate avoidance of written policy and practice -  
certainly within EMI Recorded Music - and so risk exposure from the labels is 
restricted by budgetary restraints over which they [the labels] have limited control. 
The message being ‘spend, experiment and innovate but do so to a budget and by 
the way we will judge you on medium term performance’.
Our impression overall has been of continuing strain between those responsible for 
the corporate management of the group and those responsible for the creativity or
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music side of the business. Interestingly both CEOs involved in the proposed Warner 
Music/EMI Recorded Music were known as ‘music people’ - that is their roots were 
in the area of creative music generation - they moved across to corporate 
management later in their careers. The possibility exists that their relative lack of 
experience outside the music industry might have exacerbated the difficulties that the 
merger was to face as these principal actors found themselves dealing with the 
political nature of international regulatory decision-making for which they had little 
experience.
Process
The adaptive change of our case study is one that affects the popular music industry 
as a whole. W e have seen how the concept of ‘copyright' -  as the principal asset of 
record companies -  has been redefined by changes in technology. The basic 
medium of purchasing and replaying music changed very little for nearly 100 years. 
Retail sales of music product involved people purchasing a physical product whether 
vinyl, music cassettes or CDs, at retail outlets or by mail order.
As the technology available for producing music to a higher listening standard 
through the digitalisation of sound -  a technique learnt from the computer industry -  
improved and resulted in music product being dominated by the CD format, the same 
technology became widely available for illegal copying by music pirates.
Today music piracy in CD format accounts for more than 500 million units annually 
much of which is controlled by organised crime syndicates.
The widespread use of the Internet and associated technology now permits the 
digital transmission/downloading of music product at minimal expense, resulting in at
195
least 25 million pirate files available for trading on the Internet, according to a review 
of the global illegal music market released in June 2000 by the international music 
companies trade association the International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry (IFPI).
Whilst physical recordings still account for the vast bulk of music piracy, it is only a 
matter of time before Internet downloading becomes the normal method of 
transacting pirated product. The music companies have effectively been challenged 
to the point of extinction by the very technology they developed themselves; trapped 
by their own enactment.
The change the industry attempted to make was its response to changes to the 
traditional assumption of its assets being invested in the ownership of copyright. In 
particular we looked at the activity of one company, EMI Recorded Music, who 
attempted to prepare for this change by merging with Warner Music, part of the Time 
Warner Entertainment Group who were themselves merging with AOL, an Internet 
service provider. EMI were attempting to deal with the requirement to adapt to the 
inevitable loss of copyright (or rather the increasingly difficulty of protecting it) by 
defining themselves as content providers.
In the music market of the future EMI saw technology enabling the instant 
download/play of music as the general means of listening choice for the public with 
no physical product necessary; issues of copyright being of secondary importance as 
few, they thought, would trouble with physical product.
Outcome
This case is very much one of adaptive change in process, we have tracked the 
developing dialogues residing alongside changes in technology that, in themselves 
have led to difficult issues. EMI/Wamer attempted to extend the boundaries towards 
content provision. This particular action may have failed but it has served to 
accelerate the wider change towards this method of defining value with others (BMG 
working with Napster) now seeking new ways of delivering to the same agenda. The 
change may not have been completed but the process has been advanced by others 
who shared the same sensemaking process.
A plausible synthesis
Parvin-May The Police FCOS EMI
Instances of adaptive change 4 3 1 1
Context
Private sector/Public Sector Private Public Public Private
Size of organisation (note 1) Small Large Medium Medium
Degree of centralisation (note 2) Integrated Integrated Integrated Decentralised
Output regulated by statute? Yes Yes No No
Output subject to parliamentary review? No No Yes No
Policies and procedures documented? Yes Yes Yes No
Clear reporting and organisational structure? Yes Yes Yes No
Process
Reason for change 1 -4 Economic 1-3 Political Political Economic
Imposed by external agencies? No Yes Yes No
Episodic change Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incremental change No Yes Yes Yes
Prior enactment within organisation No No No No
Prior knowledge of enactment elsewhere Yes Yes Yes No
Outcomes
Achieved successfully 1&2 No No No
Achieved as planned 1 & 2-No n/a n/a n/a
Partially achieved 4 2 No No
Footnotes:
1 Small organisation: up to 1,000 staff, Medium organisation: up to 20,000 staff, Large organisation over 100,000 staff.
2 Virtual/alliance/decentralised/integrated organisations
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At first reading we have a wide divergence of data emanating from quite different 
organisations seeking different outcomes. In terms of context, organisations vary in 
size, two are public sector and two are private sector. We have organisations regulated 
by statute, others subject to parliamentary review, and one whose output is not subject 
to any form of official control or review. With the exception of EMI, there is a high 
degree of similarity in that the rest have clearly definable reporting lines and 
organisational structures forming a traditional hierarchy with centralised decision­
making and comprehensively documented policies and procedures.
Child (1972), Weick (1995) suggest that decision makers do have the choice to 
intervene between the environment and its effects inside the organisation, they can -
•  Select among several structures (all of which may be appropriate to their output)
• Choose the environment they will operate within
• Have the opportunity to reshape the environments in which they exist
•  Improve the accuracy of their perception thus enhancing their chances of
controlling it.
Weick adds that even if the environment is unmanageable (a proposition he clearly 
doubts), it can at least be ‘softened’.
Within Parvin-May much play was made on the ‘need to conform to the authorities’ -  
repeatedly this mantra would be rolled out to provide a rational focus on the structure 
and control procedures. Not only is this confounded by other financial institutions that 
successfully balance the ‘tight’ requirements of the regulatory authorities with the 
‘looseness’ of entrepreneurial flair, but it was really only believed by those stakeholders
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with a vested interest in perpetuating the system -  i.e. Henry and Stephen. To many of 
the others, as we have seen from their comments, it was a matter of preferred 
management style.
The Police, on the other hand -  certainly at Chief Officer level - had always maintained 
a style of policing that fitted their own inclinations (or indeed excesses). The movement 
we have seen has been by Central Government to tighten the linkage and reduce the 
autonomy of Chief Officers, time will tell (but it will not tell it straight!) that, having had 
wide discretion in the past, and used it as they wished, the Police might have deprived 
themselves of the immediate prospects for operating a balanced tight/loose dimension. 
W e do however note, in the manner of the sensemaking model, it only starts to make 
sense when disturbance of the status quo leads to reflection and change - we do not 
value what we have until we lose it.
FCOS, or rather the FCO, has always had accountability to the Crown for the loyal 
support of elected ministers of state. However, the style, structure and management of 
the FCO has largely been a matter for the PUS and his senior staff. In much the same 
way as the Police, it is only of late that Central Government has sought an active role in 
changing the way the Office delivers its responsibilities. In this way Central 
Government is again tightening the FCO's relationship with policy makers by 
attempting to align all Central Government departments.
EMI Recorded Music, for the most part unashamedly creates its own environment by 
selecting the type of music it records. It then uses skilled marketing to shape the 
expectations of its buying public -  the difficulty that this organisation encountered was 
the reverse of the Police and FCO, whereas they had always been in something of a 
negotiation with the political dimensions of their environments, EMI had no such
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experience to call upon. As an apparent consequence the organisation may have over 
emphasised its capacity to control its environment.
In summary, each of the case study organisations developed its own relationship with 
its environment, and whilst some of our actors tended to lay emphasis upon the 
restraints they worked under, in our view where they existed, largely, out of our actors 
own making (e.g. FCOS relationship with the main FCO). It could be argued that for 
some the very looseness of the coupling, aligned to an apparent inability to gauge 
relationships with their environments, led them into some of the perplexing situations 
that they faced (EMI Recorded Music). The exception to this being Parvin-May, for 
them there was no significant movement in their relationship with the external 
environment and yet Stephen invoked and, therefore, enacted the external 
environment as a means of bringing about internal change. This last point also impacts 
on the process comparison where there have been a mixture of changes imposed by 
external agencies and self-imposed for political and economic reasons.
With the Police, FCOS and EMI the changes described originated partly from within the 
organisations and partly from their environments. In the same way it is possible to view 
the changes as extension to a negotiated and ongoing continuum of change. For this 
reason we have described the typology for these changes as both episodic and 
continuous. This fits not only with the foreground and background views we have 
taken, but also the interaction with the environment. This was not the case for Parvin- 
May, where the fit was much more clearly in line with episodic change.
If we extend the timeframe over which we viewed Parvin-May eventually activity would 
merge as part of a continuous process of change, but our frame of reference is not 
sufficiently wide to grasp that sense of being part of a continuum. Due we feel to the 
lack of interaction with the external environment in connection with these changes
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reinforcing our view that our actors, especially Henry and Stephen, created their own 
environment. We suggest this added to the consternation of managers, who suggested 
that Parvin-May was something of a ‘one off and was somehow disconnected by 
promoting its own brand of reality.
None of organisations had previously enacted changes of the nature described. 
However, all but EMI had some knowledge of similar enactment within other 
organisations.
In terms of outcomes, Parvin-May achieved two out of four of their changes, the 
transformation from merchant to private banking and the increase in profitability, none 
of the others could be said to have completed attempts at adaptive change. The 
inconsistency in these results needs to be explained, and a clue to this is given by the 
fact that Parvin-May did not always succeed in the way they had planned, we comment 
further on this later. Two of the changes were partly successful (Parvin-May and the 
Police) yet even here there is a question of deciding the meaning of success and 
whose meaning of success, we revisit this later.
There are plenty of areas where the case studies do not hold to points of comparison, 
especially; context and process. They start to come together at the point at which we 
examine the experience each organisation has with changes of the nature described. If 
we review the data from each organisation again this point is clarified.
Parvin-May had always been a niche market player in the banking world and even 
though it had been in existence since 1911 it had remained small, board control had 
been in the hands of a small number of shareholders. The Bank had never made a lot 
of cash but neither had it lost cash. In the words of the present CEO ‘it had been 
literally the private bank of a few rich men -  not really a business as such; indeed the
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term business did not rest easily with them’. There was no history of change in core 
activity, re-structuring, reengineering or, indeed, many of the other popular 
management fads of the 70s through to the 90s. It is true to say that compliance with 
the regulatory authorities requirements had changed over the years, as indeed it had 
for all other UK financial services companies, but at most this couid be viewed as part 
of the process of change brought about over a long time frame. Quite simply there was 
no internal or external pressure to bring about the type of adaptive changes we have 
detailed in the case study. The trigger point appeared to be the recession of the late 
1980s and early 1990s that severely restricted the deal making activities of merchant 
banks leaving those without the means to diversify their activity under strain, the 
smaller institutions did not have the reserves to wait for the economy to recover then 
attract new business at reduced margins.
The Police in the UK also have a long history dating back to 1829. They witnessed 
changes in society and certainly technology that has enabled far greater levels of 
sophistication to be applied to the prevention and detection of crime. In 1974, a degree 
of economy of scale was applied to the reduction in the number of Police Forces in line 
with changes to local Government boundaries and responsibilities. Through external 
pressure they have delivered changes to the way they consult with local communities, 
but there is nothing in their history that suggests long-term changes to their orientation 
of both managing and policing through the principles of force neither, until 1983, had 
the Police fallen under the political measure of providing value for money services. It 
should be noted that the Police might well have been protected from this scrutiny, 
partly, at least, because, until the report of Lord Edmond -  Davis, Police Conditions 
and Pay in 1978, the Police were poorly paid. The pay awards suggested following this 
report being implemented in full by the newly elected Conservative Government of 
1979. Structurally the police organisation changed little since 1829, save that there are
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now an increased number of hierarchical levels, prior to 1993 there had been no 
history of reducing the rank structure, only of increasing it.
The FCO, and our unit of examination FCOS, were attempting to modernise across a 
whole range of areas: technology, working to business principles, changing the 
structure and reducing formality and management style. In effect they were attempting 
to play 'catch up’, having been shielded from many of the principles that had long been 
enacted in other parts of the Civil Service. Using the metaphor of modernising the FCO 
had, to all intents and purposes, not had to face this challenge until 1997. It was, 
therefore, something quite novel and untried. A pivotal point being when the PUS, 
having resisted many attempts at organisational change, through pressure from many 
different directions, became a proponent of the modernising agenda.
The music industry, until recently, evolved largely from a platform of maximising the 
benefit of copyright ownership. This has been so through the manufacture of physical 
product and control over public performances -  the playing of music by radio stations, 
use in advertising and film production. Organisations have grown organically by 
increasing the appeal of popular music through low cost technology -  portable 
walkmans, music centres and the like. The have also grown acquisitively through the 
purchase and merger of smaller music businesses. None of these changes has altered 
the basic tenet of copyright being the raison d'etre for music companies. The concept 
of adapting to this change is also novel and is yet to be resolved. We have noted the 
dialogue inside EMI concerning parallel importations, the puzzlement of a senior 
executive at the thought of considering the concept o f 'onginalright’ and the difficulty in 
demonstrating to regulatory authorities how the music industry of the future might look.
Of all the companies we have worked with over the last seven years these are the 
ones that took our attention -  not because the issues they were dealing with were of
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such a magnitude that they made for compelling viewing, but the struggle managers 
had to engage and deal with issues for which they had no template, or at least none 
that they had enacted themselves. It was their puzzlement, surprise, frustration -  even 
anger, that caught our attention.
We had witnessed large organisations ‘downsize’ (IBM, Compaq, Hanson, Imperial 
Tobacco and Sainsbury’s), redefine ‘core activity’ (Inland Revenue, IBM, Excel 
Logistics, Storehouse and Cummings Engineering), change product or service 
orientation (Friends Provident, Norwich Union, Storehouse, BAT, Marconi and 
Sunseeker). Yet none of these had produced the same apparently intractable and 
enduring sense of puzzlement we saw within our case study organisations. In our 
primary consulting role we feel it was more good fortune than good planning to have 
been able to see the sensemaking process in action, the visible initiation for which 
always appeared the sense of puzzlement (what is going here?). In synthesis our 
organisations were separated by their differences of style, output and structure. What 
united them was that they were all making sense of novel situations that surprised our 
actors and ourselves! As we shall describe later these were the splashes of paint that 
fell between our canvasses.
In our next chapter we introduce a model that picks up from Pettigrew and links with 
the work of Weick by detailing the novelty of the processes we have referred to above.
Section 7:
Different ‘strokes’ for different folks
'Realities with which individuals and groups deal are 
socially constructed - that is to say, the meanings of events 
are arrived at through social transactions.'
(Wicker, 1992, p. 170)
In the previous analysis we put forward the view that the meaning our actors took 
from the change discussed was based upon enacted situations of which they had 
indirect knowledge or no prior knowledge in the prevailing system. We suggested 
that the limitations this placed upon individual selection and retention (Weick, 1979), 
resulted in outcomes that were often incomplete or unexpected (Czamiawska- 
Joerges 1996). To put it crudely, their actions lacking the repeated experience of 
social transactions were akin to improvised first night performances and this made 
the outcomes unpredictable. There are degrees of improvisation (Weick, 1998) and 
those we witnessed spanned variations on an existing theme through to 
transformation into patterns of action for which there was no theme.
The model we use to link change to sensemaking is cognitive but heuristic; it takes 
the macro-social model of Pettigrew from section 6 and addresses the process of 
change through the micro-social sensemaking model of Weick (1979, 1995). In so 
doing it does not pretend to be exact but more a means of identifying the grounds for 
the proposition we develop in sections 8 and 9.
This section provides our final position on the GAS model where we view our data 
from the 2 o’clock position that is general and accurate. That is to say we seek to
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W e suggest that actors, faced with change, comprehend that change through 
powerful stimuli -  knowledge/symbols/language that act as a three-legged stool to 
those who would build adaptive change upon their foundation (the three components 
need to be used in balance). This stimuli is tempered through a process of noticing. 
It is also tempered by selection and retention before a hand off into 
enthinkment/enactment and, as ‘we know that peoples sensemaking activities are 
prone to distortions resulting from incomplete or inaccurate information processing’ 
(Brown, 2000, p.46), we seek to unpick the causes of some of those distortions.
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In the model depicted above we position change as the first part of our process -  the 
activity of our actors is predicated by a known requirement to adapt to a recognisable 
form of change -  these are detailed in our case studies. This differs from Weick’s 
(1995) example of sensemaking applied to battered child syndrome where we might 
think of sensemaking as a process of identifying and clustering apparently random 
phenomena -  until a pattern emerges (the active collection of data by a range of 
public [health related] organisations followed by the sharing and acceptance by a 
wider audience an activity of wide social concern), until sensemaking is complete. In 
our case studies we see sensemaking determining the response to one set of 
phenomena, leadership identifying that phenomena and the sensemaking process of 
the organisation as it shares -  or not - the meaning of that identification.
We, therefore, position change and the initial processing as a prior activity and a post 
activity to Weick’s ESR model.
Sensemaking ^  Change and Processing ^  Sensemaking
(Phenomenon) (Issue) (Sharing meaning) (Organisation response)
Figure 12.
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Figure 12 above depicts a neat, linear flow of rational activity -  even if the model is 
valid we recognise that life is not this straight forward. What we separate as 
individual parts of the sensemaking process are, in all probability, aspects of a 
concurrent and recurrent processing activity. Cook & Yanow (1993), Normann (1985) 
suggest that in the processing of information, the sharing of rituals and 
understanding of symbols is the cornerstone of building cultures and that this is what 
differentiates organisations. We do not claim to have a better explanation of the 
result of this processing (different cultures) and whether sensemaking is a by-product 
of culture or culture is a by-product of sensemaking does not form part of our current 
interest.
W e suggest that interpretation or definition of a given change is subject to the 
process of noticing given meaning through social transactions in language and 
symbols (including behaviour) refined through a further process of noticing. Such 
meaning will be fed from existing knowledge -  previous experience or referred/third 
party knowledge. To illustrate this position we recall an incident that sits outside our 
case studies. In the early 1990s’ Sainsbury’s and Tesco were engaged in fierce 
competition for the position of the UK’s leading food retailer, a competition that 
Sainsbury’s lost and did not win back. In the midst of this competition Sainsbury’s, 
who were fast losing ground, announced to their management a new initiative; code 
named ‘Genesis’. This had been flagged for some weeks but the detail had been 
withheld -  it was widely expected to be a new method of attracting customers to the 
brand through creative merchandising. At this point then it was known that a change 
was on the way and it was reasonable for managers to assume -  in the context of 
needing to generate greater sales and profitability - that the language would be some 
form of guide. Specific knowledge about the project was withheld but the executive 
had previously been credited with conservative, but essentially clear, policy
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implementation. The only working knowledge of ‘Genesis’ was restricted to the 
dictionary or biblical definitions.
Within this bracketed scenario we have very limited information -  in the form of 
language about a forthcoming project with knowledge restricted to a very limited 
source. If the required activity had been some form of national re-branding exercise 
the relationship between project/language/symbols and knowledge would have fitted 
a recognised model in this organisation. As it was, the project required the 
redundancy of 20 % of the managers, leading to the staff renaming the process 
‘operation genocide’. Not so much through the loss of jobs -  unfortunate though this 
was -  more that managers felt that the executive had deceived them. This changed 
both their understanding of symbolic activity (new projects), language (the meanings 
of which may be shared equally) and their knowledge of executive behaviour (they do 
not always make their intentions clear). The greatest difficulty for leadership and their 
people in this example being that leadership acted as though there was an overlap of 
meaning whereas there was no overlap and this caused severe difficulties when 
people felt that they had been deliberately misled.
Noticing
Within our model we seek to confirm that sensemaking is a process involving the 
activity of noticing. Whilst we identify social activity, track it across a period of time 
and provide it with a definition - and possibly a suitable metaphor, this does not 
mean that the end result, albeit a completion of the sensemaking cycle, will be 
welcomed by the potential audience. Indeed although people may move from a 
position of little knowledge, to confusion, to sensemaking, they may not like the 
meaning they find and choose to disregard it. In our case study of the Police, Ron, 
the Deputy Chief, recounted how the Police started to uncover what they labelled
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‘wide-spread corruption’ amongst public officials. As the scale and implications 
became apparent the operation was terminated by political intervention precisely 
because the sensemaking cycle had been completed and significant actors did not 
like the potential consequences.
In order for sensemaking to receive wider public acceptance (in terms of maintaining 
and supporting awareness), it must go through wide ranging social and political 
refinement and receive at least nominal consent from interested parties whether they 
be actors or audience. We would suggest that this is so, whether through the 
publication of a popular management text such as In Search of Excellence (Peters & 
Waterman 1982) or the establishing of a pattern of child abuse such as The Battered 
Child Syndrome detailed by Weick (1995).
In looking at our case studies we see a relationship between leaders and context, 
and suggest that context provides the beat and leaders call out the tune. Not only do 
the two have to make sense, they also have to time their performance well or risk a 
meaning that could alienate their audience (for which there are also consequences). 
From this position a three dimensional formula is suggested between context, 
leadership and audience - failure to take account of any aspect of which can lead to 
unfortunate consequences. As the context shifts (the beat changes) and leadership 
recognises the need to adjust (adapt) the tune it has to play in a way that the 
audience understands, otherwise the performance becomes nonsense. The first part 
of this analogy -  from an organisational perspective - is when leadership notices the 
change of beat and puts in place the requirement for adaptive change.
Starbuck & Milliken (1988, a) suggest that ‘noticing may be at least as important to 
effective problem solving as sensemaking’ (p.36) their distinction being that 
sensemaking picks up on subtleties and nuances, whereas noticing picks up major
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events. We do not see any contradiction in this position; rather we suggest that the 
two complement each other. To them [Starbuck & Milliken], noticing refers to the 
activities of filtering, classifying, and comparing, whereas sensemaking refers more 
to interpretation and the activity of determining what the noticed cues mean’ (Weick 
1995, p.50). Further we also note a difference between noticing and scanning (Daft & 
Weick, 1984), search (Cyert & March, 1963) and active search (Argyris, 1996). For 
us, as with Starbuck and Milliken (ibid), noticing is a more subtle normalising activity 
that regulates what actors take from their environment. Search or scanning we view 
as a proactive process that sits in the area of knowledge gathering and fits inside our 
model (Figure. 11) under the knowledge heading.
Here we are dealing with ‘major events’ at least in the sense that the changes are 
debated and recognised as such by our actors. It seems important to us to 
understand what they do not notice almost as much as what they do notice. We see 
the process of noticing as part of the sensemaking phenomenon fuelling and 
enabling the active stage of adaptive change.
Noticing, for us, seems a particularly important aspect of the sensemaking 
phenomenon to consider during periods of adaptive change. Our posit is that there is 
a preliminary stage that sits in front of the selection and retention process, we notice 
the flow of information, based upon language/symbols and understand what they 
mean based upon our knowledge of the language/symbols. Our model suggests 
leadership wanting to present new issues to its organisation may notice the level of 
fit with existing schema and intervene by adjusting language/symbols and 
knowledge.
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In the early 1990s, as part of its drive towards public sector organisations keying into 
business practices, the Government created an internal market for the former 
National Health Service and divided the service into competing NHS trusts.
In 1996 the audit commission published a paper on NHS Trusts (Goods for Your 
Health). In a highly critical report the Commission claimed that the NHS could afford 
an extra 25,000 hip operations if managers stopped wasting £150 million a year on 
over priced equipment - much of which was stolen, lost, damaged or hidden away to 
stop colleagues using it.
One hospital had £6,000 worth of out-of-date artificial limbs another was losing 40 
kettles a year. Bigger hospitals had stopped advising smaller ones and competition 
generally between trusts had all but stopped co-operation.
Added to that, there was so much red tape from ‘cumbersome old-fashioned 
bureaucrats’, resulting in a typical order costing £30 to process. Suppliers, on the 
other hand, were paid late and often had invoices rejected because there were errors 
of a few pence.
For these Trusts we need to understand their sense of what businesses do, i.e. 
compare the above to Heifetz & Laurie (1997), Tersine, Harvey & Buckley (1997). 
For them success in business entails strategic alliances with customers and 
suppliers alike in the creation of interdependent relationships. Why did these 
organisations pursue policies that appear counter intuitive to contemporary business 
practices? For us it is wrapped up in what their leadership noticed was required to 
change and become a business based activity and, for many schooled in the public 
sector, they drew upon principles of business practice that no longer prevailed 
(buying cheapest, operating independently, little collaboration). To return to our
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earlier analogy, the beat (context) had moved on but the leadership still played the 
old tune. This, for us, was not so much the responsibility of those within the NHS 
trusts more it was a responsibility for those at Government level who encouraged the 
change and failed to notice that it would fall outside the experience of those to whom 
they (as leadership) delegated the change.
Conger (1991) states that 'one critical role of effective leaders is to be skilful 
craftsman of their organization's mission' (p.31), and yet leaders are drawn to 
oversimplification as much as those who must interpret and act. A graphic example 
of this being the Pinto fires (Gioia, 1992) where cost-benefit was used to rationalise 
the potential deaths of 180 people against the cost of fixing a design fault on a Ford 
motorcar. Our data supports this case for oversimplification of mission and 
interpretation. Politicians who called for zero tolerance and best value. Stephen 
Reading the CEO of Parvin-May, who called for responsible initiative, but did not 
disclose his aims. EMI, who attempted to redefine its business as provision of 
content rather than ownership of copyright and FCOS, who announced that they 
were going to prepare for executive agency status.
Conger (ibid) above, makes a crucial point that good leadership requires craft, simple 
messages may be all that is required when organisations are lost and leaders are not 
sure of the way to go>
‘instill some confidence in people, get them moving in 
some general direction, and be sure they look closely at 
cues created by their actions’
(Weick, 1995, p.55)
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Responsible leadership takes the difficult decisions, carries the burden of 
uncertainty and provides confidence. However, this is not the same as 
oversimplification of the change process that can lead to oversimplification of the 
noticing process and thus unforeseen consequences. Leadership is not about 
delivering barely understood metaphors and walking away.
Miller (1993), in an organisational context, terms simplicity as being ‘an 
overwhelming preoccupation with a single goal, strategic activity, department, or 
world view’ (p. 117). Sull (1999), describes, in a similar manner, the way in which 
‘strategic frames blinded Xerox to the new threat posed by guerrilla warriors such as 
Canon and Ricoh’ (p.46) or in the case of McDonalds ‘its historical strength -  a 
single-minded focus on refining its mass-production processes -  turned into a 
weakness’ (p.47). The extension to this view would be that a single view could be 
taken of meaning -  something akin to the lowest common denominator. 
Unfortunately, as noted by Kanter (1983), whilst leadership might be preoccupied, as 
Miller (ibid) states, with a single goal (that for our purposes might be a particular 
adaptive change) the audience might only notice previous failures and false dawns, 
their attempts at abstraction being limited to working out how to maintain the status 
quo without undue disruption or challenge to the leader. This is certainly the feeling 
we picked up in FCOS where successive initiatives had been announced but few had 
been led with any sense of enthusiasm, resulting in a strong sense of cynicism for 
staff who nodded sagely and then told the consultants that they had heard it all 
before. What they noticed was the pattern of poor leadership not the requirement for 
adaptive change or at least the former dominated the latter and actually made the 
noticing of change difficult -  even depressing.
In Parvin-May, Stephen Reading advocated the individual use of responsible 
initiative -  whilst a powerful leader he had difficulty reconciling what Pettigrew (1992)
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describes as ‘the countervailing influence of others inside.... their own 
organizations(s)’ (p. 163) In Stephen’s case this was the influence of Henry Simme, 
the chairman, who did not recognise nor encourage the taking of initiative. 
Consequentially, managers who had long noticed this pattern of behaviour sought 
out the lowest common denominator in the forming of committee based forums for 
displaying initiatives, thus preserving their relationships with both Stephen and 
Henry.
At figure 11 we position noticing after adaptive change and after knowledge and 
symbols/language to emphasise our view that leaders are faced with an audience 
who may, due to existing histories, be more concerned with simplifying an already 
simplified change into a typology that has more to do with confirming normative 
patterns of behaviour than changing them, prior to considering the worth of the 
change itself and how it is reflected in knowledge or symbols/language. ‘Noticing 
determines whether people even consider responding to environmental events’ 
(Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, a, p.60).
The risk for leadership looking to bring about adaptive change is that what they 
promote as important may be lost as background activity that has little impact. Our 
point being that these issues need to at least get an airing -  or an opportunity - in the 
foreground in order that meaning can at least be verified but supported by the 
knowledge, language and symbols of the background.
At EMI we saw how the term copyright dominated the foreground -  so much so that 
for one senior executive he had to be repeatedly confronted with a challenge to this 
assumption before he was able to find meaning (through the metaphor of ‘crown 
jewels’) for ‘originalrighf. Only then was he able to concentrate on symbolism and 
knowledge. We would hold that at this point he took notice, in a foreground sense,
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and then enacted this ‘new’ environment. There is a puzzle here for which we do not 
have the answer; at an individual level actors found difficulty in relinquishing their 
hold on copyright even though organisational activity (the proposed merger) could 
shift quickly into a new meaning. This is different from FCOS where background 
behaviours had been challenged by the modernising agenda and accepted as 
appropriate foreground activity (there appeared to be no conceptual difficulty) the 
change process broke down at the stage of enactment.
By way of contrast, in all probability, the Government would not have understood the 
consequences of heavily supporting the concept of 'zero tolerance'. For them it 
would have been another in a long line of political initiatives -  once again a simple 
message but one that went straight to the foreground of activity and background of 
imbedded culture. For many years, as we have noted, the Police reduced many of 
the community based initiatives that they were encouraged to embrace into 
background activity from which many rank and file officers attempted to distance 
themselves. Zero tolerance not only got noticed the meaning attributed to it went 
straight to the core value of policing and played to the service-force debate that we 
have previously seen, biased towards force as an internal and external driver of what 
policing is about. Symbolically the concept sat easily with the bias of force and such 
was the power of the metaphor; it had a self-defining quality that was readily 
understood and applied.
In attempting to change the structure of the Police, the Government ensured that the 
issue gained foreground attention. They also ensured -  but may not have foreseen - 
that the threat to the bias of force in the service-force dimension was also quickly 
understood and defended. Had the Government positioned the issue in the 
background, by using incremental changes aligned to changes in management 
behaviour through the Police Staff College and other management development
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venues, such changes may have survived longer had they not been perceived as 





“COE. MU5T F0CU5 ON OUR. 
CORE BUSINESS.'
'WE HAVE TO BE KORE 
COMPETITIVE
THIS OLD REUjOBARREL THING?
MEANING SAY GOODBYE TO 
SALARY INCREASES.
MEANING: WE CANT FIND  
OUR BUTTS WITH BOTH HANDS.
MEANING. AOIOS, TDNTO, 
AND THE HORSE YOU RODE IN  ON.
‘WERE MARKET DRIVEN.”
MEANING: WE BLAME CUSTOMERS 
FOR OUR LACK OF INNOVATION.
‘ YOU ARE EMPOWERED."













MEANING: WE'RE trying  TO 
HIRE SOME TRAINED PEOPLE
I  PROCLAIM THIS 
TO BE ‘GREEN IKK
DAY.”
MEANING’- YOU'RE "DC MONARCH | 
OF UNIMPORTANT DECISIONS.




MEANING: WE THINK HUMOR 
IS IMPORTANT
People who find a vivid label and then push it persistently 
often are able to redirect organizational action, because 
they have gained control over how the organization defines 
itself and what it says it is up to.’
(Weick, 1985)
For us, language is the currency that binds our actors into areas of creating meaning 
that we wish to develop. Language is one of the main tools of management but as a 
tool its use requires consideration and appropriate selection, especially for those 
seeking to direct organisational activity.
'Powerful language and metaphors set a tone, provide 
direction and gain commitment. Wise strategic managers
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take advantage of language, metaphors and stories that 
originate elsewhere... a strategic manager would 
concentrate on the values, symbols, language and dramas 
that form the backdrop for decision-making structures’
(Smircich & Stubbart, 1985)
The importance of language in the process of change is given emphasis by Martin 
(1993) '[organisations] do not change until a new strategic language finds its way to 
every comer1 (p.94).
The information our actors receive about given changes, and the knowledge they 
accrue, is a sharing of meaning that leads to understanding of what the process 
holds for our actors.
‘Life is neither meaningful nor meaningless. Meaning and 
its absence are given to life by language and imagination.’
(Batchelor, 1997, p. 39)
This is not to say that actors will take equivalent meaning, to make sense and serve 
the common purpose of sharing meaning there needs only to be some minimal 
overlap as we have previously described.
'We understand a statement as being true in a given 
situation when our understanding of the statement fits our 
understanding of the situation closely enough for our 
purposes’
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980 p. 179)
We, therefore, agree with Bird (1994) who sees information (in our case about given 
changes) as ‘flow’ and knowledge as ‘stock’ (retention/memory). Here we are
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concerned with information. Later we turn to knowledge but the link is an obvious 
one. When faced with information we will compare that information to our stock of 
knowledge, thus managers at Sainsbury’s found their stock of knowledge about 
‘Genesis’ limited to known definitions.
Whilst we have made our position clear; that language serves the purpose of sharing 
out meanings that may actually hold very different meanings to different people, we 
also acknowledge that our actors attempt to secure equivalent meaning and that this 
is often by use of metaphors and symbolic representation to enable others to ‘see’ 
what the deliverer (or in this work leadership) ‘sees’ through an analogous and 
commonly understood referent. As we have noted above with the example from 
Sainsbury’s, metaphors play an important part in the process we seek to understand.
Metaphors not only matter 'as a mode of thought' (Mangham 1995, p.1) 'it’s a primal 
means through which we forge our relationships with the world' (Morgan 1993: 
p.227). They both drive and are driven by enactment with the capacity to both restrict 
and expand our thoughts and actions.
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest that all information is representative. What a 
person sees is not the stimulus external to himself but a representation of that 
stimulus' (p.72). Metaphorical understanding is not fixed, yet if it creates a neat label, 
and is strong it carries a compelling trace of past meaning, but not the only meaning 
(Czarniawska-Joerges, 1996, emphasis added).
One of the difficulties for our actors, was the implementation of stylised concepts in 
the form of neat labels; e.g. creation of 'business units’, 'business process 
reengineering' and 'empowerment'. All of which infer that 'solutions consist basically 
of simple metaphors' (Keiser, p.59). A point with which Pfeffer and Salanik (ibid)
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take issue: 'there are no meanings that the world gives to us as valid' (p.73). They 
hold that there are only our beliefs supported by evidence; the observer creates 
meaning - such is the difficulty for our actors as they grapple with adaptive change in 
organisations, bringing common meaning to common purpose (Mangham & Pye, 
ibid).
The music industry recognises at a macro level assets may be measured in terms of 
content yet individuals cling tenaciously to asset value meaning copyright. Again at 
Parvin-May - initiative is taken to mean collective or committee based initiative. 
There is no evidence to support the taking of initiative at an individual level despite 
what the CEO tells his managers.
Weick (1993), in his analysis of the 1949 Mann Gulch fire disaster in which 13 fire 
fighters died fighting a forest fire, describes the accident as 'a collapse of 
sensemaking and structure' (p.634). The fire team or 'smokejumpers' as they were 
known were caught by their own construction of meaning. The fire had been 
described as a 'class C, 10.00 fire', that is, one covering an area of 10 - 99 acres 
capable of being extinguished by 10.00 a.m. the following morning. In fact it covered 
4,500 acres and took 450 men five days to put out.
Weick suggests that the crew 'rationalized the image [of a 10.00 fire] until it was too 
late. And because they did, less and less of what they saw made sense' (p.635), yet 
still they persisted. The ability of the crew had been inhibited, initially by attributing 
the 'wrong' label and then further exacerbated the situation by failing to construct new 
meaning that might have allowed them to loosen their reliance on a previously 
enacted set of circumstances. The crew had experience of 10.00 fires; they knew 
how to cope both with the fire and each other (maintain a sense of organisation). W e 
would suggest whilst the fire fighters did not create or spread the fire their enactment
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both allowed the fire to spread and killed them. They had started to create an 
environment, a context through the initial stages of enactment that was at variance to 
the environment in which they found themselves. They responded to a powerful 
metaphor and shaped their actions based upon their knowledge of that metaphor -  
i.e. relatively small, easily contained fire.
Commitment to a belief or set of values, as Weick (1988) notes in an earlier work on 
the Bhopal crisis, can be a key aspect of creating a blind spot for an organisation and 
one that may deepen a crisis. Much of this commitment appears bound by tightly 
coupled meanings and this can lead to inappropriate enactment.
Our interest is in how actors' understanding of environments and their construction of 
meaning are influenced by their understanding of the information ‘flow’ (metaphors, 
symbols etc). Tompkins (1984) puts it as the ’study of sending and receiving 
messages that create and maintain a system of consciously co-ordinated activities or 
forces of two or more people (pp. 662-663). Here we differ and question 'consciously 
co-ordinated', we would prefer to add the rider 'or tacitly' [co-ordinated]. Our position 
on this is closer to O'Reilly & Pondy (1979) who define communication as 'the 
exchange of information between a sender and receiver and the inference of 
meaning between organizational participants' (p.121 emphasis added). The process 
to us is far more subtle than ‘consciously co-ordinated’ and this helps to explain the 
sensemaking process where a little inference goes a long way.
In the Foreign Office the response by the Permanent Under Secretary to Government 
initiatives had been reduced to 'the PUS has delivered his response' commonly taken 
to be shorthand for a blocking manoeuvre (the catch being that it was necessary to 
be an insider to interpret the shorthand and construct a cultural longhand). Parvin- 
May would refer to the way the 'Bank thinks’ recognised as being a conservative and
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restraining influence on decision-making e.g. a routine test for any change would 
typically be - 'is this the way the Bank should behave?1. Even though the investment 
and trust departments made the real cash, the banking area dominated activity, and 
thus, the ‘Bank’ acted both as a functioning department and as working metaphor for 
maintaining behaviour. In this organisation 'Bank' was a powerful label and this 
appeared to reinforce the authority of the banking department.
Colville (1997) makes an important connection here by quoting Schattschneider in 
Lukes (1974) and linking organisation - as the mobilisation of bias - with switches of 
metaphor within organisations. Metaphors themselves being inherently biased (they 
carry the baggage of previous history or meaning) provide a possible platform in 
changing the bias of organisations through the changing of meaning. Morgan (1986) 
notes 'in encouraging us to see and understand the world from one perspective they 
[metaphors] discourage us from seeing it from others’ (p. 12).
In the case of Parvin-May, the inference associated with ‘Bank’ would not be readily 
identified as a verb in the form of a metaphor, it would have been seen as a simple 
noun, thus, it was liberally peppered through many conversations about changes that 
'the Bank wanted to bring about’ -  being a conservative institution the Bank wanted 
no such thing and we might suggest that this choice of language helped to trip up our 
actors -  seen particularly in Stephen’s frustrations.
Morgan (1986) suggests that the ‘use of metaphor implies a way of thinking and a 
way of seeing’ (p.12). Further he suggests 'Images and metaphors are not just 
interpretative constructs used in the task of analysis. They are central to the process 
of imagination through which people enact or ‘write’ the character of organisational 
life’. Not as a theoretical construct but as a quick method of building common 
purpose or understanding. Fisher (1985) contends that metaphors are a means for
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developing and informing points of view in a persuasive yet non-argumentative 
fashion. This seems particularly important where meanings are shared - or at least 
shared out in a non-contentious context i.e. shared understanding without 
dissonance.
Language and leadership
Much of our data concerns the actions of leadership acting as interpreter (what a 
change means) or defining action. It is important, therefore, to consider the roles of 
leadership in the use of language.
If defined and constructed words create rhetoric, 'the persuasive aspects of 
discourse’, then there is an implication that those imbued with the power of rhetorical 
persuasion also have the power to 'not simply reflect reality, but constitute^] it’ 
(Fineman & Gabriel p. 377).
If leadership includes the management of meaning, Smircich & Morgan (1982), 
Mangham & Pye (1991), it also implies a responsibility for usage; the creation of 
meaning and interpretation of meaning through words. Good leaders will create good 
meanings through the use of good words (for good read words that assist 
sensemaking). Mangham & Pye go further and suggest that it is in the framing of 
words in the form of 'telling stories' (p. 126) that leaders attempt to shape and form 
meanings for those who work within organisations and those who have possible 
influence or value for the organisation. Values, dramas, and language comprise the 
symbolic foundations that support the everyday prosaic realities of management 
information’ (Smircich & Stubbard, 1985, p.730).
Weick (1995), Sutton & Kahn, (1987) provide us with a further guide to stories, they 
suggest that a repertoire of stories is important for meaning to take place and that
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those that connect in some way create meaning. Further they state that the 
connection between the two raises the possibility that outcomes can be predicted, 
understood and possibly controlled.
Drath & Palus (1994) appear to create some confusion here, by asserting ‘..in other 
words, one person does what some other person influences him or her to do 
because doing it makes sense to both people’ (p.4) Indeed they go further in their 
posit that leaders create meaning and make sense for their people. ‘Authority is a 
tool for making sense of things' (p.6). Our data suggests that this is too simplistic a 
view and confuses meaning and sensemaking. The story of genesis/genocide at 
Sainsbury’s makes this point for us, leadership in that organisation created meaning 
(there would be redundancies) people made sense of the activity by changing the 
language to meet the symbolism and their knowledge of similar actions, this is some 
way from; ‘because doing it makes sense to both people’ (ibid).
Leaders can use authority to create meaning even though there may well be a 
compelling reason why such meanings should not be accepted. ‘Fears and anxieties 
especially, contribute to how people make meaning, what is learnable and the costs 
(and benefits) of what is learned.’ (Fineman, 1997, p.20). As Mangham and Pye (ibid) 
suggest this could include ‘...sustaining patterns of mutually expected response’ 
(p.28) from people acting inside or outside a hierarchical relationship. There is simply 
more benefit in accepting the hand that is dealt than challenging it, if you want to stay 
in the game then it is sometimes necessary to make the most of what you have - like 
it or not.
Routine responses are the normal patterns of behaviour within organisations. The 
payoff is in the sharing of meaning in a manner that fulfils expectations (Sederberg, 
1984) - even if that meaning qualitatively or quantitatively does not make sense.
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Brown (2000) puts it that 'some voices are more (and some less) privileged, and it 
may often be more appropriate to describe sense as a power effect rather than a 
negotiated consensus’ (p.46). Bate (1994) suggests: -
‘we generally prefer to use language as a substitute for raw 
power or brute force in organizations, and because of this 
preference language has come to be the main vehicle 
through which most of our activities take place’
(p.251)
We note with interest the inclusion in this observation by Bate of the words: generally 
and most but not always. We cannot ignore the exercise of power that may not 
notice and not see the need to notice. This is hard to pin down but there is some 
sense of this with the actions and words of Henry, chairman of Parvin-May who 
clearly feels that, in a proprietary way, it is his Bank and people will do as they are 
told. In the main, however, we have seen the recognition and responsibility by 
leadership to use language to create and share out meaning even if their attempts 
may, at times, have been less than successful.
Language as meaning
The Police are engaged with the gathering of statistical information about best value 
policies -  significant others [at the Home Office] have made this a mandatory 
requirement for Chief Officers -  who clearly understand what is required of them 
(they get their share of the meaning) but spending considerable parts of their budget 
to gather such information makes very little sense to them -  but they still do it. 
Whether the enactment is of a type or quality envisaged by the Home Office is a 
different matter -  they get their statistics but the process may be one that they would 
not support. This is the point of this discussion -  leaders do not have to make sense
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in order to create activity, but if they do not make sense unpredictable outcomes may 
follow and this is seen in sections of our case study material. Mystification occurring 
when people around them talk as though they share meaning on an equal basis, then 
do something entirely different from that expected.
It is our belief that here we are reviewing a key phase of sensemaking, by doing 
different actions our actors confirmed their sense of meaning by enacting what they 
believed, as Fineman (1983) puts it ‘rehearsing their parts’ (p. 149).
Meaning---------------► Can act differently-------------- ►  Tryout ------------► Reinforces meaning
(Selection) (Retention) (Enactment) (Selection)
Figure 13.
At Parvin-May, the Police and EMI we gained a sense of trying out or enactment with 
metaphors acting as a ’tool(s)’ to emphasise the ‘multiplicity of rationalities’ and 
‘functions’ (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992, p. 30). If those metaphors made sense - in 
terms of creating symbols - then ‘the organization derives meaning and significance 
from the interpretations which others place upon it’ (Selznick 1949/1966, pp. 19-20) 
and thus the rehearsal is elevated to a more stylised production where acceptable 
interpretations will be rehearsed, negotiated and confirmed into recognised symbols.
The interpretative procedures enable the actor to sustain a 
sense of social structure over the course of changing 
social settings, while surface rule or norms provide a more 
general institutional or historical validity to the meaning of 
the action as it passes, in a reflective sense.’
(Cicourel, 1974, p. 27)
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This was a process FCOS struggled to achieve, if others were improvising (from a 
theme) their roles -  finding their way by acting out meanings they confirmed or built 
upon, those at FCOS appeared to suffer from something akin to stage fright that 
prevented even the first unpolished attempts at trying out or enactment. Stephen, a 
central figure at Parvin-May, may have been perplexed by the way his people 
enacted initiative but at least he had the opportunity of renegotiating further changes 
having viewed the outcome. At the FCO the PUS had far less information to work 
from as there had been far less doing an issue to which we later return.
Here Weick’s discussion on ‘talking the walk’ (1995, p. 182) is invoked. Our actors 
‘walk’ into roles, they have a sense of history through commonly understood 
meanings, but in adapting the role to themselves there is an enactment phase in 
which exploration is through talking and walking. As Weick points out in quoting Tichy 
& Sherman (1993) in ‘walking the talk’ we take on the reality of others and it is only 
when we create our own walk that we can fit the appropriate talk or meaning to it. 
There has been no attempt here to break out language from symbols on the basis 
that language is symbolic (Blumer, 1969, Feldman & March,1981, Berg, 1985). 
However, symbolism extends further into an organisation’s culture as basic 
assumptions that operate, largely at a 'tacit level' (Dyer, 1982) manifest in the values 
recognisable and commonly held by members, but also extending to artefacts -  in a 
literal sense, uniform badges of rank, reserved car parking, large offices and social 
constructions such as organisational structures.
The most vivid example of language symbolising organisational behaviour through 
values that we came across in our research (Colville et al, 1999) was that found at 
AES Inc. an American power generating company. This organisation founded on a
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$64,000 loan operates 125 plants worldwide in areas as diverse as Hawaii and 
Kazhakstan. The company employs 14,500 people, produces 44,000 megawatts of 
power and has a market capitalisation of $25.54 billion.
AES operates its company on four explicit values: fairness, social responsibility, 
integrity and fun. This highly successful company led by Roger Sant and Dennis 
Bakke had>
‘its [toughest] year in 1992 -  not economically, but in the 
more important area of principles and values. There was a 
major breach of the AES values. Nine members of the 
water treatment team in Oklahoma lied to the EPA 
[Energy Protection Authority] about water quality at the 
plant. There was no environmental damage, but they lied 
about test results’
(Bakke quoted by Wetlaufer,1999, p118)
As a result of this incident, AES came under very strong pressure to reform their 
management principles along more conventional lines after self-disclosing to the 
authorities. A pressure that they resisted, these four values were more than a 
passing whim, they were the sustaining mantra of the organisation and without them 
AES would cease to be AES, or at least in the way described here.
Management bonuses are reduced if staff do not score them highly on maintaining 
an environment containing a high dose of fun. Suppliers are expected to take care of 
their staff, pay decent salaries and make reasonable profit -  this is an example of 
fairness. Contracts will not be sought where it is necessary to bribe Government 
officials, even though this may restrict their markets particularly in third world 
economies -  this is one example of integrity. AES is not a household name, even
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within countries where they operate. At Medway in Kent, AES supply 1m homes with 
electricity but they are barely known outside the community where they provide 
training places for young engineers, even when they do not need their services long­
term, this is how the company maintains its social responsibility.
In our case study on the Police we provided evidence of artefacts and social 
constructions such as the wearing of uniforms, the system of rank and the rituals of 
behaviour that sustained one particular type of social order. This does not mean that 
such meanings are immutable ‘rank1 does not always mean separation into strata, 
organisations tend to adapt such meanings to their particular contexts. Pfeiffer (1989) 
describes life on board a US aircraft carrier where members of the US Navy have 
developed a behavioural model that gives the captain overall command yet invests 
significant authority in the expertise of those lower down the chain of command. The 
rating who calls the weight of an inbound F14 Tomcat determines whether the aircraft 
crashes into the bridge, is slung backwards into the sea or is restrained safely by the 
arresting wires set to the exact weight of the aircraft just 7 seconds before it lands.
Pfeiffer gives an example (p.44) when this explicit interdependence was not 
operating. Earlier in November 1985 the USS Enterprise, whilst being evaluated for 
operational readiness, was seen by a number of men on the bridge to be heading for 
Bishop Rock off the coast of Southern California. The captain, who was also on the 
bridge, had not seen the hazard and no one told him about it. They assumed that, as 
captain, he would have control of the situation. This incident resulted in millions of 
dollars worth of damage.
To maintain the importance of interdependence on board the Enterprise, after each 
mission when inbound fast jets have landed, ‘150 or more officers and enlisted men 
move shoulder to shoulder across the full width of the flight deck, heads down. It's a
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FOD (Foreign Object Damage) walkdown ...clearing the deck for the next mission’ 
(p.43) during this process there is competition to spot the smallest piece of debris 
and a complete lack of deference to hierarchy. In this way a symbolic ritual is used to 
extend the requirement for interdependence across all critical functions in the carrier, 
whilst still operating within a formal, disciplined, environment
We have taken the space to touch upon symbolism in order to try better to 
understand the response of our actors to the changes that faced them. We would 
agree that the separation and processing of knowledge, language and symbols is 
wholly artificial in that all could be said to relate to knowledge or retention. Berg 
(1985) for example talks of symbolic reality as ‘coded and stored collective 
experiences’ (p.285). However we feel a simple model allows us to deal with this 
complex processing in a way that identifies interlocking and overlapping aspects of 
the sensemaking process, any one of which may lead to the consequences we have 
seen in our case studies.
Knowledge
Within the heading ‘knowledge’ we see the processes as being those of checking out 
what we already know about a given issue or the language that supports it. There 
are clear overlaps with what we term knowledge and others term learning and 
search. Taken as a whole the sensemaking process would seem to reflect learning. 
‘We find that learning appears to be about re-punctuating the continuous experience 
of the organization’ Weick & Westley (2001, p. 444) which seems to sit easily with 
the enactment, selection, retention (ESR) model (Weick, 1979). Within this section 
we try and break out the passive stage of learning -  as knowledge (the repository) 
and refer to the active stages as being search and learning.
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Earlier we termed Knowledge as a repository against which flows of information are 
validated. This is fine for confirming information about which our actors have a 
reasonable level of confidence (Fiske & Taylor 1991). To meet our purposes we also 
need to consider knowledge sourced through formal theoretical input and active 
searching for knowledge. We see that our model at figure 11 operates both at the 
individual and organisational level, although set piece knowledge development and 
search are more likely to be aspects of organisational activity with individual 
knowledge capacity growing as a consequence.
Weick (1995), deals with the issue of gaps or uncertainty in knowledge levels with his 
discourse on ‘ambiguity’ (p.95), where he separates ambiguity as ‘confusion created 
by multiple meanings’ calling for social construction and invention or ‘ambiguity 
understood as ignorance created by insufficient information’.
Within our case study of EMI we observed ambiguity in the defining of ‘parallel 
importation’ [of music product]. For some this was causing havoc with local markets, 
subjected to cheaper importations whilst to the exporter this was an opportunity to 
increase sales -  even though both parties might work for the same company. Their 
knowledge of the meaning was subject to repeated negotiation and redefining 
through social interaction. In this way their knowledge of ‘parallel imports’ grew. 
Language, as we have seen in other parts of our study -  e.g. EMI defining 
originalright, Parvin-May initiative, the Police zero tolerance, Sainsbury’s Genesis 
and others, can be taken as a critical part of the sensemaking process, learning what 
activity means and how it is represented through language. This becomes important 
for the passing on of knowledge as action and description of action (Fiol & Lyles 
1985). From our data we have seen that the two are not, necessarily, the same thing.
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In FCOS a lack of knowledge about contemporary business practice led to delivery of 
set piece training interventions that gave indirect knowledge of events that had taken 
place in other organisations. This, undoubtedly, gave actors knowledge that would 
allow them to gauge responses to future changes, but it also challenged their identity, 
and this may have led in part to what we have described as their inaction. On 
several occasions, whilst observing set piece training for senior middle managers, we 
heard comments such as ‘we are diplomats not business people’, ‘you cannot put a 
price on public service’ and ‘how do you value being shot at in a riot in 
Johannesburg?’ Clearly, in this context knowledge of business practice could be 
viewed as having the opposite effect to that sought -  it actually aided the 
sensemaking processing and challenged them to act in ways contrary to their self- 
image (Ring & Van de Ven,1994). This raises the intriguing possibility that their 
resistance to change was tightened rather than loosened by the very act aimed at 
assisting the process of organisational change at least for those who had established 
successful careers built upon the prevailing culture.
The ambiguity and complexity of their worlds imply that 
perceivers may benefit from by using multiple 
sensemaking frameworks to appraise events; but 
perceivers are more likely to act forcefully and effectively if 
they see things simply, and multiple frameworks may 
undermine organizations’ political structures. Malleable 
worlds imply that perceivers may benefit by using 
frameworks that disclose opportunities to exert influence, 
but people who try to change their worlds often produce 
unintended results, even the opposite of what they 
intended.’
(Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, a, quoting 
Brunsson.1985 and Wildavsky, 1972, p. 60)
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In our earlier case study analysis we suggested that our actors had no direct 
experience of dealing with the type of issues facing them. This would, of course, be a 
further way of differentiating knowledge according to whether it has been directly or 
indirectly experienced. Repositories of knowledge are built irrespective of the 
immediate change (we continue to build knowledge whether or not we are called 
upon to refer to it) but we might suggest that the organisation striving for innovation 
as a means of maintaining a competitive edge (Greve & Taylor, 2000) is more likely 
to be successful by conducting active searches and thus create the environment of 
uncertainty from which changes flow quite naturally. This is a qualitatively different 
case from those organisations that tend to respond to the requirement for change 
imposed by external agencies.
From our case studies we can see the effects of this bi-polar situation. At one 
extreme we have EMI who have sought out a solution to maintain competitive 
advantage following the encroachment into their market of sophisticated technical 
methods of delivering music to their customers. At the other extreme FCOS has been 
required by Central Government edict to modernise and prepare for executive 
agency status.
EMI were able to draw comfortably on knowledge based on a series of joint venture 
projects in the e-commerce market, manufacturing or distribution areas. They also 
operated an in house technical R&D department of some 250 people and had a 
number of cross sectional planning forums. From these activities incremental 
changes had taken place with little disruption to normal activity. Knowledge had been 
constructed of what this process was like and how opportunities could be converted 
into action. Taking action, even highly dramatic, mould breaking action was not seen 
as novel, whether such activity was seen as correct is a different matter, some 
people questioned choice of action but not whether dramatic action was justified. EMI
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was familiar with, and had knowledge of, implementing a wide variety of changes. 
Indeed they conducted active search (Argyris, 1996) on a regular basis and we might 
suggest that this created as much disturbance as organisational uncertainty 
(Stinchcombe 1990, Weick 1995) the difference being between planned and 
unplanned disturbance.
FCOS, on the other hand, had little history of ambiguity in its output or structure. Its 
managers were grounded in dealing with activity through known processes and in 
known ways, their distinctive competencies (Hambrick & Snow, 1977, March 1991,). 
For FCOS to understand business activities they looked to theoretical input or 
attempted to replicate behaviours seen in other organisations. Greve & Taylor (2000) 
suggest that this is a qualitatively different process to the active search and 
experimentation witnessed in EMI.
From our observations and questioning of key actors in EMI, active search led to 
experimentation and a far greater ability to engage with changes of behaviour than 
were seen in FCOS. For us then knowledge, in this context, is not limited to theory of 
doing, it includes the experience of doing. Hambrick (1982) puts it that ‘distinctive 
competences appear to arise primarily through the propensity and ability to act on 
certain environmental information’ (p. 167). The experience of acting or doing is the 
key difference between the extremes of our case studies in this area. Hambrick goes 
further by suggesting that ‘an organization’s ability to mount a competitive response 
to an environmental shift may not be limited by its knowledge about that shift, relative 
to its competition. Rather the organization is primarily, restricted by its capacity to act 
on the information.’ (p.168).
We do not suggest EMI lacked the ability to act -  far from it - we suggest they had 
developed this competence and stand alone of our case studies in this regard. We
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return to later to consider their choice and delivery of action but for now we suggest 
that EMI had the knowledge to take action but this was experimentation of the 
highest order and for that their knowledge had to be of the highest order. This 
includes knowledge of what they knew and knowledge (and consequences) of what 
they did not know. In this case the response of the regulatory authorities to the 
creation of a dominant vertical market in the form of one organisation.
Part of the reason for this, we have already concluded from our first level of analysis, 
may be explained by EMI’s loose relationship with its environment -  it dipped in and 
out in order to develop music product but had little need to understand or indeed 
notice the activity of working with the regulatory authorities. Closer working or more 
active exploration may have secured a better level of knowledge.
Weick & Westley (2001), refer to ‘organizational learning’ as an oxymoron ‘to leam is 
to disorganize and increase variety’ (p.440). Of the organisations we worked with a 
number were prepared to leam concepts and theory yet most disassociated such 
learning from behaviour. More often than not learning of this nature was something 
they did or was done to them. Picking up on Weick & Westley (ibid) these 
organisations had spent many years perfecting their organisations and of those we 
observed only one, EMI, was able to talk easily about the need to disassemble in 
order to move forward, even though, by the measures of many of our other 
organisations, they would have been regarded as successful in their existing form. Of 
note and value for our discussion later; EMI were comfortable taking action to 
disassemble, not as a process to be enjoyed, but as a necessary safeguard for the 
future. These preferences did not operate at a cognitive level, they were emergent or 
evolutionary processes that had suited the nature of the organisations. When we 
raised these points with our actors they were unable to connect with any deliberate 
processing it was more ‘the way things are done around here’.
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Problem formation
The model described in our heuristic at figure 10, is a bridge into Weick’s ESR 
model. More specifically, Weick describes retention as ‘a reservoir of beliefs’ (p. 187). 
He goes on to say that selection is based upon whether or not previous retention is 
credited. In our model we are suggesting that new ’enactments’ (for our purposes - 
changes) are ‘fitted’ (noticed flows of information tested against existing 
language/symbols and knowledge). If we find a fit with existing retention the process 
is credited, or as Weick (1979) has it, Til see it/select it when I believe it/retain it’ 
(p.187).
•  Problem 1 - This immediately causes an issue for the selection process in 
that, if believing is seeing -  and we have no retention of enactment direct or 
indirect with which we can judge -  we end up with unresolved confusion
•  Problem 2 -  if organisations only process information based on what they 
know of previous enactments they limit their scope for dealing with changes in 
their environment to what is already known
•  Problem 3 -  if organisations evolve on the basis of retaining what works they 
are less likely to be willing to change without seeing their mistakes (seeing is 
believing)
• Problem 4- if organisations are risk adverse and are unwilling to make 
mistakes they are less likely, when in doubt, to enact their selection
Handy (1994) describes the development of organisations by utilising the Sigmoid
Curve that ’sums up the story of life itself, we start slowly, experimentally and
falteringly, we wax and then we wane’ (p.50).
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AFigure 14.
The figure (above) suggests that a typical life cycle for organisations is a slow 
beginning, leading to increased success (point A), however, failure (or fear) of 
changing a successful formula leads many organisations to decline and fall away 
(point B). Organisations that are aware of this trend seeks ways of changing the 
status quo, the institutionalised disturbance that we talked of earlier, and (at point A) 
seek ways of re-generating further growth, even though this might produce short­
term difficulties. The essence of the problem formation (1 -  4) above results from the 
comfort zone organisations tend to enter when they reach point ‘A’ on the Sigmoid 
Curve.
Rigid or tightly bound organisations tend to lack the ability to adapt successfully to 
changes in their environments (Berg, 1985), whilst those that are loosely bound tend 
to be able to work with changes to their environment (Chesbrough & Teece, 1996). 
On this basis it is possible to form a typology of our case study organisations. Identify 
which category they fall into -  run the model and determine whether they encounter 
the problems we list at 1-4 above.
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Typology
Parvin-May was a small Bank with less than 200 staff yet, as we have seen, it was 
tightly bound by processes, committees and organisational structure, in turn 
managers were regulated by sanction from the top of the organisation which had a 
profound effect in restricting initiative.
The Foreign Office has operated with a settled structure and a known output for 
many years and this has led to longstanding rituals and a style of management that 
provides a form of paternalistic support, but little individual personal challenge.
In the Police uniformity has developed, nationally, across a wide range of issues; the 
response to organised crime, race relations, cautioning policies etc, perhaps more so 
now that at any time in the last 40 years due to the political pressure that the Police 
face. Whilst the Police are attempting to address issues of devolving responsibility, 
they still operate (and reinforce) a command and control structure, which must be 
considered to lead to a rigid style of organisation.
EMI with over 100 years of tradition and 10,000 employees worldwide maintained a 
de-centralised approach to its business, keeping decision-making relatively close to 
the ground. There were few centralised policies and the structure was very complex 
with overlapping reporting lines and responsibilities. This organisation stands out 
from our other case studies as being loosely bound, managers were encouraged to 
maintain the theme of music production (as a business operation) but to work to the 
maxim of what audiences might appreciate at some stage in the future, inevitably 
this would entail a high degree of speculation and cost (supporting bands that failed 
to make the grade) but this was regarded as a price worth paying to maintain the 
flow of opportunities, some of which could be expected to make the company
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considerable sums of money. This remains a non-exact science with new trends 
originating out of obscure origins but one requiring a very open style of organisation 
prepared to engage with the unknown.
Whist at first reading, a ratio of 3:1 in favour of tightly to loosely bound organisations 
might seem unduly biased, this ratio holds together as being representative of what 
we found at many of our research sites, which tended to be dominated by 
organisations focused on reducing the complexity of their environment through 
systems and controls, rather than increasing complexity by reducing systems and 
controls. Few of the organisations visited were start-ups, most had been around for 
a considerable number of years and, whilst some organisations found a middle 
ground by isolating research or design departments, only one other, AES, could be 
described as loosely bound.
Problem identification
Parvin-May
At face value (we return to this shortly) two key problems were apparent that is: ‘if 
organisations only process information based on what they know of previous 
enactments they limit their scope for dealing with changes in their environment to 
what is already known’ and ‘if organisations are risk adverse and are unwilling to 
make mistakes they are less likely, when in doubt, to enact their selection’.
These problems were manifest in the lack of enthusiasm shown for profit generation 
or the taking of initiative. In order to overcome these problems Stephen developed a 
range of actions: -
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•  He publicly lost his temper at the Strategy Weekend, drawing the attention of 
his staff to the fact that he took these issues seriously and therefore the 
implied consequences for ignoring them any longer
•  He started to make public concerns that he had previously kept private that: 
‘shareholders will not stand for moderate performance any longer1
• Staff who had experience in more entrepreneurial enterprises were recruited 
as the business grew
• Those who showed no inclination to operate in the new way were removed
• Financial incentives were introduced in the form of a bonus pool based on 
30% of the excess return on capital over the base line of 7%
• He accepted the compromise solution of initiative being in the form of group 
initiative through the forming of the Profit Committee
There is a postscript to this change that leads us into the final issue. At no stage of 
the development in the change process -  change of identity, increase of profit or use 
of initiative - were our actors aware that the Bank was being shaped up for sale. 
There are clearly issues of confidentiality involved in this, yet Stephen, within the first 
two years, expressed the hope that his senior team would conclude this eventuality 
themselves and therefore, in the context of such a possibility, recognise the sense of 
his interventions. Stephen grew increasingly frustrated that his staff would not see 
the world as he did, even though he was responsible for not letting them see it.
Stephen’s comments raise the issue of confidentiality being a valid reason for 
withholding this information into question: ‘whilst I cannot raise the issue if they [his 
senior staff] concluded this possibility for themselves we could then discuss it.’ We 
do not have the evidence to support the conclusion but we suspect that the reasons 
for not disclosing the likelihood of shaping the Bank for sale have more to do with the
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tight control over information and the internal protocols associated with positional 
power handed down by the chairman Henry.
Stephen enacted situations that, seen retrospectively, created an opportunity -  sale 
of the Bank on his terms (as successful CEO) -  rather than the previously defined 
threat of sale of the Bank on other peoples terms (failed CEO) an illustration of the 
point made by Smircich & Stubbard (1985) & Weick (1995), that strategy follows 
action, it does not precede action.
We believe the level of dialogue in the Bank was close to the point where the subject 
of sale would be laid open to discussion, at that point a specific series of actions, 
aimed at refining the processes underway, would be initiated. It remains conjecture 
whether the process would have been easier, and the problems mitigated, had this 
been discussed at an earlier stage, if indeed it was even possible to determine at 
which point threat became opportunity. Stephen, when asked this question, could not 
provide a specific time frame, referring instead to ‘a growing awareness’ that the 
situation had changed.
The Police
A central issue for changing organisations appears to beset the Police; that is a 
process of learning through experience (seeing is believing). Over the last twenty 
years a succession of public failures led to public enquiries: Brixton riots, 
Hillsborough Football Stadium, the Steven Lawrence murder, et al. Clearly individual 
officers have to fulfil multiple roles that have grown in sophistication, and yet they are 
expected to deliver a balanced repertoire that is not polarised as service or force, but 
both. The ease with which the balance can be upset tends to leave them vulnerable 
to external influences.
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W e have already heard one of the proponents of zero tolerance, Bratton (in 
Bowling, 1996) credits much of the success associated with zero tolerance in New 
York to organisational changes rather than changes in attitude of the Police. This 
key difference appears to have been overlooked by politicians in the UK. The Police 
are required to notice political agendas however political agendas that touch deeply 
held values might also result in unexpected (but not unforeseeable?) consequences.
For many years the Police failed to link performance to cost and did not appear to 
notice the consequences of ignoring widespread public spending reviews and the 
effects that this might have for the police organisation. There followed a sequential 
re-positioning of the Police until they could no longer fail to notice, by which time their 
options to manoeuvre had been greatly reduced.
Whatever the relative merits might have been to change the Police structure they had 
no visible benefit therefore, they were not believed, they had no knowledge of how, in 
a reasonable period of time, this change might have worked, without that knowledge 
they resisted the change.
We suggest that the structure of the Police is as much about its relationship with the 
public they serve as its internal management style and this has direct consequences 
for the organisation if it is developed on the basis of only recognising the potential for 
mistakes after they have occurred.
The structure of the Police was forged in 1829; it was thought to be proven and safe. 
If there was any thought that the new structure held the possibility for success, then 
the doubt was sufficient to deter them from taking the risk of trying to make it work. 
This would not be too surprising in that comment or criticism of the Police -  through 
output (interface with the public) and style (management) had rarely been linked.
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These were not regarded as inclusive concepts. Any proposed change to the 
structure was therefore seen as risk without reward.
Foreign & Commonwealth Office Services
A number of problems run through this analysis: FCOS appeared to process 
information based on what they knew of previous enactments. This limited their 
scope for dealing with changes to their environment i.e. Central Government policy 
and the response by the PUS and his senior staff.
By retaining selection that had always worked FCOS could not see the 
consequences of their actions (or lack of them) and were unlikely to do so until they 
saw the result (seeing is believing).
FCO had a history of being a risk adverse organisation, unwilling to make or tolerate 
mistakes (many had been penalised for making mistakes in their careers), and even 
though some in FCOS clearly considered doing something different, they were, 
ultimately, unwilling or unable to enact this selection.
EMI Recorded Music
With such a deep-rooted understanding of the meaning of copyright and its 
importance to the music industry demonstrated by the security surrounding the 
Beatles tapes, we might have anticipated difficulty in changing the notion of asset 
value in other areas of the business. Indeed at an individual level, we recounted the 
difficulty one executive had in recognising the originalright value of Beatles original
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recording master tapes stored by the thousand in a vault at Abbey Road. It was only 
when the street value (to collectors of such artefacts), and the devastating publicity 
that would follow the loss of this product through neglect, was forcefully drawn to his 
attention that he was able to re-frame an alternative - a value other than copyright, 
until that time the security measures had been designed to prevent access rather 
than ensure preservation.
At an organisational level EMI appeared able to cope with the ‘leap before you look’ 
(Weick, 1995) concept but there were consequences. It was no secret that a section 
of the music industry expected technology to bring instant playing of music by voice 
command into every Western home and motorcar in the near (but unspecified) 
future. At that point, control over the distribution and replication of product would be 
largely redundant, there would be little value in retaining physical product. The value 
would be in the content; organisations would be able to deliver to their subscribers -  
copyright would still have a substantial roll to play in such a scenario, but, as 
secondary to the integration of content into the delivery mechanism. This was the 
prevailing theory upon which the board of EMI proposed to bet the company in 
merging with Warner and being a content provider in a previously untested vertical 
business model.
The deal appeared to have been made on the basis of what was already known (the 
merits of building a large business) and the potential of what was not known, the 
vertical business based upon content (entertainment and delivery). In terms of 
confidence in the deal passing anti-trust problems, the attitude was upbeat: -
‘...sources at Warner and EMI suggest that they are 
confident the deal will not fall foul of the anti-trust 
authorities -  we wouldn’t be doing this if we didn’t think we
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could...its not inconceivable that it could be derailed but it’s 
improbable -  said a senior source’
(Music Week 29th January 2000)
Eventually the Wamer/EMI deal broke down when the companies could not reconcile 
the concerns of the anti-trust authorities, the approach to whom had been based 
upon merging two large companies rather than creating a new type of business. 
Everyone involved had experience of the former; none had experience of the latter. 
In proposing the merger Wamer/EMI had changed -  enacted a new environment - 
but they then approached it based on what they knew of the previous environment 
and limited their scope for dealing with the attitude of the anti-trust authorities.
‘...the proposed mergers are forcing regulators to explore 
largely untested arguments surrounding anti-trust 
regulation in the new economy...Brussels and Washington 
are grappling with the question of how to assess the 
impact of vertical integration - the combination of content 
and carriage'
(Financial Times, 7th September 2000).
The organisations concerned here had adopted a process of merger/acquisition that 
had worked before, it was only as they saw the authorities questioning the merger 
that the mistake was realised -  how to prepare the authorities for the unknown rather 
than simply justify size.
'...the collision between regulators and dealmakers 
reveals more than the lack of political finesse in the media 
and communications industry, the real issues are about 
regulating for the unknown’.
(Financial Times, ibid)
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We have dwelt on problem identification at EMI because it serves as a timely 
warning to leadership that might otherwise be tempted into the either over crediting 
or over discrediting. Over crediting may result in little or no change but over 
discrediting and ignoring context and environment may have similar consequences, 




‘If people want to change their environment, they need to 
change themselves and their actions. ...Problems that 
never get solved, never get solved because managers 
keep tinkering with everything but what they do'
(Weick, 1979, p. 152, emphasis added).
Thus far we have avoided examining the process element of the outcomes taken by 
our actors. The selection process shown in the analysis of our case studies suggests, 
discrediting was rare (EMI being the notable exception) and seldom sustained. Here, 
however, we want to focus on the element of enactment or what Weick above 
describes as ‘what managers do’. We also wish to take a position on what we believe 
constitutes enactment.
Smircich & Stubbard come closer to the position we described earlier as making a 
meaningful difference. ‘Enactment implies a combination of attention and action on 
the part of organizational members’ (1985, p.726). However even this, for us, needs 
to be further grounded ‘Enactment means thinking and acting. Enactments test one’s 
physical, informational, imaginative, and emotional resources’ (ibid, p.732). Salancik 
(1977) separates out cognition from action and suggests where action is public and 
volitional it may also need to be justified. This, for us, captures the essence of what 
we take as enactment and links to the comments of Weick above. For us enactment 
-  in the context of adaptive change, is about managers thinking and doing - doing in 
the physical sense of acting out thinking in a physically testing way or at least a way 
in which they take responsibility for a public commitment.
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Weick (1979) contrasts an enacted environment as being different from a perceived 
environment and suggests (following Pondy) that, if a perceived environment were 
the essence of enactment, then the phenomenon would be called enthinkment. We 
recognise that our position strays from Weick (1995) who, in his discussion on 
enactment, cautions us ‘to be careful not to equate action with a simple response to a 
stimulus’ (p.37). He further cites Blumer (1969) ‘given lines of communication may be 
started or stopped, they may be abandoned or postponed, they may be confined to 
mere planning’ (p. 16). So whilst accepting Weick’s position on defining enactment, 
here we are lifting the term in order to examine responses to specific stimulation and 
classify enthinkment as something that does not entail the physical process of doing; 
differing, in a substantial way, from what went before. For example, using the model 
we have discussed above; being aware of the issue and discussing necessary 
actions, but actually changing language without behaviour (e.g. the way staff are 
managed or communication with external agencies) does not fit our criteria of change 
in a substantial way and remains enthinkment, the essence being that for the 
purpose of this exercise we are pushing the boundaries of enthinkment into what 
Weick et al describe as enactment.
We come far closer to Weick’s (1995) account of ‘talking the walk’ (p. 182-183), here 
he tells us that ‘people make sense of their actions, their walking, their talking’; 
further he suggests that if people are forced to walk the talk -  effectively they are 
forced to walk words they barely understand, this leads to a reduction of innovation. 
We use this point later, but we also suggest that the same uncertainty and fear of the 
unknown leads to a reduction of enactment (as we have defined it) induced by 
entertaining the notion of enactment to the point where lack of familiarity inhibits the 
walk: we are not sure how to get to the place we think we want to go and the more 
we talk about it the scarier and further away it seems to get.
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Lippman & McCall (1976) suggest that actors can operate ‘off-line’ and do not need 
to engage in action in order to evaluate it. Weick’s point is that the action defines 
what it is; our research suggests that some of our actors did not find out what it was 
precisely because they did not take action. For Greve & Taylor (2000) ‘cognitions do 
not change spontaneously. They change because of information received through 
the actions of others and through actions taken by the focal organization’ (p.57). This 
supports Weick in that it is the action that changes thinking, not the thinking that 
changes action; we extend that concept of thinking until we pick up significant 
evidence of action, admittedly a very grey area, but one we think appropriate if we 
are to determine the qualitative difference in adaptive change and the process of 
change. Brunsson (1985) puts it that ‘organizations have two problems: to choose 
the right thing to do, and to get it done’ (p.27). It is the movement towards getting it 
done that we are interested in noting.
In summary we accept that sensemaking often does not result in action (Feldman, 
1989), we also accept that in a pure form enactment as Weick (1988) informs us is a 
synthesis, tailored for organisational settings of; self-fulfilling prophecies (Jones, E. 
1986, Jones, R. 1977, Snyder, 1984), retrospective sensemaking (Straw, 1980, 
Weick, 1979), commitment (Salanik, 1977; Straw, 1982) and social information 
processing (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Nevertheless we are interested in why 
sensemaking -  when there is an expectation of action -  results in no discemable 
activity. As a final point we would refer back to Weick & Quinn (1999) and suggest 
that whether enactment is an observable activity rather depends on the lens through 
which the activity is being viewed; ours is not one that identifies fine grain detail it is 
one that is able to focus at one and the same time across our canvases. In this way 
our perspective is taken from the collection rather than the single canvas, we now 




The change from operating as a 'merchant bank’ to operating as a ‘private bank’
The change from merchant bank to private bank was well known throughout the 
organisation, symbolically Stephen’s joint managing director had left the Bank 
following the board’s and Stephen’s plan to convert to private banking. Many of those 
in the merchant banking function had left the Bank and a re-branding exercise 
changed all the literature.
Significantly, the output and sourcing of business, therefore the doing of banking also 
changed; intermediaries (solicitors, accountants, bank members agents and other 
banks) were cultivated to direct their high net worth clients towards Parvin-May. A 
trade stand was taken for several years at the Midem music festival in Cannes, 
southern France in order to attract the attention of the agents of wealthy clients. 
Staffing levels were built up in the area of investment and senior staff with a portfolio 
of private clients were induced to work for the Bank. Within three years the Bank 
thought, looked and acted as though it were a private banking operation. The full 
enactment process had taken place.
The need to meet specific financial targets by increasing profitability
This change took far more effort to be assimilated into the activity of the Bank. 
Stephen had recognised the importance of profit as part of the package of 
transforming the Bank into a private banking enterprise. However, despite pointing 
out the importance to the Bank and staff (especially senior staff), little changed for 
the first year and, indeed, as have noted previously, there was a high degree of 
resistance from staff who valued client relationships over profit. It was only after
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several employees, who were unwilling to change their values, were made redundant 
and pay/bonuses were linked to profit, that a seed change started to take place. Over 
a period of some three years the emphasis was changed from success equals 
relationships to success equals profit. The point at which it would be reasonable to 
suggest this was commonly accepted was when the senior staff saw good levels of 
profitability and substantial bonuses in their pay packets. Seeing became believing -  
profit mattered because it made a difference to the Bank, but also because it had a 
direct impact on the individuals. Enactment here was achieved by a series of actions 
that reinforced the concept of profit and pointed our actors to further activity they 
realised was profitable for themselves as well as the Bank.
The requirement for staff to take more personal initiative in the execution of their 
responsibilities
Stephen had been quite strident in his demands for staff to take personal initiative; in 
the final analysis he was offered (and accepted) a form of group or committee 
initiative. The enactment in the way that Stephen saw it -  individuals volunteering to 
initiate and project manage new products or services never got off the ground. At 
one level we saw Stephen calling for the change but even without the influence of the 
chairman Henry (which was very strong) Stephen's behaviour was always controlling. 
Despite, apparently, recognising the need to delegate authority, he would invariably 
find a reason why this was not possible -  chairing committees or channelling 
communication through himself. Added to this, evidence that Henry would intervene 
directly and forcefully if he thought a member of staff had made a mistake (including 
Stephen), the notion of initiative was undermined by symbolism and behaviour that 
did little to encourage initiative.
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The response to the demand for initiative and push/pull effect of punishing individual 
mistakes created the collective response of initiative through committee -  in 
particular the Profit Committee. Despite our recording of failure to achieve 
penetration at the level of individual initiative, the result was that more projects were 
initiated and more profit created, just not in the way that Stephen envisaged.
The coupling of the above into a coherent proposition for sale
The changes above resulted in an organisation that was profitable and attractive to 
potential purchasers. To listen to the dialogue between Stephen and Henry, 
subsequent to the actions above, it appeared as though sale of the Bank had always 
been the objective, and the measures above were the result of a skilfully crafted 
strategy designed to enhance the sale potential of the Bank. Having watched the 
process first-hand we would comment that the initial actions taken by Stephen had 
been to save the Bank rather than sell it. However, the collective actions above 
created the opportunity for sale, not the other way around.
The Police
The attempts to change the orientation of policing from force to service and back to 
force
This issue highlights a particular difficulty for those who would seek to effect 
organisational change on a piecemeal basis -  that is changing language or structure 
or behaviour. Whilst we would not suggest that there is any particular order to the 
process, we do hold that our data supports the proposition that change is only 
complete once all these components are in place. In the case of the Police we 
documented a long tortuous process, under pressure from Central Government and
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other groups, to change their orientation from an ethos of force to service. Over a 
period of ten or more years the Police adapted to this requirement whilst further 
skilling against organised/international crime/terrorism. Always a tenuous and difficult 
process for the Police, they created symbols of change through the adoption of local 
consultation bodies, enhanced training and widespread cautioning of minor crime. 
Whist this did not sit easily with the rank and file officers, new entrants had been 
directed towards the importance of co-operative community-based policies and 
tolerance minority groupings. However, the management behaviour and structure of 
the Police had not changed and these obstacles ensured that service was an 
ancillary output of policing not core value behaviour of policing.
In 1992 the Government, for the first time, addressed the issue of structure by 
reducing the levels of command -  had they remained, this would have presented a 
further opportunity to consolidate the process by the recruitment of new officers, 
providing a platform to address managerial behaviour, resting, as it was, in the tenets 
of command and control style enforcement. As we have seen, the structural change 
was of short duration and symbolically this re-enforced the necessity of a command 
and control system.
Peters & Waterman (1982), Pascale, et al (1992) caution organisations to heed the 
cause and effect of organisational change. They contend that organisations do not 
change by altering structure or values or behaviour or symbols. More that, in altering 
one aspect of an organisation, the impact elsewhere has to be understood in order to 
mitigate against the unexpected. The requirement here was for the Police to alter the 
way in which they undertook their responsibilities, gaining something more than an 
implied consent, or, as some would contend, a taken-for-granted consent. There was 
no corresponding requirement for the Police to change their structure or a method of
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managing staff -  not surprising therefore; the impact was reduced to policing in the 
margins, enabling the ‘real’ work to carry forward.
Introduction of value for money policies
Whether by accident or design, it is in the area of fiscal restraint that change has had 
the greatest impact of those areas we have viewed. As we have indicated, Chief 
Officers still carry constitutional autonomy for the operational activity of their Police 
Forces. However the language of budgets, effectiveness and efficiency, first 
established in policing circles in the early 1980s, has shifted from activity that Chief 
Officers could avoid by citing ‘operational necessity’ or notionally satisfy, through 
creating a paper chase of objective setting.
The introduction of language unsupported by symbolic and behavioural changes had 
little impact for some fifteen years. Today all police officers, certainly down to the 
rank of Inspector, have a keen awareness of budgetary responsibility -  the 
enactment may, by some measures, be less than perfect e.g. the Police have 
struggled to import commercial concepts of value for money into a public service by 
grading the response to certain crimes according to pre-determined protocols, and 
have taken officers off the streets in order to comply with Home Office statistical 
returns. Yet the Police are building their knowledge and they are determining a set of 
agreed meanings on what value for money and budgeting means for them -  they are 
doing these things however uncomfortable or less than perfect they may be.
The point in time for this enactment can be identified as originating with the Sheehy 
Inquiry of 1993 and the placement of Chief Officers on ‘short-term’ contracts of up to 
ten years. This started to impact in the mid 1990s (it only affected newly promoted 
officers) when Chief Officers also found themselves subject to yearly performance
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reviews by their Police Authorities and these were based partly on Home Office 
statistical returns that in turn have, increasingly, been judged against delivering value 
for money policies. Despite the strains, and any ideological prejudices that may have 
confronted this change, Police Forces are enacting their own form of value for money 
policies.
Attempts to change the stmcture of Police organisations and devolve responsibility
As we have noted before, the move to reduce the number of ranks and its attendant 
link to management behaviour lasted, in one form or another, less than seven years. 
The attitude reflected from our case study material was typical of the response 
gained from officers above the rank of Inspector, i.e. the new structure was 
unworkable; officers in the surviving ranks found themselves overloaded and these 
ranks failed to meet the expectations of external agencies.
When we go back to the model, our position is that adaptive change is a process of 
changes to language and symbols, based upon knowledge. Part of the symbolism is 
that of behaviour. In the Police the language was compromised by the creation of 
‘Senior Superintendent’ to replace ‘Chief Superintendent’ and ‘assistant Chief 
Constable D’ to replace ‘Deputy Chief Constable’. This permitted a symbolic link to 
remain between the old structure and the new and prevented officers enacting 
behaviour congruent with increased autonomy and levels of responsibility. Whilst on 
paper the ranks had disappeared the reality was that they continued under different 
titles -  not only was this first-order change it was transparently first-order change.
The position taken by officers that the new ranks had not worked is, we contend, 
essentially a correct one. However, not so much because the ‘ranks’ did not work, 
more that the behaviours were never established in the revised structure; they never
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needed to be, as the process for transferring to the new structure was fatally flawed 
at the outset, by symbolically maintaining the hierarchical link with the old structure, 
thus preventing enactment of the new. Now into a new decade Charles Clark the 
Home Office minister in charge of the Police is talking again of bringing change to the 
Police:-
‘We have deliberately eschewed major structural change 
on the grounds that people focus their attention on that 
and not on what can be delivered’
(The Economist February 24th -  March 2nd 2001)
Here the Government are taking a deliberate policy decision to try and change the 
Police through behaviour whilst ignoring the structure. To us this is a failure to 
recognise the interdependent nature of organisational design and behaviour.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Services
Enactment of espoused behavioural preferences
In the previous section we suggested that the change required of FCOS had been to 
enact the thoughts and espoused wishes of the senior management team by 
undertaking a range of modernising initiatives that, when first declared, were 
unsupported by the PUS. However by the time we pick up the activity in 1999, they 
were in tune with the changed agenda, brought about by pressure from Central 
Government and the consequential change in attitude by the PUS.
All the component parts for undertaking change appeared to be in place. The political 
agenda had been set long before and, whilst the FCO had been protected from much
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of the reform required elsewhere, through publication of the Modernising Government 
White Paper, widespread knowledge of seed change in the attitude of the PUS and 
the main FCO, it was understood that the desire senior members of the FCOS 
management team previously expressed for change was now correct and met the 
needs of the times.
In terms of taking the discussion phase to enactment the process faltered; the 
business plan committed to the modernising agenda, the training prepared staff for 
managing in a different way and there was ample evidence that senior staff had the 
knowledge of similar changes in other Central Government departments, indeed, 
actually within the FCO itself. Despite the appropriateness of the action, the 
enactment stage was delayed because of problems identified with the availability of 
time, money, people, marketing plan and IT support. A full year after publication of 
the business plan, little of substance had changed, leading to the increasing 
frustration of the PUS, and the general reduction in credibility of FCOS in the eyes of 
the main FCO office, as the activity remained at the level of what we have described 
as enthinkment Having talked previously of the faltering and stumbling steps taken 
by management of FCOS we might further press the analogy that this description 
invokes. Perhaps those who are learning to walk (possibly for the first time) need a 
helping hand until they develop their own confidence. Put in another way it may be 
necessary to wean people off highly dependent behaviours in a gradual way letting 
go may be seen here as holding on in order to enable letting go.
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EMI
Change of core assets from ‘copyright’ to ‘content’
Much of the data we picked up in our case study of EMI concerned the evolution or 
process of change initially in format and then the internal discussions about copyright 
-  particularly parallel importation of music product. The issue we centred upon was 
the initiative to accelerate the process of change by creating a ground breaking 
vertical market through merger with Warner, Time Warner and AOL.
We have acknowledged the view of the music industry that change was inevitable, 
here was a business prepared to enact that thought process in a dramatic and 
wholehearted manner. EMI had shifted within two months of the initial AOL/Time 
Warner agreement -  recognised the changes in the industry, changed the concept of 
assets from ‘copyright’ to ‘content’ by undertaking to merge its business into a 
relatively small part of a much larger global entity for which it would be but one of a 
range of content providers. Here there was no doubt that enactment had taken place 
in an unequivocal manner.
Summary
In this part of the thesis, we have been trying to establish whether our revised 
definition of enactment has taken place, given the nature of the processing detailed.




• Successfully enacted the process of change from a merchant bank to private 
bank -  the Bank expanded and increased its client base and service range
• Enacted the move towards increasing profitability
• Failed to enact personal responsibility. Indeed this was resisted and reverted 
to collective responsibility
• Whilst cited as an adaptive change - preparing the Bank for sale - was an 
outcome of the collective activity above
Police: -
• Despite pressure for reform, the Police had not enacted the change from an 
ethos of force to service, so when they were asked to revert ‘back’ to force 
the ‘change’ was more a re-establishing of an existing norm
• Introduction of value for money policies was a slow process yet, despite a 
continued agenda of negotiation within police forces and between forces and 
the Home Office, this change has been enacted and senior officers are 
becoming more adept at recognising the costs of the service they provide
• Enactment of a revised Police structure was never established (whilst at one 
level it appears that the ranks disappeared in reality they were renamed), the 
consequence, as we have seen, being the reinstatement of the original titles
FCOS: -
• Of all the examples we have seen this one provides clearest example of 
enthinkment, but not the follow through of enactment. The result has been
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a confused staff (for whom little of material consequence appears to have 
altered) and a confused management, apparently caught in the headlights 
of uncertainty, not knowing how to react next
EMI: -
•  Unequivocal enactment of an imaginative conversion from assets based 
on ‘copyright’ to assets based on ‘content’ although, ultimately, the merger 
that would have finalised the transition failed because the EU competition 
regulators had no experience of such a merger and could not, 
themselves, adapt their evaluation process to the novelty of the situation
Where next?
The purpose of this thesis thus far has been to examine how organisations cope with 
adapting to novel situations based upon the sensemaking model. In order to explore 
this agenda we have taken a basic compare and contrast model to show that novelty 
was the one common denominator of our case study organisations. We then took 
Weick’s ESR model and extended it by noting changes to language, symbols and 
knowledge, to distinguish between the emergent nature of data into Weick’s 
sensemaking model, and the acknowledged data in the form of adaptive change 
feeding into our own model. What might be thought of as the differences between 
emergent sensemaking (e.g. Battered Child Syndrome) and set piece sensemaking 
(change initiatives).
We have seen a selection of successful, partly successful and failed initiatives -  we 
have also seen success from unexpected sources. Some changes have been 
resisted and little, if anything, altered. Some have been resisted but still changed.
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Some were enacted, some were ignored and at least one, apparently, supported, yet 
really did not get beyond, a process we have borrowed from Weick, and for which we 
changed the definition of and termed enthinkment.
The first level of analysis completed in section 6 suggested that our host 
organisations had one thing in common; the situations faced held a high degree of 
novelty for those concerned. This led us to an extension of the sensemaking model 
examined in the previous section. As we noted at the beginning of the analysis on 
EMI, a pattern, to that point, had emerged of the fixed nature of processing that 
seemed to operate in the three previous case studies, making them vulnerable to 
changes in their environment - vulnerable in the sense of seemingly not having the 
flexibility to meet novel situations with novel solutions. Preferring, instead, to rely 
upon crediting previous retained ways of responding.
This pattern was disturbed by EMI where novelty was met with enthusiasm -  and 
appeared, even in the macro world of global organisational mergers, to have little 
disturbance factor for those within the organisation. The world as seen by EMI was 
moving towards a redefining of the music business into content providers, rather than 
wait for the process of change to bring this about, they met the challenge head on -  
and attempted to leapfrog, not only the changes in output from copyright to content, 
but also the organisational design to go with it.
The organisational style and structure of the organisations has already been 
commented upon, convention and clear centralised reporting lines tightly bound 
Parvin-May, the Police and FCOS. On the other hand, EMI was a global company 
but acted in a de-centralised way where great pains were taken not to interfere with 
local operations -  a tacit acceptance that a multi-national organisation cannot 
communicate effectively with local environments from a tightly controlled style and
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structure. Not withstanding these comments, as we have seen, none was able to 
deliver to the agendas they would have wished.
Given that all organisations will, from time to time, embark upon adaptive change, we 
believe the ground is sufficiently fertile to sow the seed and ask: need the outcomes 
of adaptive change be as random as the evidence of our case studies and our 
subsequent analysis appears to indicate?
In each of the scenarios we have described how organisations have initiated change 
for themselves or another organisation over which they have control or influence. Our 
next task is to establish whether, given knowledge of the sensemaking model, such 
organisations could reasonably alter or direct attention towards salient activities that 
might make the process of change more accessible and predictable.
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Section 9:
Requisite Variety & Future Perfect Thinking
THE MORE TOO m ow , THE 
WARDER IT IS TO TARE: 
DECISIVE ACTIOK. _
OHCE TOO BECOVAE 
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OEGRAV. ,
%
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AS IT FIRST APPEARS. 
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BEIRG A MAM OF ACTION, 
I  CAMT AFFORD to take 
THAT RISK  ----------
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BUT AT LEAST 
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Requisite variety
Thus far we have looked back over our collection of canvasses and viewed them 
from different points on the GAS model clock face by moving our easel to establish 
different perspectives, we have layered the activity to develop the retrospective 
nature of the sensemaking model. For the remainder of the thesis we will discuss 
how these reflections of past activity (as life understood backwards) may assist our
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actors to better quality decision-making (as life lived forwards). In this section we take 
two concepts, requisite variety and future perfect thinking, we define them as 
methods for considering future organisational activity and consider how their use 
might impact on the thinking of leadership planning adaptive change.
Weick (1979) leads the discussion into requisite variety by first establishing that 
‘during selection, organizational members select those labels, explanations, 
interpretations, and meanings that allow new enactments to be fitted into old, 
enacted environments’ (p. 187).
In this way it is possible to understand that we select enactment based on what has 
happened in the past -  crediting, or we select enactment but assume that what 
happened in the past may not happen again -  discrediting. As individuals and 
organisations, we are preoccupied with reducing the world to simple regular patterns 
of predictable outcomes based on what went before. In this way we are in constant 
danger of being trapped by the notion that seeing is believing.
Selection is based upon prior activity -  that is, we make sense after something has 
happened (attributing labels and meanings), not before it. As we have discussed in 
the case study of Parvin-May (the strategy of shaping the Bank for merger or sale) 
the Bank had been prepared for sale by previous activity -  operating in a growth 
market and increasing profitability. The strategy was a label that gave meaning to 
that prior activity -  not as was suggested a cause for that activity.
Weick (1979) contents that, despite our predilection for simple recipes and 
unequivocal solutions, we live in a world that provides equivocal inputs, and that if we 
are to make sense of them first we have to register the unequivocal, hence the law of 
requisite variety which states 'that the variety within a system must be at least as
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great as the environmental variety against which it is attempting to regulate itself. Put 
more succinctly, only variety can regulate variety’ (Buckley 1968, p.495 quoted in 
Weick, 1979). An example of the principle of requisite variety is provided by Weick, 
who suggests that if a photographer has to photograph 20 subjects at different 
distances then the camera has to have as least 20 settings -  if it has fewer it will lack 
the requisite variety to register sufficient detail to provide uniform clarity throughout 
the range of photographs.
Organisations that process equivocal inputs must themselves retain the capacity for 
equivocality -  discredit the past by adopting a view that believing is not necessarily 
seeing in order to avoid failure through non-adaptation. Weick further contends that ‘if 
people cherish the unequivocal but are unwilling to participate in the equivocal, then 
their survival becomes more problematic’ (ibid). If this sounds simple then we need to 
heed the truism that simple models often disguise complex actions, Zeleny (1986) 
gives life to this note of caution when he warns us that requisite variety is much 
harder to achieve than it looks.
A graphic example of the organisational instinct for conformity and reducing the 
meaning of inputs to the over crediting of past enactments was seen from the 
example taken from the American space programme at the start of this work. We 
used this example to sensitise the reader to the concepts of sensemaking, requisite 
variety and future perfect thinking. The day-to-day settings and activities of our actors 
make it more difficult to discern these concepts as an observer, let alone intercede as 
a principal actor and we do not underestimate the level of sophistication such 
interventions require.
The law of requisite variety suggests that, if we want to survive in a world replete with 
equivocality, we have to complicate our thinking and ask ‘what if questions rather
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than 'why if questions, the former assumption challenges us to think of possibilities 
(the unknown - expanding equivocality) whereas the latter assumption challenges us 
to think of probabilities (the known - reducing equivocality), it is only when we ask 
what is the situation? (the here and now) that we are able to deal with the 
consequences (Wittgenstein, 1968).
Higgins & Bargh, 1987, Fiske & Taylor, 1991 assist us here. Their position is that, if 
managers are confident that they have interpreted the input correctly, they are less 
probing and more likely to be biased towards confirming existing beliefs -  success 
breeds success.
Weick (1979) gives us another option and that is to reduce the variety of the 
environment -  that is to say - very powerful organisations can, to some extend, 
regulate the input -  but as he points out this option is only really available to the very 
few, and that can bring further problems.
In our case study of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office we provided evidence that 
despite widespread changes to Central Government departments since the early 
1980s, particularly in the area of effectiveness and efficiency, the FCO had been 
protected by successive Foreign Secretaries as being a ‘special case’ and therefore, 
excluded from much of the requirement to change. Within the UK, and given the 
authority of the Foreign Secretary within the context of the Civil Service, this was 
indeed a powerful organisation that, with active colluding, could regulate and reduce 
the variety of input. However as Weick points out ‘simplifying an enacted 
environment may also simplify the enactor, which creates the problem of requisite 
variety all over again’ (p. 193).
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W e suggest that this is just the case with FCOS -  for many years, as part of the 
FCO, they had been protected from substantive change -  certainly as far as 
management behaviours were concerned. Language had been shaped -  the names 
of departments had been altered, but this was a game, actively encouraged by the 
PUS and condoned by successive Foreign Secretaries, to maintain distance from 
Central Government policies of reform. Ultimately, of course, the shield of protection 
was removed with a change of Government, leaving the FCO off the pace, and 
management at FCOS in the position of ‘simplified enactors’ apparently unable to 
enact a new environment -  it was a process for which they had been left ill equipped, 
lacking in the necessary requisite variety to deal with the situation that they found 
themselves dealing with. The potential contradiction between choosing the right 
thing to do and getting it done can be examined as a problem in requisite variety’ 
(Weick, 2001). To those in FCOS they found themselves in the trade off position of 
taking what, for them, would have been regarded as dangerous action (that might 
have led to understanding), and safe inaction which led to confusion (what they 
chose). Weick (1988) says that ‘it is often less true that ‘situations’ determine 
appropriate action than that 'preconceptions’ determine appropriate action (p.306). It 
was these ‘preconceptions’ that they were unable to break away from.
The converse could be said of EMI -  here was an organisation that appeared to have 
embraced the complexity of input (changes to the music industry led by changes in 
allied technology) and responded to previous events -  Internet piracy, problems 
associated with parallel importation with an equally complex response. Unfortunately 
this did not work either -  but more of this later.
In terms of organisational style and structure FCOS and EMI represent the greatest 
contrast on our case studies. On the one hand a public body steeped in tradition, 
hierarchy and rules, and the other, an industry that likes to shun convention and
267
deliberately reduces the impact of hierarchy and control by separating the creativity 
associated with the record labels from the bureaucracy of a global company.
Weick (1995) notes that decentralisation is a key method of ensuring a wide variety 
of inputs (p.56). This is supported by Hubar & Daft (1987) who suggest that 
complexity can increase perceived uncertainty. Smircich & Stubbard (1985) make a 
further point that ‘the organization of the music industry rests in particular patterns of 
beliefs, values, and assumptions that support the ongoing creation, distribution, and 
enjoyment of the various forms of music’ (p.727) and that organisation here is about 
ongoing creation or renewal - it is the output that Smircich & Stubbard appear to 
suggest that shapes the nature of the organisation. This would follow the 
decentralised nature of the business that is constantly adapting to and indeed 
attempting to best guess trends in music taste in diverse geographic locations. As a 
music business EMI needs to take note of equivocal inputs, therefore it structures to 
accommodate this requirement; therefore it is more adept, or at least comfortable, 
with requisite variety.
It might be that one of the underplayed skills of leadership is the requirement to 
improve the sensory function (Gibson, 1953) by discrediting the 'taken for granted' 
nature of familiarity and comfort. Easy to suggest, but difficult to achieve, when we 
search for stability in an unpredictable world - yet the more we question the more we 
know what there is to question, which is probably why we are reluctant to start.
Unfortunately, we saw little evidence of discrediting or use of requisite variety in our 
research. Most organisations followed Suit’s (1999) line that the more successful 
they were the slower and more resistant to change they became. With the notable 




‘If beliefs, values, and exemplars diverge and become 
more idiosyncratic, there is a greater necessity for 
detailed planning. But there is also a greater probability 
that the detailed plans will not be implemented as 
intended, because they will be interpreted in diverse 
ways and lead to divergent actions’
(Weick, 1985 p.383)
Weick (1979) suggests that enactment produces outcomes that are then given 
coherence retrospectively through the use of plausible explanations for how events 
occurred. He suggests that the telling of history in this way facilitates sensemaking 
because it is easier to describe histories about past events rather than future events. 
He confirms this position by describing three experiments about a professor taking a 
six-week sabbatical, a game of American football and a motor vehicle accident. In 
each case a group of people were asked to describe the event as though it is going 
to happen and another group were asked to describe the event as though it had 
already happened.
In each case the event described as going to happen was fanciful, but not detailed, 
whereas the event described as though it had already happened was more routine 
and much richer in detail. In watching a similar set of experiments we observed, 
additionally, that participants describing major vehicle accidents in the future were 
more likely to treat the process in a light hearted, even flippant manner whereas 
those describing the event as though it had already occurred did so with more 
application to the task, describing being able to ‘see’ what had occurred. Not only did 
this result in the detailing of the nature of the 'injuries’ they also added the makes, 
colours and registration numbers of motorcars they owned or knew, thus connecting
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reality with an imagined ‘reality’. Weick suggests that this method of thinking will be 
of interest to organisational planners and quotes Schutz: -
The actor projects his action as if it were already over and 
done with and lying in the past. It is a full-blown, actualised 
event, which the actor pictures and assigns to its place in
the order of experience given to him at the moment of
projection. Strangely enough, therefore, because it is 
pictured as completed, the planned act bears the temporal 
character of pastness...The fact that it is thus pictured as if 
it were simultaneously past and future can be taken care of 
by saying that it is thought of in the future perfect tense’
(1967, p.61)
The link that Weick (1979 & 1995), Mintzberg (1978) and Boland (1984) make is that 
reflections of past activity tend to provide consistency of behaviour for future 
activities. Once again Parvin-May being an example where a combination of 
enactments produced a situation that made the Bank a saleable entity, these were 
given a label -  a strategy - and the previous actions were cited as being the 
appropriate things to carry on doing. In this sense it could be said that the process of 
‘historicizing’ (Weick, 1979) provides confidence for action. However the downside of 
future perfect thinking is that ‘the feeling of order clarity, and rationality is an 
important goal of sensemaking, which means that once this feeling is achieved, 
further retrospective processing stops’ (Weick, 1995, p.29). Effectively Weick is 
suggesting that our inclination to create order narrows our perspective - it  can work in
the opposite way to requisite variety unless it is used in conjunction with requisite
variety.
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Future perfect thinking is a method of positioning oneself in the future and pulling the 
present forward. In so doing the inclination will be to draw the information necessary 
to provide the richness of detail from the past that is; perceived from known events.
In figure 15 we give a graphical representation of this proposition.
Future Perfect Thinking
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Future Perfect Thinking
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Figure 15.
Here we see a narrow channel drawn speculatively from the future, through the 
present, into the past, where it can be fed from the narrow channel of what was 
known, or rather what was thought to be known, about previous events.
The strength of this model is that it provides detail and certainly that may lead to 
action. The weakness is that, rather than add to the variety suggested by requisite 
variety, it can reduce it to the probability of outcome, rather than the possibility of 
outcome and from this position it could be regarded as a contradiction. Weick, when 
asked about this point, agreed that the two concepts placed in juxtaposition might 
represent something of a paradox 2 by representing mutually exclusive attributes,
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despite the fact that both are discussed within the framework of the sensemaking 
model 3.
All the organisations that contributed to this work published business plans that 
defined where the executive wished the organisation to be positioned in periods of 
between one and five years in the future. In keeping with most conventional planning 
processes, the future was viewed from the present with the near future painted in 
great detail, and the far future with a more generalised statements of intent, common 
to all was the justification of the future based upon the results of the past.
Again the extremes, within our case studies, are those of FCOS and EMI. The initial 
draft business plan published by FCOS in 1999 actually detailed past events and 
barely mentioned the future, literally the future did not feature in the text and, had it 
been submitted to the PUS in that form, its credibility would have been severely 
damaged along with that of the authors.
EMI's business plan in 1999, on the other hand, was speculating about ‘a future that 
can only be measured by what we do not know, what will the formats be.... is the 
Internet a sustainable medium for music product?'
We now suggest that evidence of this nature is representative of the general styles 
adopted by these and other organisations from our study, and suggest that it is 
possible -  with the avowed benefit of hindsight - that those responsible for the 
planning of adaptive change, or those charged with leading it, had little 
understanding of sensemaking from the perspective of future perfect thinking.
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Parvin-May
A key change in the required behaviour of the management team was that -  as 
individuals - managers took greater levels of individual responsibility. In order to 
achieve this Stephen Reading’s initial method was to provide subtle cues -  to infer 
success through flair and qualified risk taking. Had he used the future perfect 
thinking process, and sought to identify the barriers to change, he might have 
‘discovered’ that his language was at variance to that of the chairman Henry Simme. 
He might also have ‘noticed’ that decisions in the Bank tended to emanate from the 
myriad of committees, and not individuals, as these were seen as safe environments. 
He might also have realised that subtle cues weighed little against the overwhelming 
history, language and symbolism aimed at restricting initiative.
The Police
‘Let me tell you this, there is absolutely no doubt that this 
[the Police] is an organisation that is based on delivering 
measured and appropriate force. If ever we lose that ability 
we also lose credibility in the eyes of the public and the 
Government. We are not and have never been a service -  
we deliver a service it is not the same and never can be 
despite the wishes of some well-meaning politicians -  we 
are a force’
(Sir Kenneth Newman, Former 
Commissioner Metropolitan Police)
This comment was made shortly after Newman retired from his post as head of the 
UK’s largest police force in 1988, as a previous Commandant of the Police Staff 
College and Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, he was the UK’s most 
authoritative police officer in the 1980s. He was politically adept enough to realise
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that, post the Scarman inquiry into inner city riots in the early 1980s, the Metropolitan 
Police had to respond to Government and public concerns and this led him to 
authorise the 'Plus Programme’ -  a series of guidelines for police officers in London 
aimed at creating a closer harmony with the public and interest groups. However, he 
never lost sight of the need to maintain, and indeed resist, the change of orientation 
of force to service or otherwise, as he saw it, risk the essential capability of the 
Police to maintain order.
‘I emphasise measured force and this comes down to good 
management able to rationalise the complexities of policing 
by consent. It is a command and control system but in my 
view this is necessary’
The force or service debate continued throughout the 1980s into the 1990s with most 
authors commenting upon the attempts to change the orientation -  not questioning 
that it existed, (Reiner, 1983, Fielding, 1991, Bennett, 1994).
Zero tolerance was, as we have seen, a concept applauded by the Prime Minister 
despite concerns raised in the press. Given the context of the Police recounted 
above, we have to ask whether such clear endorsement would have been 
forthcoming had the concept of future perfect thinking been applied, asking the 
question: ‘what happens when a highly symbolic and evocative policy such as zero 
tolerance is encouraged in an organisation that has always struggled to restrain the 
excesses of force?’ It is tempting to suggest that this was a predictable outcome, 
however we also have to acknowledge that it may not have been a believable 
outcome. Not believable, and this really is the ‘catch 22’ effect, because as we have 
demonstrated the organisation practices seeing is believing.
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Police officers, as we have seen, operate within the bounds of a disciplined service 
and tight definitions of conduct to counterbalance actions taken with wide 
discretionary powers. This discretion operates one way that is to say officers (in 
theory at least) can determine whether or not to act to support the law 
(arrest/report/wam/ignore) however they do not have discretion to break/bend/invent 
the law. The mantra of police officers taught to all recruits: ‘at time/date/place ....I
saw...., I said , I did ’ is a method of enforced sensemaking it seeks to ensure
that important actions that may impinge upon the rights of individuals are only taken 
under circumstances that conform to acceptable and established meanings. 
However, we would also suggest that processing of the model below also serves to 
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The selection activity is based upon preset definitions of the law (stage one) that 
informs options for action (stage two), in this way discretion is defined and actions 
regulated. In a court of law evidence is presented as a stage managed presentation 
and under the circumstances above sensemaking and decision-making would be 
merged into one activity. Separated out it becomes an exemplar of the distinction 
between the two, firstly we make sense of what we see then we take the decision of 
what to do. The Police, at this level of activity, are taught seeing is believing and we 
suggest this process spills over into other areas such as organising and may account 
for the reason why -  as a generalisation police officers are often regarded as having 
a cynical outlook. They are taught to be sceptical of anything that cannot be proved 
to be fact
By the same token, it is possible to overlay the failure of the change to the Police 
structure, as the reason why the policy of zero tolerance was not even more 
damaging. If Newman was correct and the Police require a command and control 
style of organisation to restrain the excesses of force, what might have occurred had 
zero tolerance been applied at a time when the formal structure of command and 
control was under de-construction?
The changes to the Police structure, as a stand-alone initiative, did not endure, future 
perfect thinking might have concluded this a natural outcome of changing the 
language (titles) but not the symbolism (allowing the titles to be substituted and the 
hierarchical authority based behaviours to endure). Given the debate above, this 
‘failure’ might be one for which the public and Government should be grateful.
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FCOS
The senior team at FCOS were, essentially, required to catch up with changes that 
had taken place within other Central Government departments. From the privileged 
position of observers, it would appear that this left them in a state of confusion and 
inertia from which they found difficulty in moving. To some extent, FCOS had always 
been an adjunct to what was seen in the main FCO as -  ‘the oily rag brigade’, as one 
senior diplomat had described the department. From this had developed an arms 
length relationship that removed FCOS from the inner circle of policy making. Not 
only were FCOS, as part of the FCO, at the end of the Civil Service change cycle, 
our data would suggest that they were also at the end of the FCO communication 
line. In this way they had missed some of the subtleties more apparent closer to the 
centre, i.e. knowledge of conversations between the Foreign Secretary and the PUS, 
conversations between the Cabinet Secretary and the PUS, together with 
realignment of the PUS behind the Foresight Report. In this way FCOS had not 
noticed the symbolic effect these actions had started to have in changing the context 
of the main office. Once the requirement for change became a demand for change, 
the very person perceived as the obstacle for change, the PUS, was the person 
calling for it. Somehow this had, apparently, missed the FCOS management team, or 
at least Ray, the CEO, who found himself on the end of personal criticism from the 
PUS. Given the model we proposed, and in order to consider adaptive change from 
a sensemaking perspective, it would seem reasonable to suggest inadequate 
knowledge of the symbolic changes had already started to take effect (as well as a 
lack of requisite variety to enact the information to hand).
It is a matter of extreme conjecture to speculate whether or not future perfect thinking 
would have led to the changes, referred to as modernising, being addressed in any 
different manner. It is safer to suggest that, had the PUS and his officials realised
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that FCOS was so far adrift from the current thinking and political agenda, the future 
perfect thinking model might have provided a framework for establishing the support 
necessary to implement the changes required.
EMI
In the previous section above we noted that of our case studies EMI were unique in 
embracing actions, defined in this work as requisite variety. We also noted that 
despite this, they still failed to achieve the change required, namely the successful 
merger with Warner.
Here we suggest that, despite use of requisite variety to identify and initiate the 
planned change, it actually fell down because they did not use future perfect thinking. 
Use of this framework for planning would have thrown up some very pointed 
questions, the most importantly being: ‘what were the obstacles that we faced and 
how did we overcome them in order to satisfy the EC regulatory authorities?’ 
Concentration on this issue would, first of all, have highlighted the EC regulators as a 
conservative body that had never, previously, been required to consider a proposal 
of this type. Given this information, how could the merger have been structured in 
order to address these concerns? In the event, the obstacle of size, rather than 
uniqueness, was focussed upon. Once the concerns of the EC regulators became 
obvious, more and more concessions were offered to pacify what was recognised, 
too late, as a risk adverse organisation. The merger was finally abandoned when 
EMI and Warner realised that the concessions effectively dismantled the vertical 
market that had been the appeal of the proposition in the first place.
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Where does all this lead?
Both future perfect thinking and requisite variety are retrospective activities, that is, 
they are potential inputs to a present state from which we try and create more 
meaningful decisions.
The apparent dilemma or contradiction we are now faced with is that attending to 
future perfect thinking tends to narrow the channel of input, whilst attending to 
requisite variety widens the channel of input -  suggesting an either/or model. 
Adaptive change creates an opportunity to accentuate prior enactment and draw 
attention to the physical world (this is the knowledge/language/symbols model we put 
in front of Weick’s ESR model). As adaptive change is a selected activity, it holds the 
potential for interventionist sensemaking through the processes of future perfect 
thinking or requisite variety when applied to the knowledge/language/symbols model. 
We now discuss how these concepts might be applied as part of the same process.
Sense dropping
We use the term ‘sense dropping’ as a play on the phrase the ‘penny dropping’. 
Certainly in the use of the English idiom, this phrase is simple and unambiguous. It 
also provides a useful interpretation of sensemaking.
Weick (2001) holds that requisite variety is an individual act but that non- 
homogenous groups within organisations can increase the level of variety to which 
organisations can be sensitive. This is fine but, if organisations recognise the need -  
under whatever name - for requisite variety, they also need to create situations where 
the ‘penny drops’ or, as we have said, ‘sense drops’ in order that such information 
can be used to redirect organisational activity. And, if the activity is to be noticed, the
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translation needs to be compelling. In the lead up to the Challenger disaster rocket 
manufacturers Morton Thiokol were unable to persuade NASA of the danger of flights 
at low temperatures yet, at the public inquiry when Richard Feynman dipped O-rings 
from the Challenger shuttle booster into liquid nitrogen, they shattered, leaving 
everyone in no doubt as to the effect of cold on the 0-rings. In our variation on 
Weick’s ESR model we suggest that adaptive change does not move through to 
enactment unless the sensemaking cycle is supported by the appropriate 
combination of language, symbols and knowledge (a compelling translation).
Daft & Wiginton (1979) argue that language; metaphors and patterns that connect 
are powerful conductors of requisite variety. This is the reason why we inserted 
language, symbols and knowledge into the percussive stage of our link to Weick’s 
ESR model. This is where we see ‘sense dropping’ and where organisations can 
process equivocal inputs by producing meanings that make sense to those who are 
required to enact them. Watzlawick et al (1974) describes this as ‘the gentle art of 
reframing’ meaning: -
' ...to change the conceptual and/or emotional setting or 
viewpoint in relation to which a situation is experienced 
and to place it in another frame which fits the “facts” of the 
same concrete situation equally well or even better.’
(p.95)
Denison et al (1995) suggest that the test of a first-rate leader is, the ability to exhibit 
contradictory or opposing behaviours while maintaining integrity, credibility and 
direction.
Sale (1980), Fox-Wolfgram et al (1998) take this notion further and suggest that it is 
not only individual leaders that may use such complexity; ‘organizations with high
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degrees of plasticity may be better able to do this and thus satisfy the multiple 
competing demands of their stakeholders’ (p. 122).
Sensemaking is a micro-social activity; complex thinking is an individual activity, yet 
both hold the possibility for organisational behaviour. Adaptive change is an 
opportunity for organisations to intervene in the individual sensemaking process - to 
prepare the way for individual meaning and enactment. Future perfect thinking and 
requisite variety are both models that organisations can use to complement their 
planning processes. Better still, organisations can choose to have different people 
engaged in different activities that follow separate thinking principles and combine 
the two streams of information. This pattern is followed by a number of organisations 
such as HP, IBM and Microsoft, who separate out their R&D departments in order 
that they use requisite variety and are unfettered by the past. Here we suggest that 
the output of organisational planning can be informed in much the same way.
Furthermore, we also suggest that in order to avoid the entrapment of either/or 
thinking, organisations and leaders can recognise the ‘relatively short time spans 
between act and reflection’ (Weick, 1995, p.29) to apply the concepts of future 
perfect thinking and requisite variety. This might go some way to addressing the 
apparent tightness of behaviour that appears somehow bound into operating in an 
either/or manner. EMI used requisite variety to break the mould -  future perfect 




Time Present Time FutureTime past
Figure 17.
At figure 17 we combine the concepts of future perfect thinking and requisite variety. 
Weick (1979, p. 42) cites Vickers (1967) in setting up the metaphoric conjunction of 
streams and organisational processes to suggest that they are both the result of 
converging, diverse flows moving at variable rates. The stream metaphor only serves 
us so far in that whilst, Vickers suggests we cannot step into the same river twice, 
the sensemaking model suggests that we do step into streams of activity twice; we 
step in to bracket activity, step out in order to reflect and consider and then step back 
in to re-apply. If we try and sustain the idea of fast streams of activity we conclude 
that there are relatively short time frames between activity and opportunity for 
reflection before we are into the next activity. The learning from this is that 
organisations do not need to wait until the organisational processes have run their 
course in order to reflect and re-apply the processes of future perfect thinking and 
requisite variety to the ongoing stream of activity, in the same way that responsible
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leaders may chose to complicate their own thinking and reflection by dipping their 
toes in rather more often than they may think necessary.
Sensegiving
Whetten, (1984) uses the phrase sensegiving illustrated in the process described by 




They take a view similar to ours that in times of organisational change, leaders have 
the opportunity to follow their own sensemaking by shaping the change input 
(sensegiving) for their organisation, that then undergoes its own sensemaking 
process (Figure 18, above). The notion of sensegiving is attractive to us as a 
summary of potential leadership intervention even though it may be considered part 
of the wider sensemaking process (so we are back to where we position the easel), 
however, we differ in a number of areas.
For Gioia & Chittipeddi the focus is upon strategic change, whilst we do not exclude 
strategic change from our own model, neither do we consider it appropriate to limit it
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to strategic change. Much of what we have seen of sensemaking and opportunity for 
leadership intervention has been at the more mundane level of organising and to 
exclude this activity would infer that such interventions only impacted through large- 
scale change initiatives. Quite often, as we saw with Parvin-May, the initiatives 
themselves can be the output of prior activity -  for us the earlier in the process that 
organisations can identify the opportunity for intervention the more chance they have 
of influencing the outcomes.
We spent some time breaking down the process following leadership sensemaking, 
and suggested the nature of meaning delivered to an organisation has to do with the 
process of noticing language/symbols/knowledge, aspects of which would need to be 
accentuated in order to influence the noticing process for the rest of the organisation. 
Gioia & Chittipeddi limit this activity to fitting the intended change into ‘some revised 
interpretive scheme or system of meaning’ following which it is disseminated to other 
stakeholders, typically through ‘symbols and symbolic action’ (p.434). How, or what 
these might be, or where they might be buried in the history of the organisation, are 
not explored. Furthermore, heavy emphasis is given to the role of the leader rather 
than what we prefer and suggest being the role of leadership, where ongoing 
negotiation of meaning fits more comfortably as a social activity. Support for this view 
is to be found with Weick (1993):-
‘any attempt to pinpoint the leader or to explain survival by 
looking at a single set of actions is doomed to failure 
because it does not reflect how needs change as a crisis 
unfolds, nor does it reflect how different coherent 
groupings form to meet the new needs.’
(p. 119)
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More importantly, the extent to which the sensegiving process may be modified is 
limited to the negotiations that take place between the leader and stakeholders after 
the proposed vision has been delivered to them.
The original abstract vision is likely to become more well 
defined and undergo some modification (at least 
concerning espoused manifestations of the vision or 
processes used to achieve it). After that, the CEO and the 
top management team can make some adjustments and 
then push for a concerted effort towards a realization of the 
vision by the organization’s stakeholders’
(p.434)
The model is limited to providing a generalised account of the intervention process 
available to leaders involved in strategic change. It does not attempt to explain how 
the sensegiving process in itself may limit the sensemaking process. ‘It is during the 
bursts of change that executives most need to act creatively rather than on the basis 
of experience and that perceptual errors may cause the greatest damage’ (Starbuck 
& Milliken, 1988, a, p42.) The model described relies upon subsequent negotiation 
with stakeholders to refine the organisation’s vision (change). Our view would be that 
by this stage leadership has already made its point and the response is likely to be 
as much about defining the leadership process (selection as it relates to previous 
leadership interventions), as about taking meaning from the content, let alone the 
extent to which negotiation will take place which will have a lot to do with context and 
style of the organisation. ‘In making sense, or attributing meaning to surprise, 
individuals rely on a number of inputs. Their past experiences with similar situations 
and surprises help them in coping with current situations’ (Louis, 1980, p. 247).
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Gioia & Chittipeddi contribute to the possibility that sensegiving may be a plausible 
extension to the sensemaking process at times of adaptive change. We may differ in 
the application of such a concept but it assists us to reconcile an active 
interventionist process. Sense dropping implies a passive activity grounded in the 
response to phenomena, sensegiving implies an active role [for leadership] but for us 
it is also a complex role, possibly too complex for the individual -  leader or 
otherwise. We are inclined towards thinking of organisational form that is able to sift 
through complex inputs -  by sharing out responsibility -  and produce manageable 
outputs that acknowledge the variable nature of continuity (future perfect thinking) 
and change (requisite variety). We leave Weick to summarise for us: -
The importance of complication is difficult to
overemphasize In the real world signs on relationships
can change, the swiftness with which an effect follows
activation of a cause is variable whatever additional
ways we can find to complicate observers should also be 
adopted’
(Weick, 1979, p.261)
As we conclude this work, we start to envisage how and where such thoughts and 
conversations may lead us next.
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Section 10:
Wiping down the easel: taking stock
'Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from 
here?' asked Alice. 'That depends a good deal on where 
you want to get to.'
(Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland)
Actors in organisations who seek to bring order and predictability to activity, face the 
ambiguity of Alice’s situation. If they are skilled and sufficiently attuned to the 
environment they helped create, some will realise where they have been, but few will 
know where they are going. Weick (1979) suggests that organisations cannot rely 
upon history and adapting to environments being handed down from generation to 
generation in order to know where they are going; the world is much too complex for 
that.
We are left to conclude the virtue [for the purposes of creative sensemaking] of 
organisations capable of complex, diverse thinking, with an ability to apply internal 
coherence through the application of simple but meaningful common values and 
beliefs. What Peters and Waterman (1982) describe as tight coupling on a handful of 
core values and loose coupling on everything else. As we wipe down our easel, clean 
up some of the paint and think of fresh canvases we think of new organisational 
settings that might further extend our thinking.
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Weick & Westley (2001) suggest that: -
‘...under-specification of structure encourages both 
heightened sensitivity to local conditions and continuous 
mutual adjustment as local learnings keep changing 
among interdependent individuals....and by flattening 
hierarchies to put more people closer to the action’
(p.443)
Further they state
‘...learning appears to be about repunctuating the 
continuous experience of the organization. To make this 
repunctuation even a possibility, organization must be 
reduced and doubt and curiosity must be cultivated’
(p.444).
'Centralization, tight coupling and prescribed steps prevent decentralized action’ 
(Perrow,1984, p. 10). This is not to impugn any particular style of organisation -  far 
from it we share Weick & Quinn’s (1999) view that this is secondary to the way 
people organise their activity:
‘Successful firms did not rely upon either a purely 
mechanistic or purely organic process and structure.
Instead, successful firms had well-defined managerial 
responsibilities and clear project priorities while also 
allowing the design processes to be highly flexible, 
improvisational, and continuously changing’
(p.371)
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It is intended that the next stop on our journey will be to identify organisations able to 
balance tight and loose coupling in appropriate measure and examine how they 
respond to adaptive change. One that holds such possibilities has already taken our 
interest. AES, the American power generator mentioned earlier in this work. We have 
already outlined a highly successful business that operates on four explicit values: 
fairness, social responsibility, integrity and fun.
We have noted that the organisation avoids, wherever possible, the vestiges of 
hierarchy and focuses instead upon what we suggest might be viewed as a grown up 
or interdependent style of organisation, substituting responsibility for structure and 
driving down decision-making to local levels. It operates a business model best 
described as ‘informed opportunism’ (Waterman, 1987), the acquiring of as much 
information as possible, which helps organisational members to recognise 
opportunities as they come along through local networking, then using the experience 
of managers spread throughout the world to secure them. Those at AES do not 
always appear to have know -how, but they set about finding out, and this applies as 
much to new engineers, raising capital funding of £10 million for a new gas turbine, as 
it does to taking over an existing power plant in Brazil. ‘An adequate solution will only 
be found through the active and open experimentation of the participants themselves’ 
(Boland, 1984).
Having gained business by opening up the organisation to recognise and take 
advantage of opportunities, it then applies a high degree of planning to deliver the 
complexity associated with the design and commissioning of a new power station. 
Even more intriguing is the knowledge that AES does not always start with a ‘green 
field’ site; it will often take over an existing operation and then apply its own business 
principles. Initiating a modern power station with a new, highly skilled and carefully 
selected staff at Medway in Kent is one thing, taking over a power station in Northern
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Ireland or a coal mine in Kazakhstan with well established work forces is quite 
another. How AES delivers adaptive change to these environments and whether they 
walk their talk is a study for another day.
As we wipe away splashed paint we reflect upon indelible trace impressions left, not 
on the canvases, but on our easel, around the canvases. Our journey started with a 
focus on a specific phenomenon -  the outsourcing and de-layering of staff from 
organisations, and the reactions of those left behind. This focus shifted to the 
response to adaptive change in novel situations and the way in which the people 
interpreted such changes, leading us to the work of Karl Weick and the sensemaking 
model. Had we known how long and difficult the journey would be we may never 
have started, but we did, moving through the input of adaptive change, interpretation 
through the sensemaking model and finally to the suggestion of selective intervention 
by leadership.
Child (1997), in his discussions on strategic choice, suggests that today it is more 
appropriate for theorising to engage with those who would ‘deconstruct 
organizational life down to the untrammelled actions of sense-making individuals’ 
(p.72), however, as our work has established organisational change also requires us 
to understand the social nature of sensemaking especially if we are to apply the 
concepts of requisite variety and future perfect thinking that must be viewed as 
collective accomplishments (Orton, 1988).
We take three clues from this; firstly, that organisational change is about the 
interactions of people -  structures being a social construction of people. Secondly, in 
order to understand the processes of adaptive change, we need to understand how 
people make sense of such change and, thirdly, in order to do so we need to take 
heed of those who unpick how people in organisations create shared meaning and
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write in the arena of sensemaking. Cummings (1996) suggests that Weick, Frost, 
March, et al, are still categorised as operating in the margins rather than the 
mainstream of organisational research (p.262). If the mainstream is where the action 
is (in terms of wide appreciation) then this seems a shame (and a loss) because ‘a lot 
of the most interesting things in life seem to lie on the boundaries’ (Colville, 1994, 
p.218). If it is possible to learn from the processing of the sensemaking model and 
apply this to organisations undergoing adaptive change, we need consider how this 
might be brought about or rather who might bring this about.
Heifetz & Laurie (1997) see the role of mobilising people for adaptive change as the 
responsibility of leadership that needs to steer their people and themselves through 
the process of breaking long standing patterns of behaviour, often rooted in deeply 
held values and beliefs. However, they go further and suggest that this is best 
achieved through the collective sensemaking of their people. In essence leadership 
sets the pattern that we might describe as the clarification process of 
knowledge/language/symbols and then the collective sensemaking must take its 
course. Accentuating the point that the best sensemaking frameworks are those that 
recognise the inevitability of distortions and the most beneficial errors are often the 
most surprising ones.
Weick (2001) makes the point that the role of sensemakers is to convert experience 
into an intelligible world. Not to look for the one true picture that corresponds to a pre­
existing, preformed reality (p.9).
To make sense of complex change people need to 
intervene and enact in the interest of simplification: they 
need to tell stories, value imagination, and use rich 
communication media in the interest of complication: and 
they need to encourage collective mindfulness through
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teams and networks in the interest of both simplification 
and complication.’
(2001, p.306)
The task of leadership to bring about adaptive change in the contexts we have 
painted, is difficult; bringing about adaptive change -  as planned - is doubly difficult, 
especially when the assumption cannot be made that individuals will, necessarily, 
see or share the benefits of such a process.
Art: a final impression of leadership
Harper (1987) brings us back to our root metaphor of art by describing sensemaking 
‘as sculpting done by a clever bricoleur1 (p. 13). For bricoleur we think of the artist (or 
artisan) who improvises, using whatever materials come to hand (Levi-Strauss, 
1966). We have set up our easel and painted scenes from new empirical settings 
from different perspectives, as we have layered detail we have emphasised different 
aspects of organising, moving between foregrounds and backgrounds, taking the 
school of sensemaking across and onto different canvases. In the abstract, at least, 
we have had to re-position our easel, as ontological oscillation, to consider different 
interpretations of the same activity.
Our conclusion has been that there is no one simple perspective capable of capturing 
the intensity of the activity we witnessed. In the practical world it may not be possible 
to merge perspectives but in the theoretical world it can. However, as the abstract of 
changing position of our easel has forced us to evolve the common-sense 
observations of day to day life through the levels of common-sense of a high order 
now we must return to the common-sense messages this work has for leadership.
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The learning we take has as much to do with our methodology as it does the 
substance of this thesis, put another way the walk was as important as where we 
were going. If we had to move our easel from one location to another in order to take 
different impressions of the same activity, gain understanding from the gaps between 
the canvases (characterised by surprise, shock, puzzlement and anger), then our 
message for leaders is that they too must find ways of seeing between the gaps, 
working in the abstract, asking 'what is happening here?’ and reach their own 
conclusions.
Adaptive change entails leadership engaging requisite variety and future perfect 
thinking as different perspectives within the same process of abstraction, to lift their 
own easel, reposition and consider alternative views, then and only then should they 
return to the grounded nature of common-sense-giving by selecting and displaying a 
canvas (from the collection they have created) that creates a compelling, clear, and 
so far as is possible, unfettered meaning for their people. Where rapid transformation 
is required this may entail a complex synthesis of different images, where incremental 
change is required simple images may be displayed and allowed to build sequentially. 
Thereafter they, like us, must rely upon the sensemaking processes of their audience 
to take effect.
One of the purposes of this thesis has been to answer issues raised about the 
empirical settings chosen by Weick as exemplars of the sensemaking process (see 
Kilduff, 1996, section 2). Van Maanen took this point a stage further by suggesting, in 
conversation to Weick, that he was a ‘virtual ethnographer^ (using third-party views 
to paint his scenes). We have a different interpretation with which to close our 
account.
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Since 1969, Weick has taken his own easel and located it in different empirical 
settings, as with any great artist he has developed a style for which he is best known
-  the school of sensemaking. He has grown familiar with the range of colours and the 
type of strokes best suited to his style, his brushes and easel provide familiar comfort
-  they are the tools of his trade, but we suggest they are more than this. As Weick 
completes one canvas and prepares the next -  he too is left with indelible layers 
where, over the years, unused words and ideas have gathered between the 
canvasses. Paint splashed on his easel in the abstract of emerging conceptual 
frameworks from which he differentiates and links the physical world of the past (as 
canvases) with metaphysical future orientated knowledge development (as theories) 
that move us sufficiently that we might, occasionally, leap before we look and fix 
things before they break.
The compact causal structures that epitomize our 
theories are artefacts of retrospect rather than narratives 
of prospect. And that is part of the reason those theories 
fail to move us. Theorists who are able to narrow the gap 
between the present-to-hand stance of the spectator and 
the ready-to-hand stance of the agent, are more likely to 
generate work that is judged to be moving’
(Weick, p. 135,1999, emphasis added)
Weick holds our attention by displaying compelling images painted on large 
canvasses, once he has our attention he conducts a retrospect of life understood 
backwards using his interpretation of the gaps in order to return us to the mundane 
nature of a world lived forward. Weick, like us, may realise in the common-sense of 
the physical world it is literally impossible to be in two (or three) places at the same 
time, however, living forward is about connecting with the plausibility of action. For 
Weick this entails people looking between the gaps and using abstract reasoning;
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simultaneously general, simple and accurate (ibid, p. 136), for us it entails leadership 
merging requisite variety and future perfect thinking; tools of the process that is 
sensemaking.
Notes
1: the term 'private banking' refers to the client base of a bank or department within a bank; it does not refer to 
whether the status of the company is as a private limited company or public limited company.
2: question put to Weick in doctoral seminar at Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Boston 1997
3: now that our journey has ended we suggest that Weick, given the environment in which the question was put, 
could hardly have responded differently -  especially if the reply might otherwise have been as complex as we have 
proposed in section 10.
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APPENDIX A
Results of Discussions from 
Parvin-May Strategy Weekend 1997
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SESSION 1
Identify and present to the main group the specific issues which you wish to address and find solutions 
to during this weekend.
GROUPS - constitution of the working groups for each session - see Appendix 1
Group A 
Presenter: 1‘
Identified three areas of concern which require improvement:
Growth
Bank is growing and needs to continue to grow. Need to co-ordinate marketing strategy, maybe 
identify marketing team, develop relationship with outside sources. New ideas can be put directly to 
the team.
Cross selling of products has improved, but should continue.
Important to identify who are customers are, ensure existing clients who under served receive a better 
service.
One of the best areas for new ideas is to steal them from other organisations. Should keep an eye on 
other banks and institutions to see what they are doing.
Profitab ility
Profit motive is very important. Should not go unnoticed that our main motive is to make money. 
R eturn on capital is fairly poor, should be improved.
Pricing - profitability is not essential from day 1 but products have to generate profit as they develop.
Very competitive m arket - how do we continue to generate more business and get the best margins we 
can?
IT - one area for improving profitability would be greater standardisation within Investment and Trust 
departments - improved systems, better quality, generate more profits.
Stability
Staffing is fine in front offices, but in back office operations it has improved but we still have a 
considerable turnover.
Do not underestimate the importance of back office. Need to motivate them more - training, job 
rotation.
Emphasise communication between departments.
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Group D
Presenter: '  •
M arketing and PR
Not much at the moment. Believe it is important - name awareness has improved, but need that 
function to be more focused.
Database will be important for marketing and PR
Product development
How can we free up the time of key people to devote more time to marketing and PR.
Consider central marketing and PR budget - not decided by individual departments.
Remuneration within the bank
How improved profitability is shared around.
Difficulty of holding onto good back office staff
Consider other organisations of similar size, see what they do there.
Group B
Presenter: r+
Corporate culture  
How do we develop it
W hat sort of culture do we want to see - flexibility, fast responses, rigorous professionalism, customer 
service, internal co-operation, preserve lack of political infighting.
How do we grow the business
Focus on size and shape of the balance sheet for the future, how do we want that to develop
Ivylyn in the group - discussed different type of client Bahamian trust operation can attract.
How that can be accommodated within an organisation not used to seeing customers of that type






Although mission statement presented today is quite useful, it would be more helpful to come out with a 
limited num ber of very specific objectives - a defined focus on where the group is going
Look again at product range - what are we trying to provide our target market with.
Organisational structure
M anagement structure - only a limited number of people here can have a strategic input into where 
the business is going. Difficult last year for people to have much impact because they were 
concentrating on their jobs.
We want to improve things, but need a system to ensure we can push the business forward, involving 
everyone in the management of the business.
Interdepartm ental and inter-office co-operation - has been improved, long way to go. e.g. lots of 
London staff who have never been to Guernsey.
Dealing with customers
How do we get new customers. Who are they, what should we be doing to get them.
Cross selling - interdepartmental and inter-office relationships, Find if you know what people are 
doing, but we need a structure for selling services to other customers of the group.
No marketing strategy - marketing has been ad hoc, needs to have a defined structure.
Concentrating on key customers - 80/20 principle. We should be discussing ways of focusing on 
customers who are important in terms of income generation.
Space requirement fo r the group 
London lease expires in two years.
Where will we go
How many staff will we have








1 2 3 4 Totals
1 MARKETING/SALES 1 3 1 1 6
5 CLIENT CARE 2 4 3 5 14
2 PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 1 8 1 2 12
3 STRATEGY 5 1 2 5 13
6 STABILITY/STAFF ISSUES/MGMT 
STRUCTURE
3 4 3 4 14
7 I.T. 2 5 3 5 15
8 COMMUNICATION 3 6 4 3 16
9 CORPORATE CULTURE 4 9 2 5 20
10 PROFITABILITY 4 10 2 5 32
4 ADMINISTRATION 2 4 3 4 13
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SESSION 3










Procurement of new clients
Increasing share of the wallet by cross selling, up selling
Increased responsibility for sales, by capable of selling group products
Clear co-ordination between business locations - a strategy recognised by all units




Define marketing - what we are going to sell 
who will we target 
why, where and how to do it
Identified some of the problems - in particular London/Guernsey felt there was no one responsible or 
dedicated to marketing, no team or committee in place. No consistent advertising policy 
Bahamas have and
London/Guernsey felt they needed a marketer, someone who has power, who will be given a budget.
Training - understanding and selling the business. Done on an ad hoc basis. Need to receive adequate 
training for people who are dealing 1:1 with the prospect clients
Cross selling an issue - in particular for new business in diverse areas. How the group can work better 
as a team, introduce clients to other offices, integrate services.
In Bahamas time zone. South and North America, market name is not well known. Have to work much 
harder to be known and be visible. Need to add to the work of the brochure.




It is definitely something the discussion group cared about. Need to raise our name recognition in all of 
the geographical locations in which we operate.
Need to promote brand, logo in areas where we operate.
Do not wish to employee a new expert. Want to draw people from their existing jobs to do more
marketing - committee of 4 people + Bahamas on conference calls
2 x London - Investment and Banking
1 x Guernsey
1 x Financial Dynamics
Give committee a budget
Tell Financial Dynamics what we want them to do in terms of advertising, other promotions, trade 
stands, exhibitions.
Have publications ready in advance. Discuss with which newspapers, publications, sectors. Use 
their expertise.
+ draw on our knowledge of our customer base to ensure ~ work in the most appropriate directions. 
More co-ordinated and professional approach to advertising, control, use expertise.
Make more selective use of the IFA market. Use them more, bearing in mind their own profit motives. 
Make more use of Freepost facility - working well in London, give more name recognition.
Many of our best business successes have been opportunistic.





we could quite easily identify the staff that have client contact and those that do not. Bring in 
training for those that do, others will pick up a similar culture - greater general awareness of 
client culture.
Staff training - those in touch with clients at various levels need different levels of knowledge 
about the products.
Conflict between line responsibility and making time for selling. Have to commit to a marketing 
exercise - say a week of marketing - plan proactively
How do you monitor marketing? - not sure if control of marketing is different from other 
functions. Line managers have responsibility for developing new and controlling existing 
business.
+ someone from a staff function f- to take a general overview.
Are there people in your department who are better than others at marketing? Consensus was 
no, not really
Would you trust your colleagues to see intermediaries that you normally deal with - consensus 
was yes.
b) Customers
Use PERETO ratio - analyse customer base, keep in touch with clients come to end of loans or 
other projects, use entry products to get someone on the books and cross sell them.
Carry out annual review of the files for marketing opportunities 
Budget to maintain resource, allocate resources.
c) Intermediaries
Could easily bring in a database for intermediaries - make this priority database. Would 
probably maintain it as we have a vested interest.
Use as a tool when planning marketing activities.
d) Communication
If we have an effective E-mail communication would be much easier. Also gives evidence of 
instructions. Takes no time.
e) Advertising/PR 
Need a budget.
Strive to get more editorial 
Speaking at conferences.
CONSENSUS THAT WE NEED TO CREATE A RESOURCE 
How will it function?
W hat problems will it face?
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SESSION 4
Discuss marketing - look at mandate, activity/responsibility, resources/budget
Group C 
Presenter:
Mandate - 1 person - - role to be advisor, counsellor, coach. Responsible for co­
ordinating marketing effort.
Identify people to do more marketing than they currently do.
Set aside time specifically for marketing.
Line managers decide who is best suited.
Budget at departmental level for specific products, + central budget for group wide marketing.
Activity - 2 levels.
reporting to 
Individual marketers reporting to line managers
Annual plan created by marketing person, quarterly report including feedback and identifying budgets. 
Marketer would probably need assistance - a finisher.
Responsible for the database, keeping database up to date, chasing individual marketers, ensuring two 
people within organisation are not chasing the same client.
Group A 
Presenter:
The marketing “thing” - the Ministry of Revenue Procurement 
Separate from sales
Objective is to enhance profitability of the group.
Mandate - to co-ordinate and develop the marketing strategy.
Activity - reports to board.
cannot impose its will on departments, should be guiding and highlight targets within overall 
strategy
Responsibility for advertising and PR for the whole group.
Targets markets and motivates individual teams within individual departments.
Analyses database, information for database provided by individual departments.
Resources - need time to do this.
Budget - analyse the existing budget, fix a ceiling, analyse the impact of marketing.
Marketing needs support, is very important to the group. Should stretch our wings, take a flyer on the 
budget, spend a little to achieve results.
The body - AO type role rather than Director. Body of AO-> chaired by secretary - he
would take the oest minutes.




Separate the marketing function from sales.
SALES - much easier to deal with - mandate remains with the director of the department. Allocation of 
resources and responsibilities from the line manager, through director up to the board.
Need more resources for selling, free up a bit of time, line manager needs more support - maybe some 
junior support.
Additional personnel, training to hone what they are aiming at and to make sure it is effective.
MARKETING - Promotion of ' via products and services, gaining a proper understanding of the 
markets in which we operate.
1 person, existing, from within the organisation •
acts as a focus for product ideas, co-ordination, market ideas from feedback, 
reports directly to
Resources - call on line managers, better communication through that forum.
Budget allocated as the function builds. How much do you want to promote the bank, do we do it 
through advertising or through products against departmental budgets.
Group B 
Presenter:
Sales and marketing - 2 different functions.
SALES - common agreement that sales time should lie with existing staff. Need to free up their time by 
taking on additional support, allocating specific time to sales. All experts in their fields, but need time 
and training to achieve successful sales.
Activity remains within the departments.
Resources to be determined departmentally 
Keep ownership within the departments.
MARKETING - Considered - decided no.
Function should know its strategic targets, should have a group role co-ordinating making decisions on 
what products are attractive, who whom they would be attractive.
Think an individual taking responsibility is the right way to go, accountable to the board.
Marketing person there to provide input and assistance to the sales people.
Dedicated full time employee in that role - consider internal candidates.
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CONCLUSION
AGREED TO ESTABLISH A WORKING PARTY, TO COMPRISE 
Chair
ADs nominated by directors of banking, investment and Guernsey - 1 each. 
Nominations and first meeting to take place by end of September.
Proposal completed by 31st December 1997.
Mandate of working party: to define the mandate of the marketing function, 
e-g.
Identify specific jobs that need to be done
Identify the support and resources needed for the longer term.
SESSION 5
DISCUSS PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 
Not looking at specific product ideas
Consider how we are going to go about identifying what those products are 
Should products be departmentalised
Group D 
Presenter:
Group felt very strongly that product development should be done in house.
Believes linkage between departments in London is quite good, not necessarily that strong with other 
offices.
Product development is currently a bit departmentalised.
Bahamas - ' 7  explained nature of Bahamas business to the working group, huge interest in mutual
funds.
. i *>-. r... could have potential in Bahamas. Also some Bahamian clients could create an 
investment portfolio but this is a big jump from deposit client to investment portfolio - takes a lot of 
work to achieve the psychology.
Guernsey- -ly felt 7 • . had a lot of potential.
Andy felt the way forward in Guernsey is to look for clients with comparatively high net worth, create a 
straight investment portfolio and scope for other investment products.
Banking products - London and Guernsey. General feeling that we have a good range, highly 
competitive market, have to keep up with the action, very much strategy to remain very competitive, 
and to facilitate other areas to benefit from the deposit base.
Investment London - have had considerable benefit from the banking products. Still working on
' also has scope for development.
Generally felt that communication could be enhanced and that literature used has made significant 
advances during 1997, but has more scope for improvement.
In summary, do not want to sound complacent, but not aware of any yawning gaps, but need to keep 






Need to develop entry level products, target clients, increase the bank’s profile.
Need for a good product base 
Need for longer term products.
Cross functional products - had one that operated with limited success and used a lot of resource.
Products should have direct links to the group strategy.
Important to decide what we do not want to develop - what are bad products.
Products ought to be cheap and easy to deliver, kept simple to have the maximum impact.
Try and make products a whole service, not labour and resource intensive.
Discussed the use of outside contracting, felt we could lose control
In summary - need clear direction from the Group in planning products, 
products should not be too complicated 
need departmental integration




Felt that new products should mainly be developed in response to market requirements - clients 
suggestions.
Also consider suggestions from staff.
A potential new product was found by accident because of a service done for a client which could have 
been developed for others.
Spy on competitors. Identify what we might be able to use, what would help us compete.
felt that a when new product was suggested within a department, it ought to be discussed informally 
at director level to ensure all departments had an input. Then put to the board.
Look again at specific client situations - sometimes we can identify particular needs for certain clients, 
might be worth doing for high value client.
Look at new markets further afield that might be worth developing, possibly using our existing 




Purpose of the product is all important - consider strategy - producing products for liquidity
consider opportunities where we can do something to make 
money because there is a need in the market.
Design - ideas from departments, possibly external ideas for distribution, marketing, maybe use external 
expertise.
Implementation - how do we promote products - maybe have to sell harder than in the past - involve the 
marketing function.
Keep a library of competitors products- marketing function
Develop products on cross departmental basis, London/Guernsey co-ordination definitely needed, 
particularly in product development. Need to work more closely together.
There should be room for a review of the existing products, for enhancements and rationalisation or 
elimination of some products.
COMMON ISSUES:
BRAINSTORM ON PRODUCTS 
USE THE MARKETING FUNCTION
DISCUSSION OF NEW PRODUCT IDEAS AT DIRECTOR LEVEL
NEXT ISSUE:
How do we take this forward?
e.g. who is going to look at concept of new products.
Need for assessment of risk
Agreed new products do not have a forum for approval - this would ensure information is disseminated 
- cross departmental information sharing.
Agreement that the marketing working party should also consider the issue of cross departmental 
product development, and to consider a forum for discussion and development of ideas.
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FEEDBACK ON SATURDAY
There was general consensus on how we should be moving forward, with different views on 
implementation.
It is good to work to conclusions and identify how we would develop from here.
Good ideas coming out
Would not have been effective with just two people sitting and discussing 
Like the intention to involve ADs more
Lack of communication is not through lack of willingness, but rather through lack of a forum
Very important that ADs have input after this weekend, that it does not stop, continue to be involved in 
strategy
Very informative experience, going through the process of accepting other ideas and points of view, 
presenting coherent results, getting consensus.
Only forum attended where everyone has made a contribution.
“Can do” group, very few “motherhood” statements.




- essential to define where we are and where we are going, before we can determine how
to get there.
Need a strategy statement, then we can start to look at how we reach it.
Individuals within the organisation need to know what the statement is to enable them to identify targets 
specifically aimed at achieving the strategy.
Need to the statement to be flexible.




OUR AIM IS TO DEVELOP A PROFITABLE INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE BANKING BUSINESS 
W ITH A SUBSTANTIAL CLIENT BASE AND A REPUTATION FOR HIGH QUALITY, 
PERSONALISED SERVICE.
THIS WILL BE ACHIEVED BY FOCUSING ON BANKING, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
AND TRUST SERVICES FOR INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR BUSINESSES; BY EMPLOYING THE 
RIGHT  PEOPLE AND BUILDING A STRONG TEAM CULTURE; BY UTILISING EFFICIENT 
SYSTEMS AND EXERCISING EFFECTIVE CONTROLS; AND THROUGH THE SPECIFIC 
MARKETING OF A SELECTED RANGE OF PRODUCTS.
Group B 
Presenter:
OUR AIM IS TO DEVELOP A VALUABLE PRIVATE BANKING BUSINESS BY DEVELOPING 
A SUBSTANTIAL CLIENT BASE AND BY HAVING THE HIGHEST INTERNATIONAL 
REPUTATION.
THIS WILL BE ACHIEVED BY FOCUSING ON BANKING, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
AND TRUST AND ADMINISTRATION SERVICES; BY EMPLOYING THE BEST PEOPLE AND 
BUILDING A CULTURE OF CO-OPERATION AND PROFESSIONALISM; BY THE DILIGENT  
MARKETING OF A RANGE OF ATTRACTIVE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES', AND BY HAVING 
EFFICIENT SYSTEMS AND EFFECTIVE CONTROLS.
Group C
Presenter: t
OUR AIM IS TO DEVELOP A SUCCESSFUL PRIVATE BANKING BUSINESS BY BUILDING A 
STRONG CLIENT BASE AND HAVING A HIGH  REPUTATION IN OUR VARIOUS LOCATIONS.
THIS WILL BE ACHIEVED BY FOCUSING ON INTEGRATED BANKING, INVESTMENT 
MANAGEMENT AND TRUST SERVICES/////; BY EMPLOYING THE BEST PEOPLE AND 
BUILDING A STRONG CO-OPERATIVE TEAM CULTURE; BY UTILISING THE LATEST 
TECHNOLOGY AND EXERCISING STRONG CONTROLS; AND THROUGH THE EFFECTIVE 
MARKETING OF A BROAD RANGE OF ATTRACTIVE PRODUCTS WITH A STRONG 




OUR AIM IS TO CONTINUE TO DEVELOP A DISTINCT PRIVATE BANKING BUSINESS 
OFFERING HIGH LEVELS OF CLIENT SERVICES AND RESPONSIVENESS TO CLIENT NEEDS.
WE WILL FOCUS ON SELLING BANKING, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND TRUST 
SERVICES ON AN INTERNATIONAL BASIS. TO DO THIS WE SHALL RECRUIT AND RETAIN 
APPROPRIATE STAFF AND WILL MOTIVATE THEM TO STAY. WE WILL WORK IN  A CO­
OPERATIVE MANNER WITHIN A WELL CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT.
THROUGH THIS WE WILL BUILD A VALUABLE BUSINESS FOR SHAREHOLDERS BY THE 
CAREFUL MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT AND PROFITABILITY.
DISCUSSION
Clarification of use of “valuable” in original draft. 
Clarification of international issues
First paragraph agreed
OUR AIM IS TO DEVELOP A VALUABLE INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE BANKING BUSINESS 
WITH A SUBSTANTIAL CLIENT BASE AND WITH THE HIGHEST REPUTATION.




Identify the target areas which we need to address in order to achieve this strategy.
Group A 
Presenter:
We should most fully exploit the potential of existing clients, particularly 40 Day Notice clients. 
Investment Management
Increase the funds under management in the Investment Department by 10% within 18 months - end of 
financial year 98/99. We need new money coming in.
Should actively promote the . ----- as an offshore fund. Target to unitise the
by 31 March 1998.
Develop charity and pension fund accounts of the size which we are used to handling.
W ork with to sell a package to the charity funds.
Create a simple product.
Develop a performance measurement standard suitable for those accounts.
Trust
Broaden the market through which sales are made - become more international
Endeavour to find a way of rewarding the intermediaries/accounts for giving us business, by giving 
business back to them in a fair and even manner, to promote the relationships.
Increase fee income by 10% by end of financial year 98/99
Banking
Develop the sale of FX services through the Group
Continue to build a deposit base but seek to enhance the margins where possible unless it will adversely
affect the building of the deposit
l.T.




Return on Capital should be principle measure of success, not share price.
Shareholders could achieve a risk free return in excess of 7% - we need to aim higher. Target 15% 
Return on Capital within 5 years.
Investment
Funds under management most important part of the Bank in terms of growth. That is where we need 
the push, good quality income. Currently £0.5B Target £2B under management within 5 years. 
Approximately 1% margin. Gross income £20M.
- - How fast does growth have to be?
Banking
Loan book now £88M - increase to £100M. 2% margin. 5 years net profit £1.5M 
Deposit base now £300M. Target £0.5B. 0.25% margin . 5 years net profit £0.5M 
Trust
Bahamas a growing business, currently at a loss. A valuable source of introductions.
Target - not to make a loss and introduce lots of valuable clients.
NET PROFIT BEFORE FREE CAPITAL £4M 
RETURN ON CAPITAL 15%+
GO FROM CURRENTLY 8/9% AND DEVELOP OVER 5 YEARS.
HOW DO WE ACHIEVE THAT?
CUSTOMER CARE - The Bloom Principle - pick up telephone on 3rd ring 
Customer visits 
Dealing with complaints 





Need to measure our improvement in return excluding what we can earn from the capital itself - look at 
the profit generated by the businesses we run.
Trust
Looking at Bahamas and Guernsey Trust combined - for end of financial year 99/2000 generate £2M 
per annum, profit attaching £400,000 in that year. 20% profit margin.
Investment
Grow funds under management - no constraints, no capital charge generated.
10-15% growth in funds under management per annum for 3 years on a Group basis.
Need to identify margin on funds under management. On new funds under management expect to earn 
a margin of 6.5%.
- that is a very realistic margin
Banking
Increase lending book by 10% per annum for 3 years.
That area has some liquidity and capital constraints, and large exposure constraints.
Target for longer term deposits - like Millennium Account.
Target to achieve an average length of deposit book so it can be used for lending.
We could do more loans, we are constrained by opportunity and run o ff o f existing loans 
rather than other issues. Lengthening o f deposit base is happening.
Group C 
Presenter:
Looked at critical mass of the various parts of the business. Considered Return on Capital rather than 
share price.
Return on Capital best improved through organic growth rather than acquisition at this time.
Investment
Increasing margins, examining returns on cash deposits.
Gave to justify any increases in margins, by improving service, by training, by admin service and by 
l.T.
Banking
Build the balance sheet because it gives good signals to clients in all aspects of the business, but not 
forgetting reciprocity.




Very good weekend. Presented again an opportunity for senior people to get together.
Some of the issues are now concrete and hopefully something will come out of it.
Quite a steep learning curve, about colleagues and the business areas.
Greater involvement of ADs moving forward a very positive and hopeful thing.
. - really learned a lot, invaluable experience. Can appreciate as a Group much better, better
understanding of the business, have met a lot of talent in this room, can see common goals and unity in 
everyone wanting to see the Group move ahead. Made some very important points and hopefully 
Bahamas office will now be seen as a part of the team effort.
CLOSE
Looked again at the purposes of the weekend.
To get to know each other - feel we know each other a great deal better.
Develop team work and a strong common culture - have been dealing with very knotty problems, have 
been able to deal with them very effectively and with agreement about how we are going to go forward 
in marketing, product development and strategy. Demonstrates strong team culture.
Iron out any misunderstandings - interesting and severe differences of opinion have come out and been 
aired and dealt with.
Develop and fast forward plans and appreciate our strengths - we have a mission to deal with the three 
important issues. The ability to do that was only created by using this weekend arrangement.
To have an interesting and enjoyable time - interesting, enjoyable and absolutely exhausting time.
I believe we have done what we came to do as far as the overall purpose of the strategy weekend is
concerned.
A strong sense in the beginning that we wanted to end up with a concrete achievements - we have 
agreed:
1) To set up a working party chaired by including . '  and three ADs, to develop a 
mechanism to co-ordinate and promote group marketing.
2) Same mechanism would be used as the forum to ensure full information flow and proper 
development of a product span across the group.
3) That mechanism has to have dedicated resources
4) These issues would be dealt with by the end of the year.
A lso:
' will write a revised statement of group strategy for internal purposes.
The first paragraph has been agreed.
The rest of the statement will take into account the various comments made by the four groups.
To be complete by end of October 1997
As part of that we need to articulate what is meant by value.
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It is interesting looking at the two weekends and speculating on what the next one will look like.
We started last year with a rather unspecific aim. Now tightened up and tightened up some of the 
mechanisms that will help us achieve it.
NOW we are talking about other departments - looking for very big growth
own departments - very little growth
It shows there is a discontinuity between our sense of how fast we need to grow and the reality of 
achieving that within departments.
Between now and next time -
have to get to grips with how fast we have to grow.
will create a business plan and identify required Return on Capital
then have to continue to achieve that Return on Capital.
determine how fast the business has to grow and what we need to do to achieve that growth.
Next time we meet - within one year - it will be about identifying what changes we have to make to the 




Saturday 26th September 1998
Colin Smart presented a review of decisions made at last year’s Strategy weekend, 
and progress during the year.
Decisions were made to:
1) Set up Group Marketing Forum -  the committee met very soon after the last 
Weekend.
Began to put marketing into practice. Needed resource. Believe it has been 
successful in its aims.
2) To have a specific marketing resource -  was slow in arriving, but AA now with 
us
PR has improved considerably particularly within UK.
Still working on a stock advertisement.
Have run two very successful seminars 
Other seminars on the horizon.
Forum is now beginning to co-ordinate product development.
Group Gold Card on the back burner.
Have begun to put resources into research and products.
Currently discussing Group database.
Criticisms:
Failed to properly disseminate information within the Group -  need a flow of 
information from the Marketing committee and back to the committee.
Summary:
Fell it is a worthwhile move in the right direction.
Discussions of lessons to be learned for the future:
CS -  we now have the resource we lack. Product X needed resource. Some of the 
other issues are starting to move ahead.
RC -  What is the mandate of the forum?
CS -  Primarily to discuss ideas, identify which are worth pursuing, identify a resource 
to move them forward. Information flow and correct resource very important.
JR -  Does the forum have authority to make decisions about which products will be 
developed? Where is the influence from back office?
CS -  Yes, it does have that authority. Have not yet taken any projects forward to 
conclusion but will be able to now we have the resource. CS sponsoring first major 
product -  Gold card. Expect to see results in 2-3 months time. Timetable will be 
circulated.
JB -  need input from other departments
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SC -  are you happy with the composition of the committee? Should it be alternated? 
Should it collect ideas before the meetings to disseminate information afterwards?
CS -  Should have a stable membership. Should be more information flow.
SC -  do people have enough time to do it properly?
CS -  they have time for the input. Involvement in projects will need AA’s support.
JC -  all marketing ideas have to be accepted by the relevant departments. We have 
not devolved marketing responsibility to the marketing committee -  should come up 
with our own ideas and feed to the committee and various departments.
SC -  our sources of business are very good. Start up of the database was poor. Is 
the database top of the list?
CS -  one of AA’s current projects is the improvement of the database. She is 
designing a questionnaire to assist with improving, managing and maintaining the 
database.
RC -  is your role in sponsoring the Gold cart continent on being a member of the 
forum?
PS -  membership of the forum is flexible -  MB for enterprise account.
PB/CS/JP -  individuals should attend the forum as required to sponsor and promote 
their ideas.
SC -  conference call in the other locations.
CS -  Guernsey attend, + JB whenever possible.
JB -  marketing committee now has a good administrator. Now needs to decide how 
to disseminate information.
SC -  two seminars were a great success. Needs plans to follow them up.
CS -  Bank seminar not specifically followed up. Have opened some bank 
accounts.
Budget seminar -  another to be run next March.
Also considering a seminar on property lending for lawyers, surveyors
RC -  would like more narrative style of minutes.
CW -  particularly useful for non-members.
PB -  non-members need to know dates for next meeting.
PF -  what about areas of the bank that are not represented on the committee?
AG -  need wider flow of information, more detail in the minutes.
JC -  identify topics in the minutes that are interested -  follow them up. We know that 
it is not happening at present.
JS -  more detail in the minutes would help.
CS -  we can address that.
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AC presentation
SC -  is it you expectation that we achieve these targets with the present 3 operations 
and types of business, or by growth or acquisition?
AC -  through the present arrangement No expectation that we will take on 
acquisitions or other lines of business at present Until we are achieving our targets 
we cannot justify new lines of business.
PB -  I believe we have been relatively cautious. Maybe not so profitable because of 
that. Need a balance between caution and profit. Committed to profit. Concerned 
about effects of the recession. 14% growth in revenue -  if we try and over-expand 
going into recession we could make less profit.
AC -  believe growth targets require us just to do what we do, and do it well. Sources 
of business which could be developed. Believe we could get revenue growth from 
tapping into what is around us. It will not be a straight line 14%. You can have a 
good recession and come out stronger than competitors.
CS -  we might be better placed to exploit a recession than others are.
PS -  how many people in employment in 2004?
AC -  have presented a very simple model. If we hire more people they must deliver 
revenue growth. Need to look at organic growth. Possibly too small now -  need a 
little spare, extra resource. Spend time on development. Maybe a 20%-30% growth 
in people. Best way to develop is to identify a model to produce return on capital with 
smallest number of people.
JC -  Do you accept that different areas of the business at are different stages in their 
development, therefore growth rate across the group will vary?
AC -  I agree. Emphasised the importance of revenue growth around the group.
JR -  We could increase profits by reducing costs. Do you feel we can do what we 
are doing more efficiently?
AC -  I believe we will see expenses grow 7.5% - 8.5%. Do not believe it will be 
reasonable long term to expect them not to grow. Have to concentrate on revenue 
growth.
SC -  We manage our costs better than any other organisation I have been in. We do 
not manage our top line very well. If we partners with no salary but sharing of the 
profits, this weekend would be very different. We are not hungry enough.
AC -  I agree. In order to achieve this we have to give up some comfort. Look at 
customer -  we need to make more money from them. Not comfortable -  putting the 
price up is very uncomfortable.
RM -  It can lead to less business
AC -  The skill is in dealing with that issue. Every person in the organisation has 
responsibility to keep the customers coming in and optimising revenue from them -  
not just putting the price up. Combination of performance, customer service, quality 
of product.
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JC -  Sense is that profitability is getting more customers through the door. Deposit 
base is ready to move towards higher profits. In some areas need more time and 
resource to increase the amount of business.
PB -  Can fall into a cosy relationship, and forget to follow up opportunities to get 
more business from the client -  should be taking those opportunities.
AC -  The presentation was not a to do list. Simply identifying the issue. We have to 
find the solution.
Want you to have a sense of urgency over this. 2004 will come quickly. We 
have to find the solution.
We need to succeed - 1 believe success is about profit.
Need to get our minds around what we have to do to get the profits in.
RC -  Will we be talking about incentives and how to become a stakeholder in the 
business?
AC -  ROC of 6% leaves the staff with nothing. This is not therefore about incentives. 
This is about how we practically do this.
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11.30 In Groups: a) What are the implications of Arthur’s presentation?











Urgency and necessity of profit growth -  has to be the focus of everyone in 
the organisation going forward 
Better use of resources Contacts
Customers 
Skills of staff 
Interna! staff relationships 
Customer focussed -  retaining, communicating with, attracting.
Prioritising customer service.
Staff motivation -  getting people to buy in to ideas in order to achieve share 
growth and higher bonuses on the way. Have to be less comfortable in the 
way we run the business. Not always easy.
Main implication of AC leaving the room -  IT IS UP TO US if the organisation 
is going to succeed.
2
1) Responsibility -  lies with us to drive through profitability. With it
comes activity.
2) Commitment -  you have to believe in the purpose of it.
3) Introspection -  need a period of introspection to achieve that.
4) Initiative -  examining what we are doing, initiative for growing the
business.
5) Innovation -  new products.
6) Communication -  Group exercise, need to communicate group 
wide/departmentally.
7) Confidence -  AC very confident that we can achieve this.
8) £20 per share by 2004 -  we will all need to work hard for that.
3
1) Shareholder impatience
Need to change behaviour immediately
2) Better cross selling
More PM products sold
Interdepartmental understanding of products, and co-operation
3) Profits increased by:
Recruiting more customers 
Higher charges (mixed views)
4) Internal charging culture (charge for all services)
5) Less time spent on non-revenue generating activities
6) Coming out of the comfort zone
4
Pleased with what was said focus on profit was welcome
clear target to achieve
Concerns Have we got the right structure
Can we keep the good staff -  reward, 
career structures.
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Culture issues Client service, each other -  both very 
‘nice’ -  should it be so
Communication issues Important. Wider access
b) Has Arthur left to allow us to speak more freely -  is that true -  is that 
desirable. To achieve targets -  you cannot have responsibility without 
authority. There has to be some devolving of power within the organisation. 
Do we have empowerment?
JW -  What does all this mean in practice?
MH -  What are the implications of not achieving those targets?
People leave
Shareholder dissatisfaction -  sale of Bank -  bye bye PM
CM -  is it negotiable? -  no
AC leaving the room -  not a dumping of responsibility but a statement that the 
expertise and answers lie here. He will always be a resource, but the action 
planning, doing, delivering is here.
Day 1 of AC’s vision starts here.
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Sunday 9.00 am
Power and Responsibility -  What stops you feeling the passion?
JB: NEDs are a waste of time and energy. There is a huge paper waste in the 
organisation.
PT -  is AC really serious about change?
JR -  there was ahuge change when SC and PS came in -  that lasted for 3 months -  
now its back to where it was.
PB -  AC may want to devolve thing, but do the people above him want to? -  is he 
restrained?
PS -  Share holdings -  there is no structure in place which will reward people who 
work hard.
MH -  Accountability -  if you sign off a project on time, you get a bonus, if not, you 
lose it, and you are held accountable.
PS -  There’s a grey area below AD level, a huge gap. How do people get an idea 
that there is somewhere for them to go? W e will lose our good young people. The 
need shares and a structure. The shareholders should dilute their share in the 
business in order to allow staff in. I don’t care whether already hugely wealthy 
people make more, I do care about us, and about all our staff who are good and work 
hard.
PB -  AC is very keen to make a profit, but he is part of the culture of caution.
JC -  we took on 2,000 new clients -  that is progress.
JP -  2,000 new clients is worthless if we don’t convert them.
PF -  Did we plan ahead for those new clients -  we have to learn from that 
SC -  Is there a lack of initiative/motivation -  why hasn’t the conversion happened? 
CM -  You have been told that the resources are there to ‘do’ what needs doing -  
why was nothing done?
JE -  Because JC was not convinced that is the way to spend.
PF -  that’s back to power.
JC -  I’m faced with choices -  do I spend 20 thousand on a new staff member, or do 
we carry on as we are. There are constraints -  profit from banking has been 
invested in other areas of the bank, I’m not able to invest banking profits in the 
infrastructure of the banking department.
CS -  I need to take ownership of the 2,000 clients and start processing them.
SC -  why do meetings in this bank start at 9.00 am -  in other places they start at 
5.00 pm and they go on until something is sorted out. Can’t we set up a group to 
look at strategic issues.
AC -  You talk about devolution of power -  you can’t devolve into a vacuum -  you 
don’t take it up.
MH -  If people don’t deliver they have to be accountable to Arthur.
AC -  That won’t get anywhere -  THIS group needs to make it clear to the person 
doing the task they wiM get the task done. Create a mechanism.
SC -  Create a vehicle to do it.




Mgmt group comprising representatives from each function 
Task: 1. Communication
2. Responsibility for delivering actions which lead to a 20% capital return
Group 2
An inner circle consisting of Arthur and senior management, with flexible membership 
from an outer circle made up of four sections: Banking, Investment Management, 
Guernsey, Bahamas
Group 3 -
Agree with Mgmt idea, but with separate responsibility for departmental projects 
being held by departments
Group 4
Harold felt that these ideas were very unfocussed, and wanted decisions on 
attendees, agenda, frequency of meetings.
James said that there had to be a mechanism to allow a person with an idea to 
attend the meeting
Into groups to firm up on these propositions
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Group 4
Call it the Revenue Committee
Agenda -  Generating projects with focus on profitability


















As above, location by location, otherwise it doesn’t involve the wider body of staff. 
Weekly is too frequent. Peter B thought Trust should be included, not necessarily 
Guernsey.
Group 2
Call it the Profit Committee 
Should be group wide
Group 1
Mission Statement
“To implement strategic direction by taking collective responsibility for delivering 
revenue related projects by effective prioritisation of resources and effective 




Adopt the mission statement











Guernsey Michael (by conference call)
Bahamas Derek (by conference call)




1. We are currently protected by the structure of shareholders, in particular HR
2. HR age -  he will retire at 70, and will not want to hold a large block of shares 
after that date.
3. Self determination comes from a perception that we are valuable (an 
expensive share price?). Which means that any buyer has to pay a 
substantial amount of goodwill. They will only pay substantial amounts of 
goodwill if they have the agreement of management.
4. The existing shareholder structure will be stable as long as we are seen to be 
making sufficient progress.
Valuable means (see strategic statement)
1. High profits, fashionable business and high PER.
2. High profits means high return on capital.
3. Private banking is fashionable.
4. High PER means consistent growth and high quality of earnings.
Return on capital
1. PM pre-tax return on equity in the March 1998 year was 6.8%.
2. Our pre-tax return on equity should be 20%. This comes from comparative 
return on equity with other successful financial services companies.
3. We have to achieve this be consistent growth (see high PER).
4. We have to achieve this within a reasonable length of time.
Timetable
1. We must have achieved this return on capital in the year ending March 2004.
2. Why? Because HR will be 70 then, and our current shareholder protection 
may run out.
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What do we have to do to do this?
1. Operating income must grow about 6% faster then operating expenditure i.e.
Low High
Investment Investment
Operating income growth p.a. 12.5% 14.0%
Operating expenditure growth p.a. 6.5% 8.5%
2. Our three year budgets show the following for the next three years:
Operating income growth p.a. 14.0%
Operating expenditure growth p.a. 8.3%
3. So we are on track to achieve the high investment model, however, we must 
achieve these income growth targets.
4. Is low investment an option if we do not achieve our income targets?
Low investment is not a sensible option





2. If we grow we have to reward our staff:-
a. Bonuses/incentives
b. Salaries/benefits
3. The costs of being in this business will also rise
a. Regulatory costs
4. We need to grow quickly to maintain the morale.
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We need to invest well and be efficient and careful
1. In order to ensure that this investment is used to grow the business, we need 
to ensure that we operate as efficiently as possible:-
a. Operate using efficient systems
b. Make the most out of each of our staff
c. Work well together to share resources and achieve economies of 
scale
d. Watch the pennies!
2. We cannot afford to make mistakes, as this will reduce the perceived quality 
of our business (reduce our PER), and reduce our confidence.
a. Build very strong discipline
b. Build very strong control structures
c. Ensure accountability
So how do we grow our income?
1. Keep our clients
2. Get more clients
3. Make more money from our existing clients
4. Client growth must be in all areas, and must take into account the following:-
a. Natural client turnover death/decay
b. Growth in capital intensive activities may be restricted by the 
availability of capital, and may therefore grow more slowly than 
average.
c. So non capital intensive activities must grow more quickly than the
average.
Keep our clients
1. Maintain and increase service levels
2. Maintain and improve our administration
3. Maintain and improve our performance
Grow our clients




2. Increase the number of opportunities to pitch for business
a. Greater name awareness
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b. More discipline in managing our external relationships
c. Keeping in touch with our intermediaries
d. Getting existing clients to bring in their friends
e. Making better use of the existing contacts of the Group
f. Be more pushy
3. Increase our hit rate when we pitch for business
a. Increase the quality of our presentation and selling skills
b. Well organised follow through
c. Be more pushy
Make more money from our existing clients
1. Price our services properly
a. Be more aggressive in putting our prices up
2. Cross sell other services
a. Gather more information about our clients in order to identify potential
requirements
b. Actively set up opportunities to introduce the opportunity
c. Be more pushy
July 1998
PARVIN-MAY PRESS RELEASE - APPENDIX D
11* July 2000
Parvin-May PLC
Henry Simme, Group Chairman
Stephen Reading, Group Chief Executive
EMBARGOED UNTIL 7.30AM 11th JULY 2000
PARVIN-MAY PLC
Parvin-May, the private banking group which provides banking, treasury, investment 
management and trust services to individuals and their businesses, announces:
Results For the Year Ended 31st March 2000
Highlights
•  Pre-tax profits up 20% to £2.724 million (1999: £2.271 million)
• Earnings per share increased by 21% to 37.7p (1999: 31.1p)
• Final dividend increased from 16.5p to 17.0p, increasing the total dividend for the 
year to 22.5p per share (1999: 21.5p per share)
• Revenues up by 20% to £13.5 million due to continuing strong growth in private 
banking business
• Banking and treasury income up by 22%
• Investment management income up by 22%
• Trust revenues up by 24%
Henry Simme, group chairman, commented: “The positive results of our strategic 
decision five years ago to focus on private banking are now visible. These excellent 
results represent a further milestone in our plans to grow our private banking 
business and increase its value for shareholders.”
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GROUP CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT
R e s u l t s  and d iv id en d
The g ro u p 's  p r o f i t  b e fo r e  tax  f o r  the  year  ended 31s t  
March 2000 in c rea sed  by  20% to  £2 ,724,000. Earnings p e r  
share  rose  b y  21% to  37. 67p (1999 -  31 .09p) .  The board  
proposes  to  r a i s e  the  f i n a l  d iv id en d  by  0.5p to  17. Op p e r  
share  which, to g e th e r  with  the  in c rea se d  in te r im  d iv id en d  
o f  5. 5p, b r in g s  the  t o t a l  d iv id e n d  f o r  the  year  to  2 2 . 5p 
(1999 -  2 1 . 5p).  The board i s  committed to  a p r o g r e s s i v e  
d iv id e n d  p o l i c y ,  bu t  i s  a l so  aware o f  the  need to  improve 
the  l e v e l  o f  d iv id en d  cover th e reb y  in c r e a s in g  c a p i ta l  
r e t e n t i o n s  to  fund the  p lanned  growth o f  the  b u s i n e s s .
Our b u s in e s s  has made s i g n i f i c a n t  p ro g re ss  dur ing  the  
l a s t  f i n a n c i a l  year .  Operating income grew by 20% with  
good per formances  from a l l  areas o f  a c t i v i t y .
We have con t inued  to  i n v e s t  in  s t a f f ,  sys tems and 
p r e m i s e s . During the  ye a r  our average headcount rose  by  
10%, and our IT inves tm en t  in c rea se d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  In 
t o t a l ,  our expenses a l so  in c re a se d  by  20%.
Balance s h e e t
Tota l  customer d e p o s i t s  were s l i g h t l y  lower than l a s t  
y e a r  as a small  number o f  our la r g e r  c l i e n t s  h e ld  l e s s  
cash a t  the  balance sh e e t  d a te .  However, the  combination  
o f  our h igh  l e v e l  o f  s e r v i c e  and a t t r a c t i v e  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  r e s u l t e d  in  a s te a d y  f lo w  o f  new d e p o s i t  c l i e n t s .  
I  am p l e a s e d  once again to  r e p o r t  th a t  we have no t  had to  
make any p r o v i s io n  t h i s  ye a r  f o r  bad d e b t s  d e s p i t e  the  
growth in  our loan book.
Premises
S ince  September 1999 we have been in  our new o f f i c e s .  We 
have a l s o  expanded and improved our prem ises  in  the  
Bahamas. Through th e se  moves we have s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
upgraded the  q u a l i t y  o f  our o f f i c e  accommodation f o r  the  
b e n e f i t  o f  s t a f f  and c l i e n t s .  Our r e n ta l  c o s t s  have 
in c rea se d  and there  were some s i g n i f i c a n t  no n -recu rr in g  
c o s t s  in  London. However, we b e l i e v e  the improved 
working c o n d i t io n s  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  h ig h er  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .
I n t e r n e t  banking
We are aware o f  the  importance o f  p r o v id in g  our c l i e n t s  
with  improved l e v e l s  o f  s e r v i c e ,  in c lu d in g  e a s i e r  access  
to  t h e i r  accounts  h e ld  with  us. A ccord ing ly ,  we are
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p l a n n in g  to  p r o v id e  our c l i e n t s  with  i n t e r n e t  access  to  a 
wide range o f  our s e r v i c e s  dur ing  the  curren t  f i n a n c i a l  
y e a r .
D irec to rs  and s t a f f
As a r e s u l t  o f  the  c o n t in u in g  growth and development o f  
our b u s i n e s s , we have c rea ted  a group e x e c u t i v e  committee  
t h a t  i s  r e s p o n s ib le  to  the  board f o r  the  d a y - to -d a y  
management and d i r e c t i o n  o f  the  group. We have a l s o  
promoted seven a s s i s t a n t  d i r e c t o r s  to  the  board o f  
Parvin-May L im i te d , which r e f l e c t s  the  s i g n i f i c a n t  
c o n t r ib u t i o n  made by them. During the  ye a r  we were a l s o  
p l e a s e d  to  welcome a new d i r e c t o r  o f  our Guernsey t r u s t  
company.
The e x c e l l e n t  r e s u l t s  we are announcing today have  
r e s u l t e d  from the  e f f o r t s  o f  a l l  our s t a f f  in  London, 
Guernsey and the  Bahamas. D esp i te  many d i s t r a c t i o n s , 
i n c lu d in g  p rem ises  moves, the  y e a r  2000 and a h urr icane  
in  the  Bahamas, our s t a f f  were a b le  to  con t inue  to  
deve lop  our c l i e n t  base and grow our p r o f i t s .  On b e h a l f  
o f  th e  board I  would l i k e  to  thank them a l l  f o r  t h e i r  
v a lu a b le  c o n t r ib u t io n .
Prospec ts
The p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s  o f  our s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n  f i v e  ye a rs  
ago to  fo c u s  on p r i v a t e  banking  are now v i s i b l e .  The 
f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s  i n d u s t r y  has now recogn ised  th a t  ours  
i s  a f a s t  growing market.  However, i t  i s  no t  p o s s i b l e  to  
c r e a te  an in t e g r a t e d  p r i v a t e  banking  b u s in e s s  o ve rn ig h t  
and, w h i l s t  we are sm a l l ,  we have the  advantage o f  hav ing  
a proven  s t r u c t u r e  and c u l tu r e  which w i l l  a l low  us to  
make f u r t h e r  p ro g re ss  in  the  f u t u r e .
I  hope th a t  shareho lders  w i l l  share my p le a s u r e  a t  th e se  
r e s u l t s .  They re p re se n t  a m i l e s to n e  f o r  our p la n s  to  
con t in u e  our growth o f  revenues and p r o f i t a b i l i t y  in  a 
c o n t r o l l e d  and c o n s i s t e n t  manner in  the  y e a r s  ahead.
Henry Simme 
GROUP CHAIRMAN 
10th J u l y  2000
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APPENDIX E
Selection of comments made by delegates attending the first two change 
management programmes (MITCE) run at the FCO in January/February 1996 under 
the discussion heading 'what inhibits development of the FCO?' sub-headings as 
indicated.
The change process
'For us change is not real - we still do the same things in the same way and still get 
told when to do them'
'The main thrust of any shift or change has been based on the power of the 
Ambassador - if he does not want it does not happen'
'We get too much change in the way we are expected to deliver savings adopt new 
processes - we do not get the chance to come through the other side'
Staff
'Performance related pay is the worst possible thing that could have happened to the 
FCO'
W e are told that even exceptional staff cannot be given more than a box 2 (appraisal 
system based upon highest grade at 1 and lowest at 4) because the office cannot 
afford it'
'No one gives a box 4 for poor performance it is easier to give a box 3 and get them 
posted'
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The system penalises managers who try and deal with poor performance - you end 
up having to spend weeks justifying it - so it rarely happens'
•We cannot get rid of anyone who under performs'
'The senior diplomats find ways of giving each other box 1 scores'
Management
'You can only really make a comment if you know the manager well otherwise 
people tend to say very little when they disagree'
'It is the senior staff who need to know what change management is about'
'A new [government] paper comes out and we change the names then spend 2 
years writing about it then change back to what we were doing when the heat is off - 
that is how we manage'
'[Richard] Branson wouldn't take the PUS job but that is what we need - someone 
who can see beyond Whitehall'
'Senior staff will not let managers take on new behaviours'
Skills
'Business units have been set up but we do not know how to charge each other - let 
alone how to run a business'
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'Budgets get set and monitored - we record everything but do not know what to do 
with it'
'We need to acquire new skills but more importantly be allowed to use them' 
Direction
There is a general lack of communication, we do not know what is expected or why' 
W e do not know what they expect'
'Everything is on a need to know basis'
'We seem caught by tradition and image'
This is an organisation were I can think I don't really know whether I know what I've 
been told because I don't know if I am supposed to know'
W e cannot identify success until we have achieved it and someone at the top says 
it's okay so most stay as they are, it's safer*
'Leadership in the FCO is an oxymoron'
Selection of comments made by delegates attending the last two change 
management programmes (MITCE) run at the FCO in November 1998 under 




'We have had loads of change but nothing has changed'
'We are expected to take on change for the sake of change - it is a game to them'
'Change what you want but you will not change us, that’s the message from on high'
'If you want to understand change in the FCO? Look no further than 'Yes Minister* (a 
British TV sitcom based on the Civil Service) Ministers can say what they want and 
we let them - it does not mean anything here is going to change'
W e  are not like organisations outside (the Civil Sen/ice) so we do not play by their 
rules - maybe we should look harder at what they do'
' W e still have to ensure that papers going to the Chief Clerk or PUS are drafted on 
the correct colour paper, it has taken a 2 year debate to decide if that can be 
changed and it has not - so much for change'
'Communication is very traditional - if you send an email, firstly most refuse to use 
any form of technology so it may not get read - if it is read it has to be perfectly 
drafted and authorised by line management so it is no quicker1
Staff
'The selection process for promotion is all done on paper - the choice of posts is 
done on paper so there is very little real involvement with those involved'
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The range of options for managers is limited - your tour is up and you have to bid 
for the few posts that are out there - often as not you do not want it and neither are 
you any good at it but that’s the system'
The system is designed for the dips (diplomats) and fast streamers to do what they 
want'
W e  now operate a competency based appraisal system - the trouble is if someone 
under performs all that happens is that they get sent on a training course. If that 
does not work they are moved and someone else can start again'
Management
'The whole attitude of senior staff is that there is a job to be done get on and do it - 
do not question why or suggest how'
'Senior staff do not encourage managers to be open and flexible so why should 
they?'
'You want to get on in management - build an empire but because we are the FCO 
do it diplomatically'
'Management is about power - power is about position and position is about status. 
At all costs manage in order to protect your status - if you know that you can get on 
really well'




The only skill that is really valued is that of diplomacy - nothing else matters, so 
nothing else is really valued - it shows'
'It is okay to be an engineer or communications expert - they can deal with that, give 
them a hostile foreign government or even better a war they are brilliant - they take 
centre stage. Try out their organisational skills or ask them to deal with people they 
fall apart - actually they don't because they find ways of not dealing these issues 
they ask people to write policy papers'
Direction
'There is a total lack of consultation so why should people just do what they are 
told?'
'You are never too sure where we are going certainly the PUS does not tell us'
'There always appears to be an ulterior motive behind where we say we are going 
and why - its back to the hidden agenda stuff
'We certainly need to understand where we are heading'
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Foresight report nov 99 -  key findings
1. KEY FINDINGS
A PPENDIX F
the world and FCO in 2010
1. The FCO needs to market itself more effectively with other government 
departments
2. The FCO needs deeper expertise across the whole range of issues and 
countries
3. We still need a global network and a separate diplomatic service
4. We need to re-think the way we do objectives
5. Posts should be an integral part of the policy process
6. Geographical departments need to be re-engineered
7. The present division between departments on EU policy is about right
8. A separate study is needed on the worth of EU work done in bilateral posts
personnel
9. Our staff will need much greater flexibility in their careers than the FCO offers 
now
10. We need more flexibility in the retirement age
11. We need a step change in the programme of secondments in and out
12. We need much stronger and well-defined careers anchors
13. We need to identify and manage the skills the FXO needs more actively
14. We need to step up the amount of training and development we offer staff
15. We urgently need a pool of officers with strong resource management skills
16. We should keep the Board system to decide jobs
17. We should reduce the frequency of Boards to three or four a year
18 We should lengthen the lead-time for boarding home postings to a least six 
months
19. We should appoint an ombudsman for staff complaints
20. We should mix administration departments into both King Charles Street and 
OAB
21. Staff should increasingly be making their career choices for themselves
22. We will be under increasing pressure to shrink the size of Personnel Command
23. Personnel Command needs the right IT to manage staff and expertise properly
24. We should introduce 360 degree reporting
25. Support staff pay needs urgent attention
26. Performance pay should be a genuine bonus, de-linked from annual increment
27. Spouse employment will need to be continuously improved at the margin
28. The FCO will need to give long-standing partners the same rights as spouses
working practices & IT
29. The Board should include non-executive directors and two senior 
ambassadors
30. A Board secretary should be appointed to manage its business
31. We should appoint senior officials to lead teams for key issues and crises
32. We should set up teams to meet objectives shared beyond departmental 
boundaries
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33. W e should have a team of ear-marked fire-fighters who could be used in 
a crisis
34. W e urgently need a unified IT system
35. W e need to be connected with the rest of Whitehall
36. Compatible mobile IT -  laptops and palmtops -  should be available
37. A properly resourced FCO intranet would offer vast benefits
38. IT training needs to be stepped up, especially for systems administrators
39. Security has to be seen as an enabler rather than a block
40. Security will be easier and less frustrating when we use industry-standard 
IT
41. A system of flagged e-mails should be the standard form of in-house 
communication
42. We should introduce sensitivity markings below restricted
43. W e need to move to fully electronic files
44. The FCO will need to offer much more in the way of flexible working for 
its staff
45. We need an FCO 'Yellow Pages’ on the intranet giving details of all staff 
expertise
46. We should publish an in-hour foreign affairs publication
47. W e will need much more open relations with stake-holders outside 
government
48. We should be encouraging officials to publish
49. W e need better facilities for visitors and modem conference facility
customer focus
50. The public service departments need to be adequately funded and 
staffed
51. Heads of post should be visiting their consular and visa sections regularly
52. All new entrants should get experience of doing consular, visa & 
management work
53. All staff and contract staff dealing with the public should be trained in 
customer care
54. W e should accept credit card payments for visa, commercial and 
consular services
55. We should have a comprehensive digital strategy for exploiting new 
technologies
56. We should look to develop call centres -  for consular services and more 
widely
57. Our staff need real-time access to media and media monitoring services
58. We should give the Home Office responsibility for staffing ECO slots 
overseas
internal communication
59. Senior managers should spend much more time talking to staff
60. All posts and departments should spend time discussing key FCO issues
61. An internal communication unit should be established
62. W e need to monitor how much internal communication staff have taken in
63. W e should adopt an internal communication contract
64. Board members should take forward their individual Foresight areas
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APPENDIX G
List of Values and Supporting Behaviours with positive and negative indicators taken 
from Sir Richard Wilson's Report to the Prime Minister on Civil Service reform - 
'Setting the Agenda for the Civil Service of the Future'.
1. Act with integrity, propriety, and politicai impartiality, and select on merit
When we do this well, we...
•  assist the current Administration whatever its political complexion
•  respect the common standards and principles that bind us together 
as public servants
•  comply with the law and uphold the administration of justice
•  base our advice on objective analysis of the evidence
•  use public money properly, effectively and efficiently
•  use merit as the only measure for selection of applicants
•  uphold the Civil Service Code 
When we do this badly, we...
•  misuse our official position or information acquired through it
•  are negligent in spending public money
•  allow our personal views to cloud our judgement
•  frustrate the effective implementation of decisions by the 
Administration on policies and services
•  betray the principles of public service
2. Put the public’s interests first
When we do this well, we...
•  know who our customers are and what their needs are
•  put ourselves in their shoes
•  give customers the quality of service that we would expect 
ourselves
•  are courteous and helpful even when under pressure
•  involve citizens in government, actively gathering their views as we 
develop policy and deliver services
•  mediate when there are conflicting interests and find a way forward 
When we do this badly, we...
•  don’t respond to what the public want from us
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•  focus on policy and procedure and the ‘way things have always 
been done’ rather than reaching an outcome that both we and the 
public will regard as success
•  develop and deliver policy and services without listening to the 
public
•  are rude, obstructive or unhelpful
•  fail to publicise and live up to clear standards of service
3. Achieve results of high quality and good value
When we do this well, we...
•  define a successful outcome and plan how we might achieve it
•  take decisive action
•  aim to achieve the best possible results
•  think creatively
•  anticipate problems and show drive and determination to 
overcome obstacles
•  review performance and make improvements where possible
•  celebrate success 
When we do this badly, we...
•  act before thinking things through
•  lack focus and direction
•  deliver poor, second-best results
•  fail to deliver work on time or within budget
•  rest on our laurels
•  give up when the going gets tough
•  don’t encourage feedback or monitor performance
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4. Show leadership and take personal responsibility
When we do this well, we...
•  lead by example
•  understand and communicate the bigger picture and our role within 
it
•  work within our teams to generate enthusiasm, commitment and 
respect
•  show drive and determination
•  are prepared to challenge and to be challenged
•  take action to improve things
•  manage our time and organise our work effectively
•  manage risk and accept responsibility
•  look to the future 
When we do this badly, we...
•  focus on the short-term
•  are blinkered and driven by our own priorities
•  emphasise problems rather than look for solutions
•  look for others to blame
•  don’t practise what we preach
5. Value the people we work with and their diversity
When we do this well, we...
•  use people’s talents and encourage them to develop their potential
•  respect and support those around us
•  involve others in our work
•  give and encourage feedback
•  listen to others’ views and give credit where due
•  trust others to do a good job
•  encourage a healthy balance between work and home life
•  understand and work with the different approaches different people 
may take
•  actively promote equality of opportunity 
When we do this badly, we...
•  are unaware of or insensitive to the needs and feelings of others
•  try to run the show ourselves
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•  demand rather than earn respect
•  fail to make best use of people’s talents and potential
•  talk rather than listen
•  view difference, change and challenge as a threat
6. Innovate and learn
When we do this well, we...
•  see learning as part of life for everyone
• understand our own strengths and areas to develop
•  develop our own skills throughout our careers
•  are open to new ways of working and new ideas from whatever
source
•  look for and champion better ways of doing things
• take managed risks
• review performance, gather feedback, and learn lessons from 
mistakes and successes
•  measure ourselves against the best
•  share learning with others
•  use information and communications technology to improve the 
way we work
When we do this badly, we...
•  are closed to new possibilities and opportunities and shut down 
new ideas
•  stay stuck in a rut and stick with what we know -  ‘W e’ve always 
done it this way’
•  don’t recognise our own developmental needs
•  don’t value learning
•  see training and development as something that is done to us
•  move from task to task without review and so don’t benefit from 
experience
•  blame people for mistakes rather than learning lessons
7. Work in partnership
When we do this well, we...
•  understand how everybody contributes to the shared goal
•  share objectives
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•  work co-operatively with others to achieve the best possible 
outcome
•  build and support networks
•  use influencing and persuading skills to achieve objectives
•  mediate conflicts to get to a win-win situation
•  gain knowledge and experience of the world around us
•  share good practice and solutions 
When we do this badly, we...
•  ignore others’ interests
•  fail to win respect and to be heard
•  feather our own nest at the expense of others
•  compromise to the lowest common denominator
•  listen to the loudest rather than the truest voice
•  keep information to ourselves
8. Be professional in all we do
When we do this well, we...
•  implement policy and take decisions to reflect Ministers wishes
•  get best value for money
•  do the best possible job we can
• are honest, fair and impartial
•  understand the wider impact of our decisions
•  take time to think about our work and how we do it
•  evaluate the effectiveness of our work
•  measure ourselves against the best 
When we do this badly, we...
•  accept mediocre performance from ourselves and others
•  base our decisions and advice on assumptions
•  tell others what we think they want to hear
•  ignore the bigger picture
•  don’t look to improve on the way we do things
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9. Be open and communicate well
When we do this well, we...
•  give people promptly and helpfully the information they are entitled 
to
•  help people to understand government policies
•  explain things clearly in plain English
•  listen as well as talk
•  are approachable and helpful
•  show courtesy, sensitivity and tact
•  persuade and influence others rather than telling them
•  think about our audience
•  think about the best way to get our message across, including 
making best use of information and communication technology
When we do this badly, we...
•  keep information to ourselves without good reason
•  use ways of communicating we are comfortable with rather than 
what would be best
•  fail to grasp what others are trying to say
•  are seen as rude, frosty, tactless, or aloof
•  write or speak in more complicated language than is needed 
are economical with the truth
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